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Preface
In 1994, the former socialist part of Germany, the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR), was probably one of the most fascinating places for an anthropologist to 
conduct research. Five years earlier, the Fall of the Berlin Wall had initiated the 
collapse of the socialist regime in Eastern Germany and the start of German reuni-
cation. Although heartily welcomed, this prompted the complete breakdown of 
East German society and the fast disintegration of all existing material, social, and 
conceptual standards. e ensuing turmoil could be seen, heard, and felt through-
out the country. e general atmosphere was tense, and conversations on the 
most mundane topics could suddenly derail – ostensibly for no reason. Whereas 
anthropologists have generally come to accept that a society’s social and cultural 
structures are not xed but rather constructed, it was a shock to witness the panic 
and pain this confrontation caused in everyday life. People were frantically search-
ing for new safeguards.
Since then much has changed – not just the material, social, and psychological 
make-up of the former socialist society, but also the way it is remembered.  Initially, 
the painful breakdown of everything trusted and secure caused people to experi-
ence any criticism of their history as extraordinarily hurtful, but as time passed, 
people’s memories on the GDR have grown more dierentiated. In 1994, longing 
and nostalgia for the past, anger and denial with regard to criticizing it were com-
mon reactions to the complete reshuing and widespread critique of former East 
Germans’ existence. Barely twenty year later, these responses have made way for a 
more nuanced and critical perspective on the GDR. is shi is clearly illustrated 
in cinematic form by two lms about the GDR that received wide acclaim also 
outside Germany: Goodbye Lenin (2003) and Das Leben der Anderen (e Lives 
of Others, 2007).1 Although not denying or ignoring the dictatorial aspects of the 
GDR, the former lm excels in its endearing, somewhat nostalgic depiction of 
the socialist past, whereas the latter conveys a far darker mood. Goodbye Lenin’s 
main message is roughly: “life under socialism may have been cramped, and we 
may not have had much, but what we had was comfy and cozy,” while e Lives of 
1 Since both lms have been made by West Germans, they do not represent East Germans’ shiing valu-
ations of their past. ey are used here merely to illustrate, primarily for non-Germans, the two extremes 
of how the GDR is and has been recollected. 
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Others reveals the almost unperceivable corruption of human relationships under 
socialist dictatorship. From humoristic-nostalgic and tenderly ironic, to gloomy 
and (self)critical: the two lms represent the sequence of collective memories of 
the GDR in a nutshell.
Based on historical ethnographic material, this book presents a theoretical 
analysis of a society adri. It describes the situation I encountered in 1993 and 
1994, but its scope is much wider than a historical record of that time. It provides 
an analysis of how people react when the prevailing social and cultural order can 
no longer provide stability or meaning to their lives, and the apparent normality 
of how life is supposed to be lived is exposed as articial.
 Focusing on people’s reactions then, while glossing over the (public) recollec-
tions of the former socialist era circulating over the past two decades, my repre-
sentation might seem to conrm the typical image of inhabitants of socialist coun-
tries as Western Europe’s straggling ‘other.’ Such an interpretation would disregard 
the real and more general theme of this work. Apart from the specic topics it 
addresses (consumption, its role in German history, the relationship between East 
and West Germany before and aer 1989, and in the GDR between the people and 
the state), this book explores how people respond to being confronted with the 
make-believe of their society’s main ideological underpinnings. It shows how they 
try to restore condence in the symbolic order as a meaningful, discursive frame-
work that will support social structure and allow for mutual recognition. 
Writing this book would not have been possible without the generous support of 
a number of people and institutions. First of all, I am grateful to the Amsterdam 
School for Social Science Research who funded the research on which this work 
is based, and to the Netherlands Organization for Scientic Research (NWO) for 
funding the nalization of the manuscript. 
My time in Rudolstadt was one of the most inspiring experiences of my life. 
It was overwhelming to be so closely involved with people whose lives had been 
thrown into such turmoil by their history. I am very grateful to many people there, 
especially Stefan Breternitz, Hartmut Franz, Petra Rottschalk, Katrin Stapf, Heiner 
and Iris Tschoepke, Mr and Mrs Weißensee, and the late Jo Winter, for their sin-
cerity and friendship.
Beyond Rudolstadt, I would like to thank my colleagues in the international 
EUWOL (European Ways of Life in the American Century) network, for the 
hearty and pleasurable atmosphere in which we worked together. I am particu-
larly indebted to Ruth Oldenziel and Johan Schot for their personal support and 
advice during dicult times. My very sincere thanks also go to those who gener-
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ously gave me their valuable comments on sections of this book, or whose involve-
ment supported my project in other ways. In alphabetical order they are: Mireille 
Berman, Anne Gevers, Rob van Ginkel, Suzanne Kuik, Birgit Meyer, Mattijs van 
de Port, Irene Stengs, Alex Strating, Bonno oden van Velzen, and Jojada Verrips 
as well as my parents and my sister Clara. Val Kidd deserves a special mention for 
her invaluable and speedy editing and translating during our particularly enjoy-
able and productive collaboration.
My deepest and heartfelt thanks, however, go to Leonard van Es, with whom 
I was fortunate to share many happy years. His love and support have had a pro-
found and lasting inuence on me and my life. I dedicate this book to his beloved 
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Das Desiderium, die einzig ehrliche Eigenscha aller Menschen, ist unerforscht. Das 
Noch-Nicht-Bewußte, Noch-Nicht-Gewordene, obwohl es den Sinn aller Menschen und 
den Horizont alles Seins erfüllt, ist nicht einmal als Wort, geschweige als Begri durch-
gedrungen [Desire, man’s only truthful capacity, has not been investigated. e not-yet-
conscious, not-yet-realized, though it is man’s only purpose and the horizon of all being, 
has not yet permeated as word, let alone as concept] (Ernst Bloch,1959).1
Western Prosperity as Consolation
In the late summer and autumn of 1989, television news broadcasts all over the 
world were dominated for weeks by the same images. ey showed large groups of 
East Germans crossing the Berlin Wall and the border to West Germany. e im-
ages have become iconic, representing the fall of communism and the democratic 
will of the people. As the pictures also showed East Germans’ excitement at nally 
being able to enter West Germany’s consumer paradise, the events are also carved 
in people’s collective memory as iconic symbols of the worldwide triumph of capi-
talism and consumerism. To the dismay of critical reporters, many East Germans 
seemed to leave their country primarily to discover the unparalleled consumption 
potential on the other side of the Wall, and to a lesser extent because of the politi-
cal liberties there.2 
East Germans’ expectations of the abundance of western consumer goods were 
obviously high. But what exactly had they expected to nd on the other side of the 
Wall? What did they see when they looked at the western world? Why did they 
shed tears of joy when for the rst time in their lives, they stepped inside West 
German shops? And why were they prepared to spend more than 10 percent of 
their average monthly wage for a pineapple and even more for a simple western 
portable radio? ese questions aroused my curiosity and were the starting point 
for the investigations that formed the basis of this book. In this introduction I will 
unravel why these questions are still relevant today, arguing that this book’s focus 
on consumption in East Germany not only sheds light on a decisive development 
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in recent European history (socialist Europe’s breakdown and subsequent capital-
ist transformation), it oers a prism through which such wide-ranging topics as 
the role of consumption in the Cold War, the relationship between citizens and a 
dictatorial state, the role of fantasy in social life, and material culture as a suitable 
ingress to people’s hidden, unspoken interests and experiences can be viewed. 
My proposition that the seemingly trivial issue of East Germans’ desires for the 
western consumer world sheds light on such a wide-ranging combination of top-
ics is grounded in two considerations, which will briey be referred to here, and 
elaborated in more detail in the following chapters. 
e rst consideration is historical: aer the Second World War, the Cold War 
between the two superpowers was mainly being fought out on the territory of 
divided Germany, with the Federal Republic of Germany (henceforth FRG) rep-
resenting the United States’ claims, and the German Democratic Republic (hence-
forth GDR) representing the Soviet Union’s claims to European hegemony. In this 
struggle, consumption was the main stake and weapon. e United States and the 
Soviet Union tried to outdo each other in terms of material culture, technology 
and consumption, and they primarily did so in their respective showcases: West 
and East Germany. 
Next to its central role in global power politics, consumption was an extraor-
dinarily signicant issue for the inhabitants of Germany aer the Second World 
War. Struggling for food and clearing the ruins was not just an absolute necessity 
in a country attened by bombs, reconstructing the material world and striving 
to improve the material situation were also extremely eective ways to psycho-
logically process other subjects. Because material well-being and consumption 
were so important for the inhabitants of both Germanys, the leadership of the two 
German states tried to gain their populations’ support by holding out far-reaching 
materialist promises on the glorious future that was to be built up – under capital-
ist and socialist conditions, respectively. Both German states thus tried to estab-
lish legitimacy by tapping into their citizens’ (partly unspoken) needs and aims, 
promising ultimate harmony and well-being in the wake of material resurrection 
and renewal. 
e main argument unraveled in this book is that the far-fetched socialist and 
capitalist promises of consumption as the road to ultimate well-being, the partial 
realization and partial corruption thereof, the implicit social and psychological 
interests underlying the politicized promises in both countries, and the interweav-
ing of state promises and citizens’ needs formed the breeding ground for the devel-
opment of materialist, cargo-cult-like fantasies in the GDR, in which the bright-
Figure 1 – Rudolstadt, 1994, main shopping street
Source: Picture by the author.
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looking world of the west came to be seen as the place of “fulllment and ultimate 
arrival.”3
In order to gain more insight into the expectations so many East Germans had 
cherished of the west’s consumer society, I spent part of 1993 and the whole of 
1994 in Rudolstadt, an East German town of about twenty-ve thousand inhabit-
ants in uringia, where I spoke to people and witnessed the rapidly changing 
course of events. I saw the damage that had been caused by 45 years of communist 
rule and the resulting material deterioration and gloom. I also saw the disastrous way 
western money had been used to buy up and stash away all the GDR’s cracks and rust 
under a thick layer of plaster and paint. 
People told me about their lives in the GDR, what it had been like to live in a 
socialist society, how they had imagined life to be on the other side of the Berlin Wall, 
and what they saw (and felt) when meeting residents of the other Germany. ey 
talked about their earlier expectations and dreams, as far as they could still recollect 
them, now that they had long been eclipsed by capitalist reality. eir stories made it 
clear that many East Germans had bestowed almost magical powers on the material 
western world: as if life surrounded by such prosperity would simply be perfect, and 
as if all the shortcomings in their existence would vanish into thin air amid those 
things. 
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In the west everything was beautiful and wonderful. People seemed to have 
no worries, and only there was it possible to be really happy. Everything 
always looked better and more beautiful than here. It all looked so won-
derful! We really thought it was paradise, a Schlaraenland pur [e Land 
of Cockaigne in its purest form],
a middle-aged man sighed during an interview. His story is one chosen randomly 
from the numerous anecdotes and examples which might illustrate how many East 
Germans had been thinking that the auence of the west could somehow make 
them blissfully happy. e far-reaching powers attributed to the world on the other 
side of the Wall were poignantly described in a speech delivered by East German 
author and psychologist Helga Schubert, about her childhood and life in the GDR.4 
Born in 1941, Schubert had never known her father, who had been killed in the 
war. When the war was over, her grandfather was arrested by the Russians on suspi-
cion of having been a member of the SS. By the time the accusation was proven un-
founded, her grandfather had already died of his wounds. Schubert talked about the 
GDR, “die gehaßte, aber vertraute Vergangenheit [the hated, but familiar past],” and 
about the guilt she felt towards her son. Aer all, she was responsible for the fact that 
he had to grow up in that country. As if to make up for that, she told the audience, 
she had washed him as oen as she could with West German soap. “Because even if 
he could not be a West German, I could at least make him smell like one.” She went 
on to describe the time aer the Wende, talking about West Germans, “die wirklichen 
Deutschen: die, die immer schon da waren [the real Germans; those, who had always 
been there].” She talked about a day, long aer 1990, when she realized, while sitting 
in the train, that she still thought it a shame to spend DeutschMarken (DM, former 
West German currency), “das schöne Westgeld [that beautiful western money],” on a 
cup of coee. 
Schubert’s story is short but revealing. It clearly shows that the mere scent of 
the material attributes of the west oered her a form of reconciliation or relief from 
the aws in her own existence. Referring to the residents of the FRG as the peo-
ple who had been able to develop and become real Germans, thanks to their hard 
currency and prosperous standard of living, and in contrast to their poorer East 
German neighbors, she suggests that the western material prosperity seemed able to 
somehow repair East Germans’ awed self-image. Schubert’s story very poignantly 
sketches the outlines of the collective fantasy that I am attempting to unravel and 
understand in this study. 
Considering the high expectations the material attributes in the west had 
aroused, it is hardly surprising that their arrival led to deep disappointment. e 
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things from the west looked so lovely, so everyone said, but now that they had 
them, life had not improved. Quite the contrary: everyone only wanted to have 
more and more, and in the new Germany everything just revolved around mate-
rial possessions. In addition – so my interlocutors told me – the presence of all 
those consumer goods seemed to have had an extraordinarily negative eect on 
people and social life: the irresistible lure of consumer goods had made people 
selsh and egoistic, and because of their belongings, some imagined themselves 
to be more important and better than others. Nothing less than people’s human-
ity seemed to disappear behind the pretty façade of these goods. Many suggested 
that, looking back, the socialist past had not been so bad aer all, “es war nicht alles 
schlecht damals [not everything was bad back then].” 
Such were the stories that circulated in the former GDR in the year 1994. 
Investigating the experiential context of these stories, this book tries to unearth 
why the expectations about western consumer goods had been so high. Why was 
western prosperity considered capable of repairing the defects in East Germans’ 
existence, and how is it possible that the gments of imagination about the west-
ern world were shared by so many people? What role did the specic (political) 
context play in the development of East Germans’ desires? And were people’s rela-
tively warm recollections of their past lives in the GDR the exclusive result of the 
disappointment the Wende had brought about? Or were they exposing something 
else – something about my western perspective on life in socialist societies that fell 
short and had to be revised?
e fact that material acquisition had become such a signicant element in 
East Germans’ collective self-image, as well as in their image of West Germans, is 
the direct result of two related historical developments that were briey touched 
upon above: the pivotal role of consumption in the Cold War between the socialist 
east and the capitalist west, and the importance of consumption for the establish-
ment of a new (self-)condence amongst the citizens in both Germanys aer 1945. 
is book shows that the combination of these factors played a decisive role in the 
development of a distinctively materialistic outlook on life, shared by many East 
(and West) Germans. 
One of the reasons why the East German case is relevant for anthropological 
debate in general is that within this specic historical context, it highlights one of the 
classical themes of anthropological research, that is: the study of material culture 
and consumption. Because consumption is this book’s central theme, I want to 
briey discuss some of the most relevant theoretical contributions in this eld of 
anthropological study of the last two decades.
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Consumption, Identity, and Fantasy
Early anthropological theories on material culture were initially developed to 
understand human-object relations in non-western societies. us, the material 
goods surrounding the inhabitants of these societies were studied as a reection 
of their world view, cosmology or social structure. Another social-scientic tradi-
tion of investigating human-object relations focused primarily on the inhabitants 
of western, capitalist societies: following Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism, 
the materialist desires and the urge to accumulate possessions, so characteristic 
for modern, capitalist societies, have long been studied as a typical expression of 
the alienation to which the inhabitants of capitalist societies had collectively fallen 
victim. Assuming that if people were alienated from their productive capacities 
and the fruits of their labor, they would no longer be able to recognize the value 
of goods as products of human labor, the mere fact that the objects nevertheless 
appeared to have value (their price tag) would wrongly be regarded as inherent in 
the goods themselves. is is what Marx referred to as “the mystical character of 
commodities.”5 When goods, valuable in themselves, tempt people to buy them, 
this is due to the suggestion that their possession would add value to the pos-
sessor’s alienated existence (so Marxist thinking goes). Striving for possessions to 
express status was thus considered by the theorists of the Frankfurt School to be 
“an inadequate compensation for the denial of a more meaningful life … tolerated 
in the absence of alternatives.”6
ese two perspectives on human-object relations have set the anthropologi-
cal research agenda for an amazingly long time, and when anthropologists be-
gan to study material culture in western societies around 1970, their research was 
roughly conducted along one of the lines mentioned above. is meant that the 
place and signicance of the goods with which the inhabitants of western con-
sumer societies surrounded themselves were explained in a manner normally ap-
plied to non-western (so-called primitive) societies (as the reection of underly-
ing social, mental and/or moral patterns and structures within society).7 Or, when 
studying the fact that since the Second World War, consumption had become an 
important means of forming and expressing their identity for most inhabitants of 
the western world, this was not considered a topic for serious research. As an at-
tendee at a conference organized by the University of Leiden remarked when she 
heard about my proposed research: “at is just about jeans and Coca Cola...those 
things don’t have any real meaning, do they?,” aer which she went on to present 
her interpretation of batik patterns in relation to the social structure of Indonesian 
society. 
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Whereas the (neo)structuralist school tended to ignore the distinctive features 
of modern consumer societies, the (neo)Marxist school considered them to be 
merely the direct result of the alienating basis of capitalist societies, without mak-
ing any attempt to connect to the everyday life and experiences of real-life people. 
is situation changed in 1987 with the publication of two books: anthropolo-
gist Daniel Miller’s Material Culture and Mass Consumption and sociologist Colin 
Campbell’s e Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Consumerism.8
Although very dierent, these two books have in common that both authors 
attempt to deal with the subject of consumerism from a less biased perspective 
than was the case within the Marxist-inspired framework. Miller proposed an all-
encompassing theory about the role of material culture and mass consumption in 
modern societies, while Campbell concentrated on the issue of why the inhabit-
ants of contemporary (western) societies show such an innite desire to continu-
ally have new possessions. Although both books were published more than twenty 
years ago, they have denitely reset the social-scientic research agenda on con-
sumption and are therefore still the most frequently quoted works in theoretical 
discussions on consumption. For that reason, and because they have had a decisive 
inuence on my thoughts on the subject, I present a brief outline of both works. 
In his book, Miller endeavors to nd a theoretically sound answer to the ques-
tion of why consumption plays such a signicant role in people’s identity-forma-
tions nowadays. Unlike the (neo) structuralist theorists before him, Miller strives 
to conceptualize identity in a more dynamic way. Although he nds his inspiration 
in Marx’s (Hegelian) perspective on self-realization as a continual process of ob-
jectication and alienation, he takes the Marxist premise that people are doomed 
to alienation when they are deprived of controlling their own labor to be anachro-
nistic. People do not know any better than that labor is for sale – so Miller argues. 
And the same critique applies to Marxist ideas, which state that alienation clearly 
manifests itself in the relationship between people and goods. As mentioned 
above, when people no longer recognize goods as the product of human labor, 
they tend to see the value these goods appear to have as inherent in those goods. 
People then buy them to obtain that quality in order to neutralize their alienation. 
According to Miller, however, this line of reasoning is outdated. People simply 
know no other goods than those that ood the market throughout the world, and 
whose producers are completely anonymous. at is the context in which they live 
and build their lives. In Miller’s view, alienation is an important factor of present-
day existence, but it is not so much the result of the disturbed relationship between 
man and his productive capability as of modernity’s freedom, making people fully 
responsible for their own existence. 
18 Material Fantasies
e knowledge that the conditions and criteria by which we live our lives are 
“our own creation, rather than merely given by some external force, is a deeply 
unsettling one.” And although Miller certainly recognizes its positive sides, the 
negative side is that of a world which oen presents itself as characterized by “alien 
abstraction.” is also applies to the goods that ll our shops. No longer made by 
ourselves or by someone we know and with whom we have personally been in 
contact, the objects we buy are strange to us. “[A]t the moment of purchase…the 
object is merely the property of capital or of the state from which we receive it.”9 
In Miller’s view, however, this potentially alienating experience is merely a 
temporary phase. According to him, people convert alienating freedom into a 
self-arming and self-construing act through consumption. Consumption is the 
arena where people appropriate the outside world of endless possibilities and, by 
way of the choices they thus make, contribute to their own process of self-devel-
opment and realization. 
e individual act of consumption, re-appropriating alien products and invest-
ing them with personal value is a deeply social phenomenon according to Miller, 
which “cannot be reduced to mere social distinction.” Apart from the fact that 
choosing products from the supermarket shelves is one of the concrete ways in 
which people substantiate their (family and social) relationships, there is also a 
more theoretical reason why Miller regards consumption as a deeply social phe-
nomenon. is is due to the fact that people primarily come to know the world 
as an object world – it is by way of its material surroundings that they learn about 
their society’s “cognitive order, ideas of morality, ideal worlds and other abstrac-
tions and principles.”10 ey understand femininity, for instance, by looking at 
its material manifestations. By subsequently appropriating aspects of the outside 
world (through buying, consuming), they (re)create not just their own, individ-
ual identity, they also work upon the world, thus changing it. When, for instance, 
someone buys a typically feminine item and rearranges it in a typically male way, 
this person slightly changes existing notions, manifestations, and meanings of 
femininity. Appropriation is thus a creative act, through which one constitutes 
oneself and re-creates the world, according to Miller.
ere are two reasons why Miller’s book has earned such an iconic status in the 
social science literature regarding consumption. In the rst place, he developed a 
theory in which he seriously engaged with the empirical fact that for many people, 
consumption is a way of establishing or expressing their identity. Furthermore, he 
sought to create a dynamic perspective on the relationship between commodities 
and people’s identity – a relationship that, before then, had always been considered 
in more or less essentialist terms. 
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Notwithstanding the theoretical importance of these insights, some critical 
notes must be made concerning his argumentation. Miller could not of course be 
expected to have anticipated the anthropological discussions on the concept of 
identity that have evolved over the past two decades, but it is remarkable that he 
does not confront his view on identity as a dynamic and continually changing phe-
nomenon with the empirical observation that people usually refer to their identity 
(collective or individual) as if it were a solid, unchanging entity. Merely dismissing 
these statements as a wrongful attempt to freeze a never-ending developmental 
process is hardly satisfying. e intensity and frequency with which people tend 
to defend their identity, even trying to endow it with an aura of eternity, suggest 
that what Miller describes as alienation might be more than a temporary phase in 
a relatively smooth developmental process. 
Just how traumatic the confrontation can be with the instability of identity as 
a construct was something I became very aware of during my stay in the former 
GDR. e collapse of all referents and ingredients of the earlier East German ex-
istence had produced an overall sense of desperation that was almost tangible. 
And although I fully agree with Miller that identity is a process, anthropological 
theories on this subject should take seriously and incorporate the empirical recog-
nition that people oen do their utmost best to deny its ever-changing character. 
Inspired by the anthropological discussions about the ways people try to make real 
their collective identities, I investigate the role of material objects and materiality 
in this process, more particularly the way in which the western material world had 
oered East Germans the concrete means to support their fantasies about a true 
identity and solid society.11
Colin Campbell’s book on e Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern 
Consumerism has been extremely inspiring and helpful in developing this argu-
ment. Although he does not work with the concept of fantasy, his book features 
a similar theme, namely the unbridgeable gap between the reality of everyday life 
and people’s romantic desire to improve reality. e main premise in Campbell’s 
work is that people’s desire for consumer goods is not just about goods; it is a 
much more diuse, relatively unfocused, romantic longing to improve, enrich, 
and change reality. According to Campbell, this Romantic ethic, which came to 
the fore in 18th- and 19th-century Romanticism, is actually an important byprod-
uct of western enlightenment. Although most people may be inclined to think of 
Romanticism and enlightenment as opposite developments – the one driven by 
idealism and dreaminess, the other by rational deliberations and the drive towards 
ever more knowledge and clarity – both developments spring from the same root, 
according to Campbell. Both are the product of the same longing for betterment.12 
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It is this longing, this urge, this desire, that has remained an important driving 
force in our everyday lives – so Campbell’s main argument goes. 
Because reality is never as perfect as people’s romantic imagination would like 
it to be, people desire to close the gap between the two. e “permanent desiring 
mode” that thus arises13 manifests itself in daydreams, in which people succumb to 
their desires: “improved versions of the reality they know...improved in imagina-
tion to the point of near-perfection.”14 Compared to these daydreams, everyday life 
is a dissatisfying experience. e gap between the two results in “a general desire 
to experience in reality the more nearly perfect experiences already enjoyed in 
imagination.”15 Seeking a way to experience the reality they have lived out in their 
daydreams, the desire then attaches itself to concrete objects that are in some way 
related to the daydream (but do not necessarily feature in it). When, for instance, 
I am daydreaming about a calm and quiet life in a cottage with a rose garden, a 
roseate bedspread may come to visualize this daydream. e bedspread becomes 
almost irresistible, so I purchase the desired object. However, as the desire that 
underpinned my purchase was many times greater and more diuse than the sat-
isfaction which the bedspread can possibly provide, its possession never lives up to 
my expectations. “[T]he gap between the real and the imagined can never actually 
be closed.”16 is gap is consequently the source of new materialist desires, but the 
“consummation of desire” is always and inevitably a disillusioning experience.17 
Campbell’s hypothesis that the purchase of things is somehow related to the un-
achievable desire to bridge the gulf between imagination and reality is particularly 
relevant when trying to understand the situation in the former GDR. As Helga 
Schubert’s anecdote about western soap suggests, for many in the GDR, western 
consumer goods somehow underpinned far-reaching fantasies of an existence in 
perfection. How these fantasies came about, what elements in East German his-
tory and everyday life were responsible for their development, and why exactly 
western consumer goods seemed able to close the gap between East German real-
ity and its imagined perfection are questions covered in this book.
ere is, however, one element of Campbell’s analysis I do not agree with, and 
that is his premise that it is only a coincidence that people use material objects to 
bridge the gap between reality and imagination. Campbell states that “products are 
desired less because of their character as material objects than because consumers 
anticipate their possession will bring pleasurable experiences.”18 
I wonder whether there really is such a clear-cut distinction between the ex-
pected, enjoyable experiences of goods and their material nature. Schubert’s story 
of how the fragrance of soap had seemed able to reconcile her own and her son’s 
life for an instant is not unique. Many East Germans’ anecdotes about western 
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goods center on the looks, smells, tastes and textures of things, suggesting that 
these sensory characteristics were at the heart of their allure. I have taken these 
stories as my starting point to investigate the possible link between the irresist-
ible power of material objects and their materiality and sensory characteristics. 
Inspired by the works of social scientists who have shown that the senses play a far 
more important role in social life than was recognized until recently, I argue that it 
is the very materiality of objects that makes commodities so prominent in people’s 
elusive search for a stable identity. 
As will be discussed in the following chapters, another signicant reason why 
material goods were so meaningful in East German identity fantasies is related 
to the distinctly materialistic politics of identication fostered by the East German 
state.19 Material objects and the striving for material betterment are frequently used 
to alleviate social tensions and traumas. In order to achieve hegemony, the GDR (just 
like the FRG) presented explicitly materialist promises, thus fostering the idea that 
material solutions were an apt way to deal with all sorts of problems. 
By focusing on materiality, I hope to open another archive that will enable us 
to grasp the complexities and ambiguities of life in the socialist East and Central 
European states. Historians and sociologists are engaged in lively debates as to how 
the inuence of the East German state on people’s everyday lives ought to be concep-
tualized. Too oen, however, they argue in terms of suppression, dictatorship and 
totalitarianism, terms that cast the inhabitants of these states in the role of either 
perpetrator or victim. My ethnography aims to show that East German reality was 
far more complex. To make that point, a brief presentation of the main outlines of 
this debate is required.
Life in Dictatorial Societies
Western (social scientic) thinking on the GDR has long been dominated by two 
opposing perspectives, both strongly politically and ideologically tinted. Put very 
briey: one is generally positive and the other generally negative. During the last 
two decades, this bipolar stance has given rise to extensive debate and discussion, 
with the result that a third perspective has developed [which I approve of myself] 
that attempts to reconcile the two.
In the rst perspective, endorsed not so much by scientists but primarily by 
le-wing, western politicians and intellectuals, the GDR was regarded as a well-in-
tended (albeit partly failed) experiment.20 With this view, the moral high-ground 
intentions of socialism were reiterated, with special attention to what historian 
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Konrad Jarausch has called “the legend of the good beginning” – the socialist 
state’s attempt to build up something new and noble from the debris of Nazism.21 
In this line of interpretation, people primarily focused on the more positive attri-
butes of the East German state: the punishment of national socialist war criminals, 
collective ownership of the modes and means of production, the attempts (partly 
successful) to create equal opportunities for all, and the emancipation of less for-
tunate and/or subordinate groups. 
Apart from the obvious critiques on this approach’s contents and its selective 
reading of history, the positive reading of socialism also confronts one with a 
conceptual problem. An exclusive focus on socialism’s good intentions leaves one 
with the question of which factors were responsible for the ultimate failure of the 
German socialist experiment. When did things start to go wrong, and what factors 
were responsible for that? Was not the fact that they went wrong inherent in the 
state’s totalitarian claims?
is latter problem does not pertain to the more common perspective on the 
GDR, which highlights the negative aspects of life under a socialist dictatorship. 
Many people – laymen and academics alike – tend to regard the GDR as a com-
pletely illegitimate, dictatorially ruled state, based on violence and oppression, 
which can best be studied in terms of the state’s totalitarian and totalizing claims 
and aims. Analyses of this school tend to point to the restricted and undemocratic 
nature of socialist societies and to the authoritative and repressing characteristics 
of the socialist states in East and Central Europe. e societies created there were 
regarded as entirely politicized, with hardly any space for a normal private life, and 
their citizens, in as much as they were not collaborators, had to be considered as 
victims. 
A major advantage of this approach was that it was centered around one of the 
most signicant aspects of Eastern and Central European socialist societies: the 
unequal distribution of power and its consequences for the political culture and 
(in)exibility of their economies. e focus on the repressive and authoritarian 
aspect of the socialist states also helped to explain their lengthy stability. In spite of 
these positive aspects, this so-called totalitarianism perspective is now generally 
dismissed for being too short-sighted and limited. 
e principal objection to a nearly exclusive emphasis on the repressive aspect 
of socialist state power is that it ignores the conicts, resistance, cultural contra-
dictions, forms of protest and would-be collaboration that all existed within so-
cialist societies. Furthermore, and along the same lines, if one only focuses on 
the totalitarian aspect of socialist states, it is dicult to understand the strange 
paradox of their lengthy stability and sudden collapse.22 A second objection to the 
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totalitarianism paradigm is the stereotypical representation of life in Eastern and 
Central European countries referred to above, unjustly suggesting that daily life in 
those countries was entirely tainted by the political aims of their regime. Such a 
perspective fails “to recognize the ordinariness of much of GDR life,”23 while most 
inhabitants of these countries “were less concerned about the ‘big issues and aims’ 
of socialism, than they were about their own interests and needs.”24 
Several authors have insisted on a “more holistic approach to GDR history that 
identies the uid interconnections between the SED (the ruling Socialist Unity 
Party) and society.”25 A leading compilation about the GDR, with the telling title 
Dictatorship as Experience, edited by historian Konrad Jarausch, states that serious 
investigations into life in the former socialist society can only be successful if they 
attempt to penetrate “beneath the surface of dictatorship.” For as Jarausch makes 
clear, the GDR was certainly not “a monolithic system of Communist dictator-
ship over a reluctant people,” nor “the most loyal satellite of Moscow,” nor “[an] 
egalitarian social experiment, aiming to break with the pernicious traditions of 
German history.” He advocates abandoning the two diametrically opposed per-
spectives in favor of seeking “their interdependence, probe their relationship, and 
untangle their connection.”26 
Jarausch suggests that the tension between the regime’s emancipating aims and 
its repressive tactics formed the core of the East German socialist project from the 
very beginning. Whilst the country’s national socialist past forced East German so-
cialist rulers to break with the catastrophic rst half of twentieth-century German 
history, the GDR at the same time and right from the start leaned on the Soviet 
Union in order to exist at all.27 Consequently, East German society displayed a 
large number of partly opposing characteristics simultaneously. It was not just:
[A]n exciting experiment in social engineering to advance human equal-
ity, a living hell of unjust persecution of ideological or class opponents, or 
the latest version of that German staple, the Obrigkeitsstaat [authoritar-
ian state] that challenged its citizens to invent creative ways around its 
arbitrary rules… From the perspective of experience, the GDR dictator-
ship looks like a set of confusing ambivalences and irreconcilable antino-
mies… A more subtle reconstruction of the East German past therefore 
ought to be multidimensional and oriented towards a theoretical under-
standing that stresses complexity.28
Terms that best sum up the complex relationship between the East German state 
and society are “konstitutive Wiedersprüchlichkeit,” “participatory dictatorship,” 
and “welfare dictatorship.” With the latter term, Jarausch attempts to do justice to 
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the emancipating aims and rhetoric of socialism and to the tyranny of Stalinism 
and, with it, to both the enforcing and the compelling nature of the socialist “uto-
pia.”29 An important advantage of the term is that it reects the ambivalent experi-
ences and memories that East Germans themselves have of the GDR; as a repres-
sive and at the same time caring state.30
Inspired by these debates, a large amount of research has recently been car-
ried out in which one of the most fruitful questions pertained to the relation-
ship between the state and the country’s inhabitants.31 According to the cliché 
image, East Germans scarcely played a role in the way socialism was established 
in their country – they supposedly were only able to act on orders from above. 
Recent investigations have shown, however, that the socialist transformation of 
East German society was a much more sluggish and less purposeful process than 
originally intended. It was not just “a process of dictating but also entailed a degree 
of negotiation, however implicit, informal and asymmetrical it may have been.” 
Although the most characteristic aspect of the society that eventually developed 
in the shadow of the Wall was undoubtedly the extent to which the socialist party 
(the SED) succeeded in penetrating the farthest private corners of East German 
society, it would be inadequate to regard everything within that light, “for society 
and everyday life in the GDR clearly amounted to more than dictatorial tutelage.”32
e state and citizens in East Germany negotiated with each other in numerous 
domains. At the same time there were also areas which the state scarcely managed 
to penetrate. Good examples include the informal exchange networks between 
people, family life within the home, and communal life in the allotment gardens. 
Studying these phenomena as areas beyond the boundaries of dictatorship would 
wrongly suggest that there existed politics-dominated and politics-free areas of 
society, whereas the challenge is exactly to rethink the phenomenon of (political) 
power in this dictatorial society, and to study it in a more anthropological way. An 
inspiring example is the work of historian Corey Ross, who makes it clear that the 
authority of the East German regime was based on “a process of interaction and 
mutual dependence between rulers and ruled that can rest on informal structures 
and practices as well as formal ones. Seen in this light, political authority is a pro-
cess of give and take.”33
is book takes these insights as its starting point, demonstrating empirically 
that the GDR cannot be seen as a dictatorial state power ruling from above, exer-
cising its authority over a suppressed population. It shows the mutual dependency 
between the East German state and its citizens, and it searches for the underlying 
reasons, and places where the two met. It thus stands in a long tradition of po-
litical anthropological research on power and domination. e French (Marxist-
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inspired) anthropologist Maurice Godelier already showed ethnographically that 
domination does not so much depend on violence displayed by those in power 
but on a mental, idealistional conformity between rulers and ruled.34 He does not 
suggest that those suppressed approve of their suppression, but he unravels the 
shared mental and ideological domain – not implying that people share the same 
interpretations. “Consent means the sharing of the same representations, even 
with dierent interpretations of the same ideas, with opposed interpretations. But 
if you live within the same circle of ideas, you reproduce them even with an op-
posite attitude.” 
Along similar lines, a great deal of research in the past decades has been carried 
out in (post-)colonial societies on the exact functioning of power and repression. 
e assumption prevailed for a long time that colonial domination had destroyed 
authentic cultures and communities; now researchers have gradually begun to 
shi their focus to investigate how domination exactly took place. What transla-
tion, cross-fertilization, and acquisition occurred between long-standing religious 
and ideological frameworks on the one hand, and those of the colonial powers on 
the other? Here too, the idea is that it is more fruitful to look beyond the obvi-
ous but barely explanatory terms suppression and resistance and focus instead on 
the connections between the colonial authorities and powerless locals. Even in 
situations of brutal repression there oen exists what Achille Mbembe has called 
“an intimate tyranny” and “conviviality” between suppressors and suppressed; a 
situation that cannot be fully understood by only focusing on “search operations, 
surveillance or the politics of coercion.” Even when expressing critique and re-
sistance, the citizens of authoritarian states oen remain within the ideological 
framework of the powerful, which they thus at the same time maintain and help 
to reproduce.35
Such insights force us to take a dierent perspective on power, as well as on the 
state. Since life in authoritarian-ruled societies is characterized by the omnipres-
ent but therefore scarcely perceptible interweaving between state and society, it is 
worthwhile to look for the ways and places the state is seen – and thus temporarily 
made – as powerful: “in mythologies of power, as practical, oen non-political 
routines or as violent impositions.”36
In this book I examine the relationship between the East German state and 
society in the GDR. Was there indeed an unspoken agreement between state and 
citizens? And if so, what formed its basis: was it a case of partial legitimacy, confor-
mity, fear, or consent? Or had the suppression been internalized to such an extent 
that it boiled down to what historian Alf Lüdtke has called “miβmutige Loyalität” 
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[sad loyalty]?36 And given the particular focus of my study: what role did materi-
alistic and consumption promises play in all of this? 
In answering these questions, I will illustrate which aspects of socialist prom-
ises provided the main links between the state’s ocial ideology and East German 
citizens’ social and emotional lives. In particular, I want to focus on the role of 
material and consumption promises and themes, showing which social and emo-
tional interests of East Germans were met by “the oensive connection” they had 
with their state.38
By examining how it was possible that the people of East Germany, who seized 
the rst opportunity they could to leave their country, nevertheless felt part of the 
state which had deprived them of that opportunity in hard-handed fashion for 
decades, this book provides insights concerning domination and compliance and 
how even authoritative powers succeed in bringing about deeply felt identications 
amongst the population. is remains an amazing phenomenon, for although I 
fully appreciate the previously mentioned calls to study the GDR not only from 
the perspective that it was a dictatorship, I strongly disagree with those who state, 
in their attempt to avoid falling into the trap of totalitarianism theory that: “[T]he 
GDR was quite a normal country, despite its unusual international and domestic 
political setting…its citizens for the most part led normal lives, dominated as in 
most countries by family life and concerns about work and material welfare.”39
e fact that inhabitants of the GDR demonstrated the same type of economic 
and material preoccupations as elsewhere does not mean that life in the GDR was 
therefore more or less the same as in other countries. e situation in the GDR 
was exceptional. For although its inhabitants may have been leading their lives as 
normally as possible, working and striving for material prosperity, they were doing 
this in a dictatorially governed, mostly closed-o country, with an extraordinarily 
active state security service. In addition, they were aware that on the other side of 
the Wall, where their relatives lived, levels of material prosperity had been achieved 
that they could only dream of. It would be a shame to ignore these dierences in an 
attempt (albeit justiable) to show that the GDR cannot be equated with the politi-
cally ideological program run by its state powers. It would also be unjust to ignore 
the most fundamental aspect of this society, namely that East Germany’s history 
must be seen rst and foremost as a string of unfullled promises. 
Analyzing empirically and at a local level why the material characteristics of an 
inaccessible society became so meaningful for so many East Germans, this book 
shows how consumption and consumer goods became the vehicles for collective 
fantasies on perfection. Although the use of the term fantasy is usually restricted 
to private and individual desires and wishes, my aim is to show its relevance for 
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the study of social life. I nd myself inspired by a number of recent works in which 
philosophers and social scientists have shown how the main tenets of Jacques 
Lacan’s legacy might be protably applied to social scientic and historical theo-
rizing.40 Although there is a long-standing tradition of applying psychoanalytic 
theory to anthropology and history,41 the use of this body of theory in the social 
sciences has oen been criticized. e main objection is predictable: it concerns 
the use of concepts and ideas that were developed for studying individual subjects 
to explain occurrences and dynamics in the social eld. Clearly, these critics have 
a point. Studying the social as the sum total of many individuals – and assuming 
that because the members of a certain community or society have shared the same 
experiences, their emotional reactions are also comparable – is a line of reasoning 
that runs the risk of wrongfully generalizing individual experiences and reactions 
while failing to take into account the social aspect, in as much as this refers to the 
relationships between people. e work of political scientist Yannis Stavrakakis on 
the signicance of Lacanian theory for the political sciences, however, has opened 
up a dierent line of thought that I deem highly protable for an analysis of the 
sayings, silences and sentiments that I encountered in Rudolstadt. It allows me to 
ponder the parallels between Lacanian thinking on “the impossibility of identity” 
on the one hand,42 and recent anthropological insights on the intrinsic fallibility of 
the constructions anthropologists study as culture on the other.
During the past decades, anthropologists have time and again stressed that the 
identities, cultural categories, values, ideologies and classes which they study are 
not the result of laws of nature, geographical adjustments or unilinear historical 
development. ey are manmade constructions, and they could have turned out 
to be very dierent. No matter how pertinent this insight may be, it raises an in-
triguing issue. As Michael Taussig argued more than twenty years ago: instead of 
focusing time and again on the constructed character of this or that category, an-
thropologists should ask themselves, how people manage to convince themselves 
that their constructions are real.43 How can people come to believe that their cat-
egorizations are true, everlasting and beyond doubt? How do they come to believe 
that their ideas on what is proper and just are incontestable, natural or God-given, 
whereas those of others are weird, wrong and deserve to be banished? How is it 
possible that people recognize their identity as a more or less unchanging and 
almost natural given? 
Lacan’s work oers a fruitful starting point for exploring possible answers to 
these questions. His thoughts on the existential need for and simultaneous impos-
sibility of constructing a solid identity show many parallels with the anthropologi-
cal insights on the social and cultural necessity and ultimate fallibility of culture.44 
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While people simply need to categorize, classify and draw boundaries in order to 
discriminate (between just and unjust, dirt and cleanliness, us and them), every-
day life continually confronts them with the inadequacy of this undertaking. How, 
for instance, does one dene “us” in multi-ethnic societies? How to account for 
female leaders when competitiveness is classied as a male characteristic? How to 
maintain that solidarity is one of our main characteristics when the fear of being 
denounced by one’s neighbors is omnipresent? Once people are confronted with 
the make-believe of what they simply used to refer to as us or their culture and 
society, they have a hard struggle to restore their condence in the symbolic order 
as a meaningful discursive framework that can support the social structure and 
allow for mutual recognition. 
e history of the GDR, with its dramatic succession of totalizing stories and 
their complete failures, perfectly demonstrates the relevance of these general theo-
rems. During my stay in the former GDR, I was frequently confronted with peo-
ple’s frustration with the many break-ups in their recent history. When I asked an 
old man for his opinion on the material abundance on Rudolstadt’s market square, 
he sighed while pointing to the cheerfully decorated Christmas stalls: “is is the 
third time that we have been betrayed” – referring to the sequence of ideologies 
that had been the framework of his life: National Socialism, Communism, and 
Capitalism. 
Inspired by Stavrakakis’s use of Lacanian theory to rethink the domain of the 
social, this book aims to shed a dierent light on ideology’s capacity and fallibility 
in (re)constructing society as a meaningful, coherent entity, allowing for mutual 
recognition. As East German history makes painfully clear: those in power use 
their ideology’s beautiful promises (in socialist East Germany primarily involving 
equality and social harmony) to win people over and establish hegemony. If they 
succeed, the ideology formulated by them functions as society’s discursive basis. 
eir promises to recreate society and undo the causes of its previous failure come 
to constitute the referential symbolic framework through which society comes to 
see itself. In this way, ideology actually delves its own grave, for the more utopian 
its promises, the less likely they are to be realized. When reality does not live up 
to the ideological promises that “initially” gave society its coherence, people’s faith 
in their shared commonality as such is at stake. Colloquially phrased: If we are 
not what we were promised and thought to be, how can we be sure that we are an 
entity at all? 
is is where fantasy comes into play. When reality threatens to undermine 
the discursive fundamentals supporting a certain group as a more or less cohesive 
entity, people have two escape routes at their disposal to restore and uphold faith 
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in their mutual coherence: creating a scapegoat (who is to blame for all that went 
wrong) or suggesting that the true “us” is to be reached, accomplished, found, 
and developed somewhere else. Both are fantasies that help to cloak ideology’s 
deciencies. East Germany’s history clearly reveals that ideology needs fantasy to 
uphold its promises. By showing that ideology and fantasy are communicating 
vessels, it demonstrates why fantasies are certainly not to be dismissed by social 
scientists – they are pre-eminently social and collective.
East German fantasies revolved around the western consumer world. With 
its focus on consumption in East Germany, this book explicitly asks why com-
modities in particular played such a signicant role in the processes of subject and 
fantasy formation. It furthermore investigates the role of the socialist state in the 
dialectics between consumption and these processes of identity and fantasy for-
mation, exploring the relationship between ideology and fantasy. e spotlight on 
East Germans’ fantasies of western consumption uncovers more than just speci-
cally East German issues and tensions. It is a historical ethnography on consump-
tion, power and collective fantasies. 
Apart from contributing to our understanding of the role of consumption in 
twentieth-century European history as an integrating and dividing factor in the 
relations between the socialist East and capitalist West, this book aims to shed 
light on consumer goods’ power of attraction in general. Explicitly focusing on the 
sensory ways in which East Germans came to know the western consumer world 
(as a world of dierent tastes, smells and tactile sensations), it unravels some of 
the mechanisms through which western models of consumption came to be rec-
ognized as an appropriate way to represent a nation’s idealized identity.
Analyzing the history of East Germans’ collective fantasies of western con-
sumption as the cure to all social ills, this book also seeks to show the relevance 
of the notion of fantasy – both for the study of consumption, and more generally 
as an important theoretical concept for the social scientist and historian’s toolkit. 
Although the term fantasy is usually applied to private and individual desires and 
wishes, this book shows its relevance for the study of collective phenomena. 
e main reason why fantasies need to be studied more by social scientists and 
historians is that this will enable us to probe beneath the public face and ideal-
ized self-representations people usually present. Whereas in everyday speech the 
term fantasy is oen used as the opposite of reality, its most important theoretical 
characteristic is precisely its Janus-faced character. Of course, as they articulate 
people’s desires, fantasies oer an escape from everyday reality. Yet at the same 
time they also uphold everyday reality: by helping to gloss over reality’s awed and 
unpleasant features, they oer an idealized version of reality that is worth striving 
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for. Fantasies are thus capable of seducing people with the suggestion that, under 
dierent circumstances, reality could actually be perfect. 
Although perfection is inevitably bound to locally specic issues and themes, 
it generally refers to a situation in which dominant discourses and people’s ex-
periences coincide. Promising perfection, fantasy’s power derives from its seem-
ing ability to close the gap between people’s real-life experiences on the one hand 
and the stories, discourses or ideologies they live by on the other. Studying them 
therefore not only opens a window on people’s desires and dreams, but also on the 
distressing gaps and cracks in their symbolic order.45 at is why these imperfec-
tions always glimmer through the dream world. In other words, you could say that 
fantasies depict an ideal, while trying to cover up something unpleasant, which 
they thereby implicitly reveal.
Considering the pivotal role that the concept of ideology plays in sociological 
theories, it is remarkable that fantasy’s social and political role has been ignored 
for so long.46 Where an ideology is used to establish political hegemony by prom-
ising mythical or imaginary resolutions to social tensions and contradictions, 
fantasy can be regarded as its principal comrade-in-arms.47 For whenever reality 
turns out to be not as perfect as promised, fantasy is there. Presenting a scapegoat 
or pointing to the perfection somewhere else, fantasies help to cloak ideology’s 
deciencies. East Germany’s history is a clear illustration of this general principle. 
It convincingly shows that ideology needs fantasy to uphold its promises, thereby 
demonstrating not only that ideology and fantasy are actually communicating ves-




Before presenting my analysis on the role of fantasy in the recent history of East 
Germany (GDR), I want to explain the relation between this book’s argument and 
conclusion on the one hand, and the kind of material presented and used in it 
on the other. e reason to do so is that the book’s main line of argument pri-
marily derives from forms of knowledge that are essentially non-linguistic. Given 
the central role of eldwork in anthropology, this is certainly not a revolutionary 
remark. But exactly because eldwork, described as “deep hanging out” in order 
to generate “informed intuition,”1 occupies such a central place in our academic 
identity, I nd it striking how little attention is paid in mainstream anthropologi-
cal texts and case studies to the question of where and how we nd the sources that 
inform our intuition.
Both times that I did extensive eldwork, I was struck by how little informa-
tion interviews and conversations produced. is was especially clear in the for-
mer GDR. Already aer a few weeks it struck me that the stories I listened to all 
sounded rather alike. Whomever I spoke to, whatever I asked, no matter how hard 
I tried to steer the conversation in another direction, change the topic, or did my 
best to tempt people to give a more personal account, it was to no avail. I listened, 
endlessly and to the point of irritation, to what I soon began to call the standard 
story: about the fact that nothing was available in this country, and what happened 
when there were nally children’s clothes for sale, how everyone enlisted each oth-
er’s help to get hold of the highly desirable jumpers; and how since 1989, now that 
everything was there, things had not improved, because nowadays everyone just 
thought about themselves; a real division had arisen between the people who had 
a lot and those who could not aord anything, and it had never been like that in 
the past, for in the GDR there had been more equality and community spirit than 
now, and so on and so forth.
Nothing but good things about the past, except for material provision. 
Capitalism was responsible for the total corruption of morality, social ties and 
economic security. e story was both simple and one-dimensional. Although I 
wondered frustratingly what I was doing wrong, it was remarkable that at the same 
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time ideas emerged, almost intuitively, on the reasons for this specic representa-
tion as well as on western prosperity’s impact on the former East German exis-
tence. ese ideas partly stem from conversations and the more or less concrete 
material I collected, but they mainly derive from much vaguer sources. Again, this 
may not be a ground-breaking observation, and there are plenty of specialized 
journals and volumes in which the methodological and phenomenological pitfalls 
of anthropological knowledge production are dealt with.2 But apart from these 
specic sites, in general anthropological texts and case studies, language’s inade-
quacy in conveying relevant anthropological information is hardly problematized 
or reected upon, and neither is the question of which non-verbal sources the 
anthropologists’ understanding is based on. 
is is even more remarkable given that so many of the experiences we as 
anthropologists try to grasp and understand are noticeably dicult to put into 
words. Certainly when they are painful, embarrassing, shocking, or traumatic, or 
when they threaten to confront people with what in the previous chapter was re-
ferred to as “the distressing gaps and cracks in a society’s symbolic order,” it is no 
wonder that they are not easily expressed verbally.
is chapter seeks to elucidate that although such issues and experiences are 
not (easily and explicitly) talked about, this does not mean that they are impen-
etrable, or that it is impossible to gain an inkling of their importance, their place 
and meaning in other people’s lives. As stated before, eldwork derives its merit 
from the anthropologist somehow learning to read between the lines, to under-
stand the unsaid in relation to the said, and to gain a feel for the pains and pitfalls 
of certain topics.3 Pinpointing how and where exactly this feeling comes about is 
not easy. But below, I will describe four more or less distinguishable sources that 
played a crucial role during my eldwork in Rudolstadt. ey are: my reections 
on people’s (oen defensive and negative) reactions to my questioning presence, 
the conspicuous silence pertaining to specic topics, my personal experiences 
with the material culture I investigated, and the remarkable fact that sometimes a 
seemingly trivial utterance kept on haunting me – begging me, as it were, to crack 
its hidden signicance.
Reactions to My Presence 
Astonishingly little has been written about the resistance and negative reactions 
that anthropologists encounter during their research.4 We hardly ever read about 
unwilling respondents, about the anger and sometimes downright aggression 
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that anthropologists’ questioning presence arouses, or about the insights gained 
from all this. Yet during both my eld research experiences, people’s defensive 
and negative reactions to my questions have had a signicant impact on how I 
became acquainted with the particular society. My attempts to talk to the people 
of Rudolstadt about their longing for western goods, the changes in consumption 
that had taken place, or the ensuing deep disappointment oen met with opposi-
tion, for example when I distributed questionnaires on consumption. 
When they heard about the topic of the questionnaire, a surprisingly large 
number of people reacted disgruntled, and many refused to ll in the forms. One 
woman, a hairdresser to whom I had handed the questionnaire in her salon and 
who had initially been quite enthusiastic and obliging, gave me a friendly smile 
when I came to collect the papers a week later. “Oh here comes that woman with 
the nice name,” she laughed, while cutting an older lady’s hair. And she continued, 
still grinning broadly:
We were just talking about you. You have a lovely name, but what stupid 
questions you ask! I was just telling her – and she pointed to the client in 
the hairdresser’s chair: ‘If that’s what you call a Doktorarbeid!? [disserta-
tion],’ it was only about what I had and what I bought. I wasn’t going to ll 
in those papers, so I threw them out. I chucked them in the re.
is nal statement, of having thrown the papers in the re, was repeated twice. 
Another woman initially took the papers from me when I came to her front door, 
but aer a quick read, her face lled with anger, and she tore up the questionnaire 
in front of me, looking triumphantly as if to say: “Well, what are you going to do 
now?” 
ese were extreme reactions. More oen people were simply defensive or in 
denial when I asked about the extraordinary meaning formerly attached to western 
goods. Once, when sitting in the cafe in the market square with the barkeeper, watch-
ing the shoppers leisurely picking out what they wanted from the fully laden vegeta-
ble, fruit and clothing stalls at the market, I asked out loud what the market scenery 
must have looked six years ago. e woman snapped at me: “Well, things have not 
changed that much you know!” Knowing that six years ago there had always been 
a lack of fresh fruit and vegetables and that the supply of aordable clothing could 
never meet the demand, her reaction was remarkable. Another time, I was walking 
down the street with Karl, a youth worker who lived in Rudolstadt, on our way to a 
restaurant. It was winter, and it got dark early. Despite the twilight, the mountains 
of rubbish that piled up everywhere on the pavements were still clearly visible. 
ey contained entire kitchens and all the other things you could think of, from 
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sofas to oce chairs, televisions, fridges, and cots. I had seen this scene before. 
Every time, on the special days that large items of rubbish were to be collected, the 
pavements were piled high with a huge assortment of things, which I now knew 
to consist of old East German household goods (see gure 4.1 and 4.2, chapter 
4). I got the impression that, with the arrival of the western consumer world, the 
residents of Rudolstadt collectively seized the opportunity to substitute as many of 
their possessions from former times as quickly as possible for new things. When 
I drew Karl’s attention to the mountains of rubbish, saying that it seemed as if 
people were simply throwing away everything that reminded them of the GDR, he 
denied this vehemently and immediately changed the subject. 
In the restaurant, I tried again to talk about the piles of rubbish. But again, 
Karl’s response was a denial: it perhaps seemed as if people had thrown away their 
old stu because they had bought new things, but there were other reasons why 
the piles on the sidewalks were so high. He explained that in the days of the GDR, 
everybody kept all their belongings – because you never knew when you might 
still need them. Besides, the average rent had increased so much since the Wende 
that every square meter of people’s living or storage space had become expensive, 
and los were simply cleared out more thoroughly than in the past. What is more, 
in the old days, people used to have to pay for rubbish to be collected – or not, and 
anyway he was not the slightest bit interested in this subject! Old or new things? 
What did it matter! Since the Wende, much more signicant socio-economic 
changes had occurred in the GDR and he would rather discuss those, instead of 
talking about objects. When I reminded him that in the autumn of 1989 his com-
patriots had apparently attached great importance to consumer goods, he denied 
it. According to him, the Wende was welcomed by most people in the GDR simply 
for idealistic reasons. It had nothing to do with prosperity or anything like that.
Apparently my questions about the expectations and changes in consumption 
touched a sensitive nerve.5 People seemed to be ashamed because they had at-
tached so much value to things that in retrospect were apparently not worth it. In 
this book, I present material to illustrate and make plausible the reason why this 
subject was so sensitive: it touched upon a fantasy that had been shattered, con-
fronting East Germans with its traumatic breeding grounds. 
is interpretation is to a large extent based on experiences as described above, 
and on my reections on them. Reection on the subjective nature of eld re-
search has been an important development in the history of anthropology. I nd 
it remarkable, however, that the emotional reactions which the anthropologist’s 
presence evokes have been discussed so little as a source of anthropological knowl-
edge and insight. In their writing, anthropologists hardly devote attention to the 
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extent to which they were informed by the emotional interaction between them-
selves and their interlocutors. Even in the theoretical literature on anthropological 
knowledge production, most attention is paid to the potential pitfalls and prob-
lems during verbal contact, resulting in texts in which much theoretical signi-
cance is ascribed to the literal conversations between the anthropologist and his 
informants, in order to provide insight into the intersubjective nature of anthro-
pological knowledge.6 
Noticeably absent in the school of anthropology which inspired this is attention 
to the intra-emotional aspects of contact. However, the anthropological knowl-
edge process gains momentum thanks to the words people speak to each other, 
but also emotionally. e anthropologist’s questioning presence evokes emotions 
in the people s/he attempts to engage with, and they aect the way people ap-
proach him/her – especially when s/he represents the former colonizing or west-
ern hegemonic powers. During my research in a German village in Argentina, I 
noticed that my questioning presence caused many people to react defensively and 
suspiciously: why had I chosen to do research precisely in that village? Why not in 
Argentina’s one and only Dutch village? 
In that situation the reactions were defensive and somewhat suspicious, but 
I can imagine numerous anthropologists must have noticed that the people they 
tried to talk with were trying to atter them or demonstrating in other ways how 
they looked up to the world they came from, or the contrary: how they struggled 
with, hated and despised that world. e fact that this is barely mentioned in the 
anthropological literature is probably partly due to feelings of guilt, but I think it 
is also caused by another reason: the subject of emotions has long been taboo in 
anthropology.7 It is a blind spot, according to Charles Lindholm mainly because of 
[e] vain disciplinary hope to be recognized as objective scientists of 
culture. To achieve this aim…the study of emotional life was le to clini-
cal psychologists, who formulated pencil and paper tests that turned the 
analysis of personal emotional states into a matter of statistics.8
ere is, however, a rich tradition in psychology (albeit clinical) to reect on the 
informative nature of mutually emotional contact between people. Initially de-
veloped by Freud, the recognition of transference and countertransference’s im-
portance as informing processes is presently shared by all branches of clinical 
psychology. By explicitly paying attention not only to how the people being inves-
tigated react to his/her questioning presence, but also to the feelings they evoke in 
him/her, the anthropologist has an important source of information at his/her dis-
posal.9 e suspicion I encountered among German emigrants in Argentina and 
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how I experienced constantly having to justify my research were extraordinarily 
relevant sources of information there.10 During my stay in the former GDR, an-
other response pattern gradually became discernable when I realized that people’s 
reactions during conversations regularly made me feel as if I had to almost belittle 
myself: pretend not to know things, and emphasize that I too was insecure. Apart 
from numerous little incidents that gradually formed a pattern, I also noticed this 
when once I went to a disco with a couple of friends and was attracting more at-
tention than I found comfortable. For my own sake as well as for my companions, 
I adapted my dancing accordingly. All in all, the way I compelled myself to behave 
was reminiscent of the analysis given a long time ago by anthropologist George 
Foster, who described the central, unarticulated role of envy in some societies.11 
He made it clear how people unwittingly model their behavior and conceal any-
thing that could cause the slightest provocation, for fear of arousing envy in oth-
ers. Foster quotes extensively from the work of anthropologist Gerardo Reichel-
Dolmato. ose quotes read as a concise guide to what to do and how to act for 
visitors to the former GDR: 
e best…measurement an individual can take…consists in not appear-
ing enviable in the rst place and in pretending to be poor, ill, and already 
in trouble. One should, therefore, never boast of one’s health and property, 
never make an ostentatious display of one’s belongings or qualities, never 
let it be known that one possesses some advantage over others.12 
In retrospect, I now realize that I also adapted my behavior in the above-described 
way, but for a long time during my stay in Rudolstadt, I was hardly aware of it. And 
in as much as I was aware, I would not have easily dared to use my adjustment and 
examples of it as information. Fortunately, I received verbal conrmation of what 
I had merely experienced up until then. e episode occurred when I was out one 
evening with Stefan, a friend from Rudolstadt, and Mattijs, a Dutch friend who 
was visiting me. When we, the two Dutch people, expressed our enthusiasm about 
the town and East German society, Stefan laughed, saying that we would never get 
used to life here. We were “too big” for Rudolstadt. I did not ask him what exactly 
he meant by that. I was too busy taking the edge o his remark – “too big? what 
nonsense!” – but if I had asked, it is doubtful that his explanation would have 
made the remark any clearer. Despite its generality, it said it all.
I was fortunate that Stefan’s remark put into words what I had only felt and for 
that reason found more dicult to use as information. e distinctly subjective 
insight and information his remark brought about – as a verbalization of innu-
merable other impressions – was highly relevant for it made manifest what other-
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wise remained unsaid (paraphrasing): In the implicit comparison with others who 
come across as self-condent, we tend to feel small and insignicant. e inkling 
that this comparison and the feelings of inferiority it aroused had somehow played 
a role was highly relevant. It colored the general representation of the ex-GDR as a 
warm and harmonious society in a new way. How exactly the overall positive rep-
resentation related to the vague insights described above, and what role material 
culture and consumption played in this, will become clear throughout this book. 
Partly due to the important role linguistic anthropologists have played in the 
last decennia’s critical reections on anthropological knowledge production, much 
attention is paid to linguistic interaction and sources, suggesting (implicitly) that 
the emotional interaction between interviewer and interviewee is barely relevant. 
is book is informed in crucial ways by my experiences with and reections on 
the emotional interaction between myself and my interlocutors, whereas the spo-
ken word proved to be especially informative on account of the conspicuous gaps 
and silences. 
As mentioned before, the general one-dimensional representations on life be-
fore and aer 1989 had struck me. Albeit hindered by material shortages, life be-
fore then had generally been warm, harmonious and social, whereas the new era 
had brought glitter and outer shine, but this had come at an extremely high price 
– especially concerning mutual contact between people. Although this representa-
tion had triggered my curiosity and suspicion, I hardly received a concrete clue to 
show that this was a selection. I could of course have taken refuge in the opposing 
representation and simply confronted their story with the stereotypical western 
depicture of the GDR as a dictatorial society ruled by mutual distrust. is sto-
ryline has indeed informed the argument put forward in this book, but as I hope 
to make clear in the following chapters, this is not solely the result of my western 
perspective, but to an important extent due to the general and tell-tale silence per-
taining to the dark sides of life in the GDR. 
Material Culture and Tell-Tale One-Liners
e experiences in my contact with Rudolstadt’s residents and the signicant se-
lections they appeared to make regarding their past and present life were not the 
only aspects that supported my intuition. As mentioned before, there were two 
other sources that proved to be highly illuminating: the material world, and the 
incidental remarks that somehow struck me, even though I oen did not quite 
understand why. Since material culture played such a central role in my research, 
38 Material Fantasies
it goes without saying that I was more focused on and paid more attention to the 
material surroundings than I would have done otherwise. I gathered a lot of infor-
mation on the topic – listening to people’s stories, going through relevant journals, 
collecting the advertisements in my mailbox, interviewing designers, shopkeepers, 
salespeople, etc. But in spite of all this, I remained an outsider, without a real clue 
as to the signicance the western object world had had for so many people before 
1989.
Again, it was my own experiences with material culture that eventually lled 
the gap, revealing in an almost physical way the eects the western material world 
could have had on East Germans before it was actually there. One example of such 
an experience was shortly before Christmas 1993 when in the course of one day, I 
happened to visit toilets in both the east and the west of the country. 
In the morning I visited a former LPG [agricultural production cooperative] to interview 
some women who had temporary jobs there as part of an employment scheme. e women 
were growing cut owers – chrysanthemums, roses and such like. Because their jobs were 
nanced by the state and they were not dependent on the free market for their turnover, the 
atmosphere in the greenhouse was relatively peaceful and not too hectic, but the mood of the 
women was decidedly despondent. When I got to chatting to them, they told me how their 
lives had changed aer 1989. eir stories were almost identical to those I had heard count-
less times during my stay in Rudolstadt; they were stories about loss.
e Wende had not been kind to any of the women. ey were nearly all dismissed immedi-
ately. Being out of work for a long time meant that they had to scrimp and save to make ends 
meet. ey felt useless, nished, lonely and le to their own devices until they were able to 
come work here. e majority of them had worked on a conveyor belt or operated machinery 
in large production companies during the time of the GDR, and from an early age they had 
belonged to a collective. e day-to-day tasks, the colleagues, and the social environment 
that went with that had always been a fundamental part of their lives, around which the rest 
of their daily chores were organized. And now? Once the two-year work provision scheme 
was nished, that would be the end. ere was no hope of other work. As women, most of 
them a bit older and mothers, they might as well forget it.
e greenhouse where the owers were grown was old and dilapidated, and nearly every-
thing round about it was proverbially grim and grey, not helped by the chilly December 
weather. Mud, tractor tracks, trampled grass, a shaggy dog, and a scrapped Trabant domi-
nated the scene. At some point, one of the women led me inside the building for the inter-
view. Here, too, everything looked old and worn: large formica tables, a broken sink, bare 
walls, a cold stone oor, a single light bulb hanging from the ceiling and small, sagging metal 
stools. Aer the interview I went to the toilet. It was in a hallway that was as dark, dismal and 
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cold as the rest of the place. e tiles on the wall were faded and cracked, the hook to shut the 
door was hanging loose, and under the door was an open space so that you could see other 
people’s feet. e toilet seat was cold , the water I washed my hands in was cold, and the towel 
was cold and clammy. 
Besides being cold and dilapidated, I recognized the remains of an idealistic project in 
the place’s rigid and sparse furnishings. By now, I knew enough about the history of East 
Germany’s material culture to see how the design of this washroom represented a number 
of core values that had characterized the optimism with which East German designers had 
tried to recreate war-shattered eastern Germany. e no-frills, unadorned material things in 
this washroom represented some of the country’s central socialist slogans (analyzed in more 
detail in chapter three), such as “let’s produce more eciently,” “let’s create a more honest 
world,” and “we no longer need decorations that do not match our ideals.” Dilapidated and 
cracked, the washroom exemplied the ultimate downfall of a once well-intentioned attempt 
to build up a future of mutual equality. e ne-sounding ideas and slogans were faded and 
worn. Driving back from my visit to the LPG, I felt numb. 
Aer that interview, I le to return to the Netherlands to pick up some things. By late aer-
noon, I was driving through dusky villages in West Germany, brightened with Christmas 
street lights. A warm glow radiated from the shops and houses. It was a typical West European 
scene, full of traditional coziness and commercialized would-be romanticism, a scene that I 
would normally not have found attractive at all. On this occasion, however, its warmth radi-
ated towards me. e shops appeared cozy and warm, everything looked equally inviting, 
and even from the front seat of my car, I could imagine the smell of Christmas baking. 
In one of the villages I stopped for something to eat at a restaurant, and when I went to the 
ladies toilet, I remembered having gone to the toilet at the LPG that morning: the contrast 
could not have been greater. Here the shiny tiles were decorated with pale blue owery prints, 
the mirror shone from a distance thanks to the ower-shaped lamp hanging above it, and 
the wash basin was huge and gleaming white. e place smelled of lilacs, and the solid toilet 
looked so expensive that for the rst time I noticed that toilets could also have a brand name. 
is one was made by Villeroy & Boch. 
e dierences in outward appearance between both toilets had a strong eect on how I felt 
in each one. In the East German toilet I had felt numb, whereas here I felt nice and comfort-
able. at feeling was mainly aroused by the material dierences between both places. Yet 
the interior design of the West German washroom was not what I would usually have found 
particularly attractive. In other circumstances, I would probably have viewed it with some 
contempt, as decidedly chintzy. e very reason I now felt so comfortable there was because 
I had just come from such utterly desolate surroundings – both materially and mentally. is 
did not mean, however, that my visit to the West German washroom made me feel grateful 
to be back at last in the prosperous west. e very opposite was true, for although at that mo-
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ment I felt chilled by the material and mental gloom that was so omnipresent in the former 
GDR, it was precisely due to the huge disappointments and to the hopes and expectations 
which now and then glimmered through the gloom (and became so charged in the autumn 
of 1989) that my stay in Rudolstadt was such an exciting and moving experience. I really 
enjoyed being there, and I would never have exchanged my time there for a stay in the FRG. 
What my senses experienced in the West German material surroundings and the pleasant 
feeling that overcame me in that West German washroom went much further and had a much 
deeper impact than merely a desire for material prosperity as such. At that moment, I expe-
rienced the warmth and shiny nish of the West German toilet as a kind of consolation for 
the material and mental desolation of the GDR and the visible downfall of all the hopes and 
expectations which I had felt that morning in the East German LPG. As if the West German 
toilet made up for what had gone wrong in the former GDR.
Western prosperity as consolation. It is a wild idea, based on a highly personal 
event that informed me, without me being aware or being able to express at that 
time what it was actually saying. But the information was being stored, and when 
I later heard Helga Schubert’s anecdote of how the magical bar of West German 
soap seemed to be able to reconcile her with her life in the GDR, that story reso-
nated with my earlier experience. Schubert’s story earns its prominent place in the 
opening chapter of this book thanks to the fact that it ties in so seamlessly with the 
previously described ash of insight, which in all its vagueness nevertheless struck 
me with its clarity.
Equally dicult to comprehend was the fact that some remarks stuck in my 
mind without me knowing why. I was struck by words whilst hardly anything was 
actually being said. is is nearly the opposite of a ash of insight: the words lin-
gered in my head despite their apparent insignicance. Once, for example, I had 
a discussion with the chairman of one of Rudolstadt’s allotment garden associa-
tions. He explained the role of the allotments in the GDR and talked about life 
then. His description was quite positive. At one point, when he recalled the dif-
ferences between society then and as it had developed since the Wende, he men-
tioned in passing that formerly most people were not used to sticking their neck 
out – metaphorically speaking. at was, he explained, “because in the GDR, it 
was important that once you had secured a warm seat by the re, you never le it. 
For if you went away, you never knew if someone else would come along and steal 
your place.” 
e story stuck in my mind, initially probably just because the endearing im-
age of a lovely, warm seat by the re appealed to my imagination. Only much later 
did I realize that his remarks had possibly also struck me because although brief, 
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they completely contradicted the image of the GDR that had been portrayed to 
me until then. However neutrally the comment was made, what it conveyed was 
distrust. Fear and mistrust of others, fear of the conict which could erupt – then 
you might be caught, and your place could be taken.13 Although this was almost 
the only account I recorded during my eld research which evoked a dierent im-
age of the GDR than the warm and mutually helpful society presented by the rest 
of my informants, the chairman’s anecdote came to play a decisive role in my per-
ception and representation of former East German society. As mentioned above, 
it had been clear to me from the outset that the society had not been just as warm, 
friendly, and egalitarian as described by my informants almost without exception. 
e chairman’s remark gave me a hint of some of the unarticulated characteristics 
of the previous world.
is of course raises the questions of why and on what grounds I ventured to 
attach more importance to one man’s remarks despite them being in such shrill 
and clear contrast to the picture nearly everyone else had painted? ere are 
two reasons for this: in the rst place, I did not trust the picture nearly everyone 
painted. But secondly, it was the nonchalant way the chairman made his remarks 
that gave them such pertinence. 
Precisely because it was made so casually, the story struck me as being meaning-
ful. If its moral about “the way of the world and people” would have been expressed 
more forcefully, I would probably have taken it as someone’s personal opinion – 
“listen to what I have to say about this.” en I would not have given it any more 
thought. But because the chairman mentioned this life lesson almost in passing, it 
was obvious that he considered it to be common knowledge: we all know that you 
should: never take for granted what you have acquired; never trust everyone; better 
not stick out too much, as you never know if this could be used against you. 
e story of the place by the re, with its implicit message about fearing loss 
and mutual distrust, speaks for itself so succinctly that it is a clear example of what 
Michael Taussig has called “implicit social knowledge,” referring to the life lessons 
“that move people without their knowing quite why or quite how.” 14 It is the kind 
of knowledge that, because it is passed down from generation to generation, is 
completely self-evident without having to give explicit details as to what experi-
ences it actually refers to, to make it so meaningful. 
Although such life lessons can sometimes be neutral or positive, or at other 
times negative and depressing, they always relate to knowledge that is so self-evi-
dent that everyone knows that this is just the way it is. Consequently, such knowl-
edge is also typical in that it is not oen articulated and therefore not easily found:
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Implicit social knowledge is a reservoir of insights that are not contained 
in a society’s canons; knowledge that is not embodied in the language of 
newspapers, books or academic journals; knowledge that you will not 
be able to nd under any of the keywords in a library catalogue; knowl-
edge that is not included in regular syllabuses of schools and universities. 
Knowledge that does the rounds of [a] society like a scent that nds its 
way into everything and everybody.15
Precisely because this knowledge is self-evident and preconscious, it is usually not 
articulated. One can assume, however, that if the knowledge provides unpleasant 
insights into la condition humaine, not articulating it is in the people’s best interest: 
the interest of not having to confront and address negative insights about oneself 
and one’s fellow human beings. 
e story impressed me because it suggested that mutual distrust and fear of 
others were part of East Germans’ implicit social knowledge. is also suggested 
why the material I collected and the conversations I had were so one-sided and 
gave such limited insight into the issues that interested me. A major part of the 
information remained unarticulated – because it was self-evident, because people 
were barely aware of it, but also because it was too negative, too black. And be-
cause as such, it could have a disastrous eect on the community spirit which had 
existed and still did exist in East German society. In this way, things remained im-
plicit that were better kept implicit: the insight that, under certain circumstances, 
homo homini lupus est [man is a wolf to man].16 is does not mean to say that 
the positive image people described to me was incorrect or further from the truth 
than the story of distrust and fear of others. It means above all that people had an 
unarticulated interest in the choices they made, in the selection they presented. 
is sheds a dierent light on the unity, fanaticism and general character of 
the rose-colored image people presented of the past: by emphasizing its mutual 
warmth, people were ensuring that any experiences of the opposite were kept in 
their place: guiding, but implicit and unarticulated. is also sheds a dierent light 
on the regularly recurring hostile, defensive, and suspicious reactions in my di-
rection: due to my continual questioning, I threatened to make explicit what was 
implicit, forcing people to articulate what they preferred not to express or con-
sciously acknowledge.
While the allotment chairman’s passing remark had highlighted the fact that 
an embedded form of distrust was also part of the GDR’s heritage, the way I un-
wittingly adapted my behavior during my stay made it clear to me that it was im-
portant to avoid envy. Slowly but surely, the impression evolved that the Standard 
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Story about the GDR being a warm society of mutual equality also functioned to 
cover up the distrust, envy and rivalry that had also existed, while the material 
culture of the west oered some sort of comfort or consolation. Although at rst 
very tentatively, I thus began to recognize the relationship between what Dutch 
anthropologist Bonno oden van Velzen described in a recent interview as a so-
ciety’s “covered culture,” and the “emotional undercurrents” hiding under it.17 I 
only gained insight into the relationship between the two domains by explicitly 
focusing on the emotional interaction between myself and others, the conspicu-
ous silence pertaining to specic topics, my personal experiences with the mate-
rial culture I investigated, and by taking some seemingly trivial utterances to be 
an entrance to the non-discursive, social knowledge that this society had in stock.
Generalization, Differentiation
Above, reference was made regularly to the unequivocality of the stories of the past 
I heard in Rudolstadt, and I have given clues for the reasons why this Standard 
Story was generally shared. is book aims to oer insight into the social interests 
behind that story. is approach has one important disadvantage: it consolidates 
and reproduces the unequivocality and uniformity that struck me during my re-
search. I regularly refer to the East Germans, who were longing for something and, 
on account of that longing, were attempting to cover up certain characteristics of 
their society. is choice of words is reminiscent of the Culture and Personality 
School, which became popular in anthropology in the 1940s and 1950s and which 
is regarded with utter contempt and disdain in contemporary anthropology. 
Although most criticism of the work done within that subeld is to the point and 
important, it is essential not to forget that the practitioners of the culture and per-
sonality school were concerned with one of the main issues in anthropology, that 
is: the relationship between a common locality and history on the one hand, and 
the existence of certain dispositions, opinions and behavior on the other.
One of the main problems within this anthropological school was that the 
barely dened concept of culture almost seemed to have acquired powers of its 
own. It was thus not only essentialized and xed, but also taken to be the deter-
mining factor of behavioral patterns (culture A makes its people behave in such 
and such way) instead of the starting point of analysis. Both the culture under 
consideration and the people practising and experiencing it were thereby frozen 
into unchangeable units. Culture, however, is not the driving force behind people’s 
behavior; it is the visible and ever changing outcome thereof. It is not culture that 
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dictates how people act, think and value something. If striking patterns are dis-
cernible in people’s acts, thoughts or values, we should rather aim to discover the 
causes, reasons and interests behind these patterns. at is what this book aims 
to do: to investigate the possible interests behind a relatively generally imparted 
self-image. In this regard, it stands in a long tradition of anthropological research.
Aer the culture and personality school’s popularity in anthropology began to 
wane, the issue of the relationship between shared history and location, and obvious 
patterns in human behavioral dispositions, did not disappear from the anthropolo-
gists’ agenda. For example, French anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu developed the 
term habitus to capture not just the visible regularities in human behavior, taste and 
value dispositions, but also the power relations and interests behind them that are 
unwillingly expressed and perpetuated in these dispositions.18 In his oen quoted 
work e Symbolic Construction of Community (1985), Anthony Cohen focused on 
the constructed nature of group ties and boundaries, and on the active role people 
play in creating and stimulating mutual similarities.19 And with the help of the term 
“chosen trauma,” Vamik Volkan demonstrated that people even have an unarticu-
lated interest in selecting certain traumatic experiences as a binding force.20 
e signicance of such insights began to dawn on me during my research in 
Rudolstadt as I acknowledged the unmistakable and uniform nature of the stories 
I heard. Nothing would have been easier than to associate this Standard Story with 
the fact that the GDR had been a dictatorship, consequently binding or reducing 
East Germans to the post-totalitarian culture to which they supposedly belonged.21 
Bearing in mind the above authors’ work, I felt it would be more productive to nd 
out which choices and interests lay behind such a black and white, generally held, 
and unquestionable representation.
I was amazed that the desire for the magical world of the west could get such a 
rm grip on so many East Germans, and that the disappointment with post-Wende 
changes was so widespread, so I wanted to delve deeper into the roots of these op-
posing feelings and experiences and discover what unarticulated interests they con-
cealed. I have not attempted to dierentiate them in terms of class, gender or gen-
eration. e main reason for not doing so is that the most remarkable ethnographic 
fact requiring further explanation was the rigid character of the generally shared 
stories about the past and present. By focusing on my East German interviewees’ 
generalizations and contemplating their unspoken choices and interests, it gradually 
became clear what things were being le out. Subsequently, combining them with 
what was actually said led to a dierentiated picture of East German history. It is, 
however, not dierentiated in terms of class, gender, education or other social crite-
ria, but along the lines of Jarausch, Ross and others, who called for a dierentiated 
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analysis of East German history – focusing on its internal contradictions instead of 
opting for condemnation or Verharmlosung [belittling, playing down]. 
e argument in this book has thus been decidedly inuenced by relatively 
minor incidents, the associations they called to mind, and other highly subjective 
experiences. On this basis, an idea was formed about the possible reason and cause 
of the west’s irresistible power of attraction. I then collected the material to sub-
stantiate this idea, this interpretation. People could say, and rightly so, that what 
I present here is actually Whig history: tracing the past in order to understand its 
present outcome, without accounting for the fact that things could have turned 
out very dierently. 
History and anthropology have a great deal in common, which can make in-
terdisciplinary cooperation both productive and innovative. But innovation also 
takes place if people do not shy away from the boundaries of their discipline and 
its mores. In as much as I have done this, the result lacks historical accuracy. My 
sweeping and (historically) undierentiated pen-stroke is guided by the questions 
I was seeking to answer, but I am fully aware that this has narrowed my view and 
perspective. For that reason you could describe this book as a collage: from every-
thing I experienced, heard and collected, I have made a deliberate selection, and I 
hope this has helped to make my perspective of East German history and society 
both insightful and comprehensible. 
Betting the image of a collage, my incorporation of statements by intellectuals 
illustrates a more general Empnden [feeling]. Generally speaking, it is question-
able to what extent the statements and writings of intellectuals can be used to ex-
press the sentiments of ordinary people. Students of the former GDR certainly face 
this question. For if one thing was clear when East Germans took to the streets in 
the autumn of 1989, it was that the intellectuals and the ordinary people held com-
pletely opposing views on which course to follow and the desired perspectives for 
the future. Whereas the former advocated change while maintaining the socialist 
state, the latter were mostly set on abandoning the GDR as quickly as possible and 
uniting with their rich, prosperous neighbor. ese dierences were expressed in 
the diering slogans both groups yelled: “Wir sind das Volk [we are the people],” 
aspiring to democratic change, chanted at the start of the Wende, aer a while re-
placed by the sentence “Wir sind ein Volk [we are one people]” – a call for unica-
tion. Many of my East German acquaintances in what I shall describe for want of 
a better term as the alternative circuit told me that for them, this change-over was 
the turning point. Disappointed, they gave up. 
At that time the wide gap became highly visible between what one could call 
the general East German Volksempnden on the one hand, and the voice of East 
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German intellectuals on the other.22 e fact that I nevertheless refer to the texts of 
the writers Günther de Bruyn and Christa Wolf, psychiatrist Hans Joachim Maaz, 
psychotherapist Annette Simon and others in order to attribute their feelings and 
experiences to ordinary people is noteworthy. My decision is rstly based on the 
fact that the obvious dierences between the politically ideological opinion and 
position of these two groups do not mean in my opinion that equally great dif-
ferences existed in the way they experienced life in the GDR. Somewhat polemi-
cally, one could even claim that the abandonment of politics by the majority of 
intellectuals in 1989 when the people entered the stage was in fact the forerunner 
of the latter group’s pending disappointment. One could also say that in 1989 the 
intellectuals were better able to fathom what happened and what consequences 
this would have, and to express this, than the people; they were used to doing this 
at the time of the GDR as well. 
is is the second reason why I think the voice of East Germany’s intellectuals 
can be generalized: particularly in the GDR, writers fullled a crucial role – like 
they do in all dictatorships and totalitarian societies. Precisely because in such 
societies many things are not allowed to be said, thought or even felt, writers and 
other intellectuals are not just the people’s voice, but also their conscience and 
antenna. In a way that can barely be perceived by an outsider, they were revealing 
between the lines what was not allowed to be shown, expressing what was not al-
lowed to be said, and oen making it clear to the reader what many others prob-
ably would not and could not have dared to feel, see and experience. Romanian 
philosopher Andrei Plesu states clearly that in the dictatorial societies of East and 
Central Europe, literature had a much greater readership than one would probably 
expect: “[P]eople were used to standing in line as patiently for books as they did 
for food.”23 Especially in dictatorships, it is the unique role of writers, poets and 
intellectuals to put into words what otherwise threatens to be swept under the 
totalitarian carpet.
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Chapter 2  
Germany 1945: A Country in Ruins 
What would become of us all if we were to let the space in our memory 
be unlocked to see what remains (Christa Wolf, 1990).1
Material and Social Trauma
e Second World War ended in the spring of 1945. With larger and larger ar-
eas of Germany being occupied by the Allies, the German army surrendered un-
conditionally at the beginning of May. Initially, uringia was occupied by the 
Americans, but on June 30, 1945, the American occupying powers exchanged it 
for an area of Berlin which up till then had been under Russian control. From 
that moment on, uringia became part of the Sovjetische Besatzungszone [Soviet 
Occupied Zone, further SBZ], just like Brandenburg, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Ocially, these ve federal entities only formed a 
separate state on October 7, 1949, but they were administered as a separate entity 
from the beginning of July 1945. Power was executed by the Sovjetische Militär 
Administration Deutschlands [Soviet Military Administration of Germany, further 
SMAD], working together with members of the German Communist Party and 
the Social-Democratic Party Germany.
In many ways the end of the war did not bring closure for the inhabitants of 
the eastern part of Germany, for there was more continuity between the nal years 
of the war and the years thereaer than the word peace suggests. According to 
German ethnologist Ina Merkel, “chaos, collapse and misery” reigned, and “the 
end of war acts did not bring an end to violence and destruction.”2 e country’s 
ruinous economic situation deteriorated even further aer the war, causing ten-
sions, mistrust and animosity to are up amongst the population. Even without 
the macro-political separation, Germany would have been a deeply divided coun-
try in 1945.3
Figure 2.1 – Berlin, 1945, clearing the ruins 
Source: G. Gronefeld/Deutsches Historisches Museum, Berlin.
Figure 2.2 – Berlin, 1945, refugees
Source: Getty Images.
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e war begun by Germany had cost nearly y-six million lives, of which 
about six million on the German side. Bombs had attened large parts of the 
country, and whatever faith still survived in the national socialist doctrine and 
national socialist world view was certainly shattered when all the details of Nazi 
war crimes were made public. Forty percent of the German population had lost 
everything. Some cities, like Dresden, were completely destroyed, and of the eigh-
teen million dwellings in what would later be the GDR, about ve million had 
been demolished. Aer the war, large parts of Germany were divided up between 
Czechoslovakia and Poland. By the autumn of 1945, twenty-ve million Germans 
were fugitives or being driven from what had been their homes. e country was 
split into one part occupied by the Soviet Union and another part occupied by the 
Western allies. In the months aer Germany’s defeat, the area that would become 
the GDR housed 3.6 million refugees.
For most ordinary Germans, the end of the war meant further decline. e 
country’s industry was nearly on its knees, and the supply of foodstus and raw 
materials from the occupied areas had come to an abrupt halt. e agricultural 
land was barren due to years of neglect. In the years aer the war, starvation 
reigned, and people fought over a crust of bread.
In one family, consisting of a father, mother and three schoolchildren, a 
parcel arrived in the spring of 1947, the rst CARE package from America. 
e father, utterly starving due to the freezing cold winter and permanent 
food shortages, secretly smuggled the package down to the cellar and ate 
the contents himself in a matter of days.4
Unlike the inhabitants of the later FRG, the people in what would subsequently 
become the GDR received no Marshall Aid. ey had to come up with about 
fourteen billion dollars in reparations for the Soviet Union in the rst eight years 
aer the war.5 at amount was paid mostly in kind: the Soviet occupiers dis-
mantled everything they could lay their hands on, which was consequently trans-
ported to the Soviet Union.6 Estimates show that 45 percent of East Germany’s 
production capacity had been destroyed during the war and aerwards a further 
total of 3,147 East German companies were dismantled and shipped to the Soviet 
Union.7 Because huge sections of the East German railway network (sleepers, rails, 
etc.) disappeared to the Soviet Union as well, whatever production could still be 
achieved was further hampered by the impossibility to deliver materials and n-
ished products.
In the rst years aer the war, one and a half times as many inhabitants of 
East Germany died as during the nal years of the war.8 e ration cards for food, 
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sarcastically nicknamed “Friedhoarte” [graveyard cards], were wholly inad-
equate. Half of Leipzig’s population, for instance, had so little food in 1946 that it 
was almost impossible to survive. And despite the fact that the city had to take in 
relatively few refugees, compared for instance to Rudolstadt, even there the atmo-
sphere was dominated by people’s “Futterneid [envy of food]… People’s physical 
and mental strength deteriorated due to the chronic malnutrition: they were not 
just apathetic and lethargic at work...but the ‘mental depression’ spread to all parts 
of man’s existence.”9
Everyone was hungry, permanently hungry. “Wo es nach Essen roch, war die 
Mitte der Welt [Where you could smell food, that was the center of the world].” is 
was the time when life was ruled to such an extent by “der Traum vom Sattwerden 
[the dream of becoming satiated],” that a girl even killed her grandmother with 
an axe in order to steal her food and clothes. German historian Reiner Gries rig-
orously dismissed as fairytales the later memories, cherished by many, that this 
period had brought about a form of solidarity and a form of “unity in time of great 
need.”10 
Germany was broken, and not just materially. e visible ruins were an ad-
equate symbol of the country’s general situation. e organic Volksgemeinscha 
[people’s community] which the Nazis had promised to forge for the people of 
Germany was shattered. When Swedish journalist Stig Dagerman travelled across 
Germany in 1946, he gave his impressions under headings such as: “Ruins,” “e 
forests of the hanging,” “Unwelcoming,” “e rivals,” “A lost generation.” His de-
scriptions leave little to the imagination:
In the entrances to the cold, overcrowded houses, the local kids play 
war games with refugee children from the eastern zone or Sudetenland 
dressed in rags...If you show them a picture book, they immediately start 
talking about the best way to kill the people or animals in the book. Two 
little boys blasted out of their homes by bombs have not yet learned to 
speak, yet their pronunciation of the term “totschlagen [beat to death]” is 
disturbingly perfect.11
e houses that had to accommodate the never-ending stream of fugitives were 
“infected…with the hate, jealousy and hunger of those living in too cramped con-
ditions.”12 is description seems to capture quite well the general situation in 
post-war Germany, where scarcity and famine inected envy, while jealousy and 
hate reigned.
e situation in uringia was no dierent: its territory housed about two mil-
lion Umsiedler [migrants], of whom 700,000 had to be taken in permanently – 
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and thus provided with some sort of shelter and food.13  e area in and around 
Rudolstadt probably had to cope with 30,000 new inhabitants. Several refugee 
camps were set up near the town. e camps were overcrowded: barracks built 
to take a maximum of 420 people sometimes housed more than a thousand chil-
dren. Tuberculosis spread, epidemics broke out, and when people died or their 
misery drove them to commit suicide, the lack of cons forced the survivors to 
press four or ve corpses into each con. If the fugitives were oered shelter in 
people’s homes, this also meant that people had to share the scarce food with them, 
which was a further cause for tension and anguish. “Wir haben ja nichts gehat, 
man hat uns als Bettler angesehen, es gab viele Spannungen und Reibereien [We 
had nothing then, people saw us as beggars. ere was a lot of tension and fric-
tion],” one of the former new inhabitants told me. e hunger in the Rudolstadt 
area was so great that of the 24,000 children living there in 1947, about 23,000 were 
suering from malnutrition.14
Although the city had survived the war relatively unscathed from a material 
point of view, here too the damage was considerable: one church, ve porcelain 
factories, and 103 dwellings had been entirely destroyed by the bombardments, 
and 62 houses partially. More than 300 families had become homeless, many had 
lost everything, and 117 people lost their lives during the bombing. Forty people 
were killed before and during the American occupation (on April 12 and 13, 1945). 
All in all, the war had caused the deaths of more than a thousand of Rudolstadt’s 
inhabitants.15 at gure does not include the many hundreds of prisoners of war 
and convicts put in camps around the town during the war, an unknown num-
ber of whom did not survive. Also not included in these gures are the prisoners 
from the concentration camp Buchenwald located twenty-ve miles away, who 
dropped dead or were executed in the streets of Rudolstadt during the infamous 
death march of April 1945. eir numbers “hat keine Statistik erfaßt [were not 
included in any statistics].”16 
In general, the situation in Rudolstadt seems to have been similar to that in the 
rest of the country: the material damage was as bad as the famine. Consequently, 
and intensied by the reversal of power, the social climate was disastrous. “What 
at rst sight may look like unity, is in fact covered with diagonal, vertical and hori-
zontal cracks.”17 e disastrous social climate deteriorated further in the eastern 
part of the country due to the communist takeover. e rigorous social, economic 
and political transformations that were implemented intensied the struggle for 
survival.
Although western historians have long regarded the post-war Soviet occupa-
tion of the eastern part of Germany as the start of the unavoidable Soviet annexa-
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tion, this representation appears to be wrong. During the rst years aer the war, 
the Soviet Union had no prepared plans for the part of Germany it occupied, and 
there was still plenty of scope for local policies. is had a devastating impact on 
the social climate in Eastern Germany, for a signicant part of the politics decreed 
by the SMAD was carried out by local politicians (KPD and SPD members).18
at applied for example to the redistribution of modes of production, which 
began in October 1945 aer SMAD order no.124, “Über die Beschlagnahme und 
provisorische Übernahme einiger Eigentumskategorien in Deutschland [on the sei-
zure and provisional attribution of some ownership categories in Germany],” and 
no.126, “Konszierung des Vermögens des NSDAP [Conscation of NSDAP capi-
tal],” were carried out. ese orders announced the expropriation of former Nazis. 
From that moment on, everything that had belonged to the national socialist state 
or one of its associations was now owned by the new powers. e same applied to 
the possessions of certain categories (vaguely dened) of individual members of 
the NSDAP. Lengthy lists stated which objects in the Rudolstadt area should be 
expropriated as Wehrmacht und Reichsvermögen [military and state-owned prop-
erties]. e items included barracks, drill sites, command posts, schools, banks 
and buildings formerly belonging to one of the many mass organizations linked 
to the NSDAP. For all these objects, the new powers had to allocate a new use, and 
the same applied to the possessions of individual NSDAP members. In the min-
utes of a meeting held in Weimar on January 4, 1946, where further instructions 
were given to those responsible for the execution of the orders in the Weimar and 
Rudolstadt area, the expropriation was substantiated as follows:
Our most important task concerns the problem of feeding and clothing 
the German people and providing them with accommodation…rough 
order numbers 124 and 126, the Soviet Union is oering us the opportu-
nity to settle the debts of the war criminals, stripping them of their eco-
nomic role. Everything taken charge of, which will be expropriated later, 
is to be used for our reconstruction.19 
No matter how reasonable and conceivable the argument may be, the expropriation 
resulted in further escalation of the existing tensions. And because certain sections 
of the population had been harshly excluded from the German Volksgemeinscha 
[national community] by the Nazis in favor of the consenting majority, it is hardly 
surprising that the post-war reallocation of power with its accompanying realloca-
tion of possessions was seized by many to settle old scores.
Rudolstadt’s Landratsamt [district administration] archives contain an ex-
tensive exchange of letters that demonstrate how the announced expropriation 
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caused huge internal strife at the local level. ere are letters from people ercely 
opposing the conscation that is about to happen to them. ere are letters from 
others justifying the planned conscation from their fellow citizens by pointing 
out their political crimes. And there are letters from people trying to seize the 
conscated goods of others by submitting a request for the possessions which were 
to be shared. Clearly, there is extensive correspondence on people’s losing, acquir-
ing and reallocating possessions.20 “I was neither a war criminal nor an activist, 
have never had a role in the party, was not a member of the SS or the SA, and 
never worked for the security police or the Gestapo,” wrote a man on September 
5, 1946, to Landespräsident [district president] Prof. Dr. Paul, adding that he 
had not had any benet from the war. According to his account, he was old, ill 
(Gelenkrheumatismus, Schlagaderverkalkung [rheumatism, arteriosclerosis]), and 
physically and mentally worn out. His son had been missing for a long time, a year 
ago he had lost his wife and had to evacuate his house, “and now – just because 
I was a member of the party long before 1933 – my possessions are being cons-
cated.” It is too harsh, the man’s letter concludes. His correspondence had another 
letter stapled to it from Rudolstadt’s mayor, in which he dryly remarked that the 
author wore the golden party medal Alter Kämpfer [veteran] and had been a mem-
ber of the NSDAP since 1929. e mayor also stated that he could not imagine 
that the man in question, who had joined the party so early on, was a member in 
name only – as he claimed in his letter. en he would never have been given a 
gold party medal.21
ere are many letters like these. Some of them helped people who were try-
ing to keep their material possessions by making clear that they were not as bad 
as they seemed. ere are messages from couples who ed to live in the British 
occupation zone when the Red Army arrived, and aerwards sent their children 
to claim the conscated goods on behalf of their mother: she had not been a party 
member, so surely there was no reason to disown her just on account of her hus-
band’s party membership? 
In other letters people attempt to describe that they were victims of the Nazis 
and for that reason claimed a right to a share of the conscated Nazi possessions. A 
letter from the mayor for example recommends that a certain man be recognized 
as Opfer des Faschismus [victim of fascism]. e man in question had been jailed 
as a political prisoner from 1939 till 1945, and because he was interested in the 
shop owned by SA-Sturmführer [paramilitary rank of the NSDAP] B. in Königsee 
(a little village in the vicinity of Rudolstadt), he could make good use of the title.22 
People were not just trying to keep or get back their former possessions or 
acquire new ones, they also did not hesitate to betray each other in order to get 
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someone’s things. One correspondent even told of couple X who had deliberately 
got divorced aer the war so that the “divorcee,” who was not a member of the 
NSDAP, had a chance of getting back the conscated goods, while meanwhile se-
cretly living together with her divorced husband in American-occupied Bavaria. 
ere are accounts of people reporting each other to the new powers so that they 
themselves could take possession of the other’s furniture or company. Petty crimes 
were revealed in order to discredit others: “ese gentlemen had hidden the items 
so carefully in their private villa that they could only be found aer a meticulous 
house search.”23 And they accused each other of betrayal. One woman accused 
her former daughter-in-law, who had been telling tales about her ex-husband (the 
correspondent’s son) to the new powers in order to get revenge for the divorce 
while she herself, her former mother-in-law wrote, “was having it o with Russian 
soldiers” – which was the equivalent of a crime.24
Although the Rudolstadt archives do not contain much on the period directly 
aer the war, the little material there is conjures up a picture of a society ripped 
apart by mutual envy and strife. People fought ercely with each other over the 
scarce possessions that were available. ese struggles were at least partly the re-
sult of the reversal of power and the accompanying reallocation of possessions.25 
In retrospect, it is evident that the transition was used by both the state and indi-
vidual citizens to get even with former opponents. e KPD’s call to every “honest 
German” to help “trace Nazi leaders, Gestapo agents and SS villains who were in 
hiding,” issued on June 11, 1945, may sound impartial, but it gave rise to a climate 
in which anonymous accusations and betrayal could become rampant.26 Joachim 
Gauck, the East German church minister who was given the task of managing the 
Stasi archives aer the Wende of 1989, remembers vividly that his father was sud-
denly gone: 
In broad daylight, in the middle of the summer...my father was ‘taken 
away’...an apparition that had developed in the Nazi era. I was eleven 
years old...My mother and my grandmother went to see Pieck, Grotewohl, 
and Ulbricht (East German politicians, mv), and they even went to the 
Russians in Berlin-Karlshorst, but they were always given the same infor-
mation: ‘We do not know this person.’ My father was simply gone, he had 
become a nobody, without even a gravestone to remember him by. Aer 
two and a half years of complete uncertainty, we received the rst sign of 
life from my father – a card, just like prisoners of war sent, telling us in 
tiny letters that he was alive and asking about the children.27
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According to the ocial accounts alone, 157,000 people were deported be-
tween 1945 and 1950, to end up in so-called Speziallager (special camps, includ-
ing the concentration camp Buchenwald). As the calculation of the gures does 
not take bureaucratic errors and propaganda into account, the total number of 
deportees is probably considerably higher. Of the 157,000 ocially accounted for, 
at least 44,000 died.28 It goes without saying that this was a carefully kept secret at 
the time; ocially, Buchenwald was no longer used aer the Nazis were defeated. 
e üringisches Hauptstaatsarchiv [main state archives] has some of the cor-
respondence between the local rulers at that time and citizens who tried to get 
information about members of their family who had suddenly disappeared. Many 
of those taken away without formal charges or stated reasons were former Nazis. 
Sometimes the neighbours were able to report that the person concerned had been 
taken away by Soviet soldiers. But it frequently happened that those le behind 
did not have the faintest clue as to what had happened to their husband, father or 
son, because nobody dared to speak out, for fear of being the next to disappear. 
Family members oen did not receive word about the deported person’s where-
abouts till much later, and oen they did not hear anything at all.29 Many people 
never returned. Only aer the Wende of 1989 was it ocially announced what 
many already knew, suspected or feared, namely that in the rst post-war years, 
not only Nazis were deported, but also people who were completely innocent – 
including many social democrats who supported a dierent party line than the 
SED.30 Investigations into this part of East German history had only just started 
when historian Hermann Weber remarked that many of the internees were “ran-
domly chosen persons.”31
e letters I studied clearly showed that many of those who disappeared had 
been betrayed to the new powers by their fellow citizens. e reason for their in-
ternment oen seems to have had nothing to do with the Nazi past. ere is, for 
example, a letter from a woman whose 72-year-old husband was taken away al-
though he had never been a member of the NSDAP. On the contrary, the Nazis 
had even punished him for his criticism of national socialist politics:
In 1933 my husband exchanged harsh words with the formal leader of the 
local (party) branch because he was against the council’s decisions. He 
was punished by being transferred to Munich in Westphalia; at the age of 
sixty, and within ve days he had to leave his Heimat. Aer that he was no 
longer promoted. Because he was not a party member, although he was 
a high-ranking civil servant, we had to ght an ongoing struggle to sur-
vive…My husband was not a political person, he lived a philosophically 
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academic life [sic]…he was a great handyman and he enjoyed hunting. We 
had a peaceful life together, and inwardly he was a very honest, good, and 
strong…person. We had a happy marriage, my husband was everything to 
me. Without him my life is shattered.32 
e letter revealed that the man had possessed shotguns, which he had buried 
when the Americans were approaching Rudolstadt at the end of March. When 
the Russians found them, they had him deported for that reason. His wife never 
received a reply to her letter. Another man was deported in 1949, because as a 
SPD member he had refused to join the SED. He spent seven years in various 
Russian prisons. His wife suspected that he had been betrayed by others.33 In a 
volume about the history of Rudolstadt published in 1992, historian Peter Langhof 
describes that the internments were carried out completely randomly and mostly 
initiated by accusations. In this way, he concluded, “many thousands of SPD, LDP, 
CDU, yes even KPD followers, as well as many non-party citizens were rendered 
politically harmless and oen physically destroyed.”34
In the rst years aer the war, the slightest provocation was enough to be re-
ported as an enemy of the new regime. In this way, old scores were settled. e at-
mosphere of suspicion and climate of fear must have been terrible.35 Daily life was 
dominated by distrust, jealousy and the insight that one man’s death was the other 
man’s bread. e well-known photographs of the ruins in Berlin and Dresden are 
a painfully appropriate illustration of the general situation in Eastern Germany. 
Besides the personal and material losses people had to endure during the war, a 
long famine ensued aer 1945. Partly due to this and strengthened by the reversal 
of power, the social climate was one of strife and fear of mutual denunciation and 
betrayal. “e fault line which ran through German society…was of enormous 
signicance, not just at Zero Hour, but in the months and years to come.”36 
In Search of a Hold
e question is how the population in the eastern part of Germany reacted to the 
traumatic experience, when all the remains of solidarity, mutual trust and cohe-
sion had disintegrated, making way for a raw form of distrust and betrayal. How 
could people believe that things would ever return to normal? Where were they 
going to look for something new to hold onto and restore faith in the future? 
ese questions are extensively dealt with in the literature on the western part 
of Germany, illustrating that most people’s reaction was a combination of “pre-
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serving silence and industriously devoting themselves to the Wirtschaswunder 
[economic miracle].”37 Below I will further describe and analyze this combination, 
which has been portrayed in detail for the western part of the country. ere is, 
however, reason to generalize the western response. East German author Christa 
Wolf, writing about the eastern part of the country, made clear that: “nowhere was 
there such innite silence as in German families.” And historian Mary Fulbrook 
also concludes that in those days, the only thing that united the German popula-
tion was silence; there was a “community of silence” in both parts of the country. 
American anthropologist John Borneman draws the same conclusion. He points 
out that most West Germans’ secondary response to the traumatic situation they 
were confronted with (that is: industriously trying to rebuild the material remains 
of their society as quickly as possible) also applied to the eastern part of the coun-
try.38 
Even in 1945, eyewitnesses were amazed when they saw how Germans reacted 
to their completely devastated lives. e country was in ruins, but that was hardly 
discussed. People seemed to want nothing else than to rebuild their material world 
and move on. 
[P]eople here are running back and forth between the ruins, like ants on 
a destroyed hill…excited with a mad fervor...e devastation does not de-
press them, but acts as an intense motivation to work...People show...me 
certain residential blocks, pointing out: that was a bombardment, there 
too...And that is all. No more announcements are made…People are get-
ting on with the work.39 
e urge to rebuild their material existence played a major role in the restoration 
of the country, which took o so quickly that it is generally referred to as a mira-
cle: the Wirtschaswunder. e book e Interpellation describes that miracle, of 
which its author (Christian Geissler), is extremely critical, like most contemporary 
commentators. 
He describes a country bathing in “ashing neon lights,” where vivid colors 
and billboards “lit with a thousand watts” brighten up the streets. Its residents look 
up, expecting to see sailing boats and sports cars fall from the sky. ey are not 
in the mood for reection but merely “live for the day...and the world smiles opti-
mistically at them” because “no one can be bothered with people’s problems.” Set 
in the optimistic period when the Wirtschaswunder began to yield its fruits, the 
author’s conclusions are denitely gloomy. According to him, the cheerfulness, 
optimism and energy as well as the material prosperity which started to re-emerge 
in West Germany were merely a desperate attempt not to sink into “the void.” For 
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him post-war West Germany’s fascination with material possessions was simply 
an endeavor to forget about the war and “stand rm even in this void.”40 
Geissler was not the only one to make a connection between Germans’ pro-
ductiveness and preoccupation with material things on the one hand, and the 
trauma of the Second World War on the other. Many reporters agreed that the 
Wirtschaswunder was not just enabled by the American Marshall Aid, but es-
pecially by the urge to remove the pain of the past. e necessity to rebuild the 
country seemed to form a kind of screen, behind which people hid experiences 
that were so painful that confronting them had to be avoided at all cost. 
Regarding what exactly was to be swept aside, Geissler refers to the Void being 
hidden from view by the country’s blinding material recovery. Other reporters are 
more specic, but they all describe the unbearable burden of the past in moral 
terms; they speak of guilt, shame, pain and despondency, all linked to the post-war 
West German obsession with material progress. West Germany’s fast recuperation, 
from a land in rack and ruin to one of the most prosperous countries in the world, 
has even been interpreted as an avoidance tactic to distract people’s attention from 
the unforgiveable crimes committed in Germany’s name. In their famous and oen 
quoted account of the situation in post-war West Germany, the Mitscherlichs also 
posited a direct relationship between the country’s fast economic recovery on the 
one hand and Germans’ untenable shame and guilt about the Second World War 
and Auschwitz on the other. Or as one of Geissler’s characters scorns his country-
men: “[T]hey build houses…[but] as long as nothing is right yet, neither in the 
cellar, nor in the lo, the lovely spaces full of owers in between are no more than 
ammunition rooms...Whenever the past is simply reduced to ashes, the present 
glows so hot that you rush to the future as if it were a cool place in the shadows.”41
e disapproving, moral undertone appears to be based on the premise that 
the German population was (or should be) suering terribly from the burden of 
the past. Reporters were amazed at the (apparent) lack of feelings of pain, guilt, 
and shame, and at the energy displayed in their place. “It will be much easier for 
them to rebuild their cities than to induce them to perceive what they have expe-
rienced or let them understand how it came about.”42 Such accusations stem from 
the assumption that the German people should have been able – directly aer 
the war – to confront their own involvement and responsibility for the disastrous 
recent past. e German nation’s obsession with reviving their existence and the 
fanaticism displayed in restoring their country aer 1945 were thought to have 
been inspired by an attempt to deny or repress the collective feelings of guilt about 
Auschwitz. e material reconstruction which gave people something to hold on 
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to would be absolutely vital in order to ward o a deep moral crisis brought about 
by oblivious feelings of guilt. 
Although the argument sounds convincing and is indisputably true in indi-
vidual cases, I do not nd it a satisfactory explanation for the reactions displayed 
so generally by German people aer 1945. I nd it too moralistic and therefore 
unbelievable. It seems implausible that, aer nding out what atrocities had been 
committed in their name, people would suddenly be overwhelmed by feelings of 
guilt towards those for whom they had previously harbored scarcely any feelings of 
solidarity or involvement. at moral standard simply seems too high. According 
to me, Germans’ post-war reticence and their fanatic removal of the material ruins 
should be explained in a less altruistic manner. Furthermore, I also nd it unsat-
isfactory to interpret the collective reaction to social trauma as the sum of many 
individual responses, in this case pertaining to guilt. Whenever there is communal 
silence, it seems sociologically more relevant to trace which communal interests 
were being served instead of interpreting the silence in terms of individual psy-
chology. 
In this context it is telling that silence, dedication and throwing one’s self fa-
natically into rebuilding the future are well known reactions to internal societal 
crises. Not only the perpetrators but also the victims of terror are reported to pres-
ent such reactions. Dutch sociologist Jolande Withuis, for instance, showed that 
many children in Israel have also grown up in silence, “with the knowledge of a se-
cret.” ere, too, the most frequent reaction to the trauma of war was an enormous 
drive to rebuild the future by working very hard.43 And Japanese women aected 
by radiation from the atom bomb during the Second World War presented a com-
parable reaction. ey, too, initially kept their mouths shut about their suering, 
only breaking the silence to argue the case for their experiences more than twenty 
years later.44
Such reactions are not only linked to the uncommunicativeness of the expe-
riences endured, but also to the social climate that then characterizes a society. 
When war, famine or other large-scale disasters strike a people who have lived 
together for a long time without animosity, they are confronted with the fact that 
the community which up until then they had assumed as self-evident was actually 
founded on a rather shaky basis. When the violence, hunger or hardship has been 
caused by one’s neighbours, distrust comes to dominate society. One of the hard-
est problems facing people at such times is to nd experiences or other connecting 
factors which, despite the social tensions dening communal life at that moment, 
are able to restore the suggestion of community.45 One way to veil the borderlines 
in a community which is split between perpetrators and victims is, for example, 
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the collective choice of victimization.46 By stressing a joint role (even ctitious), 
one can rebuild a collective relationship with the past, thus restoring at least the 
illusion of community. 
e most striking reactions the inhabitants of Germany displayed aer 1945 
(silence, dedication and striving for material reconstruction) should also be seen 
in relation to the country’s social climate at that time. Hardly any feelings of com-
munity existed in Germany aer 1945. Social life was dominated by deep and 
widespread mutual distrust, and fear was all around.47 In this context, silence and 
material reconstruction had two important social functions.
Apart from the fact that clearing the ruins in a country attened by bombs 
and overrun by refugees was an absolute necessity, reconstructing the material 
world is also an extremely eective way to psychologically process other things. 
When the outside world that people unquestionably felt part of suddenly mani-
fests itself as fundamentally untrustworthy and threatening, they nd solace in 
distancing themselves, focusing on the material reconstruction of their personal 
lives.48 Rebuilding a house is a good way to exclude mutual distrust, also because 
the house will provide a safe haven from which people can start, slowly but surely, 
to explore the outside world again. Furthermore, building houses and streets is 
also a concrete and symbolic form of working for the community and its future. 
While clearing up the debris and building a new neighborhood, people literally 
structure the foundations of the future community. e ruins and suspicions from 
the past are removed, to be replaced by new houses – as a symbol of new trust in 
living and building a future together. Building up the collapsed world brick by 
brick with one’s own bare hands is therefore an excellent way to (re)gain control 
of one’s life. And later on, the building process, as a shared experience, will appear 
to have functioned as a foundation for future community experiences and spirit. 
It is known that this strategy worked well in the western part of the country; 
the restoration of houses, factories and roads, the gradual removal of ruins and 
debris actually succeeded in establishing new faith in society and the future. West 
Germans’ loyalty towards the new nation developed thanks to the stable material 
basis the Bundesrepublik would soon become. e economic growth and improved 
standard of living created not only consumers, but also loyal West Germans.49 
Obviously the West German Wirtschaswunder did not just appear out of the 
blue. Apart from the West German fervor, it was to a considerable extent the re-
sult of the Marshall Aid oered by the United States. e Treaty of Versailles had 
taught the Allies not to leave defeated Germany to its fate for the second time – 
aer 1918 this had laid the foundation for the kind of resentment in which Hitler’s 
national socialism thrived so well. e Allies were determined not to make that 
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mistake again. Another, equally important reason for America’s post-war generos-
ity towards West Germany was that it directly served an American goal. e coun-
try to be restored was an ideal place to market American products and services, 
and once developed as a prosperous capitalist society, it could be a signicant trad-
ing partner for the United States.50 International capitalist collaboration and the 
global spread of America’s model of consumer citizenship were the explicit aims of 
America’s post-war aid to defeated Germany. 
e famous West German Wirtschaswunder thus came about because it best 
served the three major parties’ interests: it enabled the population to disguise the 
Void; if successful, it would help legitimize the new state; and it would provide 
the western allies with another loyal partner (politically and economically) in the 
short and long term. 
Little is known about the situation in the eastern part of the country. How 
did those in power deal with people’s needs and wants? Did a form of collabora-
tion exist between occupiers, state and residents? To what extent was the new East 
German state able to adapt to people’s desires to keep quiet about the recent past 
and mutual suspicion, and instead put all their eorts into rebuilding their exis-
tence? In what way did the East German state accommodate the traumatic experi-
ence of what Geissler described as the Void?
Analyses of East Germany’s history are usually quite critical: the repressive 
state is generally described as having had no consideration whatsoever for the 
needs of its population. And the overriding representation is that the country’s 
material reconstruction lagged behind developments in West Germany right from 
the very start. Although it is certainly true that the new socialist powers did not 
enjoy the full support of the people, I think it is worthwhile looking further than 
the obvious divergences between what the state was oering and the people’s needs 
and wants. e socialist ideology, which the new state used to justify itself, did in 
some ways accommodate the silent, materialist way the German people were at-
tempting to delete their recent past. 
e next chapter delves deeper into the similarities between state ideology and 
the needs of the people. Although insucient to justify the new state in the eyes 
of its residents, these similarities did play an important role in accomplishing the 
East German state’s hegemony. By promising the people a socialist utopia which 
would be accomplished in an explicitly materialist way, the East German state was 
nourishing a materialist politics of identity. is would indirectly provide a breed-
ing ground for the collective fantasies of material wealth as a source of redemption 




e GDR: Future Promises 
When the Americans le uringia to be replaced by Russian troops in the spring 
of 1945, most of the region’s residents feared the situation would deteriorate fur-
ther. As the national socialist regime had always portrayed the Soviet Union as the 
empire of evil, most East Germans had strong anti-Russian feelings. e popula-
tion’s general attitude towards the various occupational forces was aptly summed 
up by a female resident of Berlin, who stated: “When we saw Russians coming, 
we would run down the basement steps. If we saw Americans, we would run up 
the steps to meet them.”1 East Germans’ worst fears about the Russian occupi-
ers were painfully conrmed with the massive violation of East German women 
by members of the Red Army, and with the brutal ways the Soviet occupying 
power claimed its war reparations. is all resulted in widespread anti-Soviet at-
titudes and strong opposition to Soviet “early socialization policies.”2 e new East 
German leaders who wanted to win the population round to the socialist project 
were thus setting themselves an almost impossible task.
In spite of the general hostility, people seemed to gradually come to terms 
with their country’s socialist project. is was mainly thanks to the appeal of what 
can be termed the GDR’s ideological fundament: its presumed antifascist nature. 
Claiming this label as an apt description of the new state’s raison-d’être was accom-
plished by thoroughly rewriting recent history. As will be suggested in this chapter, 
the new, socialist-proof version of the recent past perfectly accommodated wide-
spread popular yearnings – to quietly build a new life (materially and socially) in 
order to cover up the lack of mutual trust and restore faith in the future. Despite 
East Germans’ widespread reluctance to conform to the Russian occupation, the 
state’s promises for the future and popular strivings eventually established a form 




When the Soviet Union occupied the eastern part of Germany, it had no well-
designed plans for its future. is began to change amidst mounting antagonism 
between the western allied powers and the Soviet Union, and when it gradually 
became clear that the western part of Germany was going to be integrated in the 
capitalist bloc. In 1949 the GDR was founded as a separate German state under 
direct Soviet control. is new state was not supported by popular feelings of be-
longing or national identity, and its leaders faced the task of ruling a country with 
practically no national legitimacy. In order to grant socialist Germany a certain 
rationale of existence, it was necessary to claim that the new state was dierent – 
dierent from its predecessor, and dierent from the western part of the country. 
ese dierences were professed to have been caused by the GDR’s distinct anti-
fascist nature. “e GDR claimed the historical honorary title of a ‘new Germany,’ 
whose politically and social-economically founded antifascism meant a rigorous 
and denitive break with all traditions that had resulted in 1933.”3 
e rst claim to substantiate this title was by arguing that Germany’s fascist 
history was the unique result of the capitalist system – which had been abolished 
in the GDR. Secondly, the collapse of the national socialist regime was ascribed 
exclusively to the incessant battle with East German communists and other anti-
fascists – who were the new leaders of the GDR. Last of all, it was claimed that the 
necessary denazication aer 1945 had only been carried out successfully in the 
eastern part of Germany. Denazication of the western part was said to be a mere 
farce (for how could it be otherwise – so it was claimed in the GDR – given the his-
torical continuity in the west of Germany, where the capitalist mode of production 
had remained unaltered). ese three reasons were used to justify the assertion 
that the socialist state had to be established in order to preserve all the valuable 
elements of the German heritage.
It is important to stress that the GDR’s socialist leaders indeed forced con-
siderable changes in the existing political, economic and social structures of East 
German society, by radically altering the social relations and mode of production 
– as briey sketched in the previous chapter. Also, the majority of the politicians 
who cooperated with the Soviet occupying powers, and who were later to join the 
rst government of the GDR, had indeed risked their lives in the struggle against 
fascism. Last but not least, the new East German leadership had achieved a radical 
transformation in the existing balance of power. Most members of the commer-
cial and intellectual bourgeoisie were bere of their positions, and many teachers, 
professors, and judges, as well as the majority of administrative executives, were 
 e GDR: Future Promises 65
dismissed and replaced with people from a lower class background. “In order to 
realize its political and ideological program, the SED replaced the entire elite, an 
unprecedented upheaval in modern German history. is process of restructur-
ing destroyed traditionally developed milieus, basically changed the social climate, 
and mobilized society to a considerable extent.”4 e restructuring of society had 
a major additional advantage for the new leaders: it assured them of a large group 
of loyal adherents and advocates of the socialist ideology.5 
Given that the East German leadership had indeed accomplished real changes, 
they were blown out of all proportion by the East German regime. e result was 
a completely unrealistic representation of the recent past and the near future. No 
matter what sources one consults, whether East German history books, song-
books, autobiographies of famous East Germans, educational literature for young 
people, or advertising placards: they all show the same razor-sharp line drawn 
between pre-1945 national socialist and post-1945 socialist society. Before social-
ism, life was allegedly infected by the continuous capitalist struggle of “all against 
all.” is struggle was said to have disappeared in the new socialist society, to be 
replaced by friendly cooperation, “collective commitment,” and feelings of mutual 
solidarity. e last period of the war was thoroughly rewritten – it was reported 
to have been characterized by “heroism, resistance, and victory.” e East German 
population was described as an innocent people, living in an innocent country, 
in which unfortunately two brutal categories had lived and reigned: the Junker 
[derogatory reference to the aristocracy] and the Monopolkapitaliste [monopoly 
capitalists]. ese groups were responsible for all the disasters that had taken 
place, and they were exclusively described within the well-known Marxist, socio-
economic framework of analysis. Although national socialism had claimed to be a 
variety of socialism, East German historians explained it had to be regarded as the 
last horric convulsion of the capitalist system. As East German historiography 
drew attention to the anti-Semitic and racist characteristics of national socialist 
politics, this was within the framework of an overarching critique of capitalism.6
East German historiography on the post-war period is equally clear and one-
dimensional. Denazication of the Soviet-occupied part of Germany was said to 
have been pursued in a strict, just, and successful way. Almost all Nazis had pre-
sumably been punished, and their possessions were said to have been redistributed 
or sequestered, nationalized and subsequently used for the common good. Ocial 
historiography claimed that the majority of the East German population swily 
understood that they had been abused by national socialism and its capitalist lead-
ers. Contrary to the situation in the western part of Germany, the GDR was said to 
have been liberated of fascism in 1945 once and for all, allowing the records to be 
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closed. As part of their education, generations of Rudolstadt’s schoolchildren vis-
ited the former concentration camp Buchenwald (twenty-ve miles to the north) 
in order to learn about the socialist liberators who successfully put an end to the 
catastrophic “prot seeking of German Monopolbourgeoisie [monopoly bourgeoi-
sie], its bestial exploitation, and repression in concentration camp Buchenwald” 
and the “horric history of German imperialism.”7
Although, as I mentioned before, a signicant part of the East German govern-
ment indeed consisted of members of the resistance who had risked their lives 
combating Nazi Germany, present-day historians generally agree that “the image of 
a pristine antifascist government cleansed of all ex-Nazis was more antifascist my-
thology than East German reality.”8 Denazication of the eastern part of Germany 
was neither more thorough nor more successful than in the western zones, and 
the Soviets appear to have known this all too well: “[T]he Soviets publicly claimed 
satisfaction with their success, while privately they too admitted failure.”9 e of-
cially sanctioned representation of East Germany’s recent past was “as ctitious 
as it was self-serving for the SED.”10 Because admitting it would have completely 
undermined the legitimacy of the GDR as a separate German state, antifascism 
was and remained the core of the socialist state, which helped to “morally li up” 
the GDR.11 Reference was constantly made to the “identity-conrming ideological 
fundament of the East German state” in order to legitimize the state’s continued 
existence, its balance of power, and political decisions. Apart from its legitimizing 
role, the GDR’s antifascism was also used to morally bind people to the regime, by 
commanding loyalty with the brave antifascist Wiederstandskämpfer [resistance 
ghters].12 
Life in socialist society was apparently characterized by the common owner-
ship of all, which would bring about equality, mutual harmony and solidarity. is 
would bring forth “the gi of a new people,” claiming to dier from their fascist-
capitalist predecessors thanks to their genuine identication with collective goals. 
Because they knew their individual interests corresponded entirely with the col-
lective ones, there would be no more “petty bourgeois and individualist ambitions. 
Envy and hate would rot away, and people would be freed from the existential 
loneliness on earth.”13 e East German population would be released from the 
social-destructive tendencies and experiences that had always plagued their ex-
istence. Instead, they would become part of the “socialist community of people” 
where “man was the only goal and standard.” is would allow for the “free devel-
opment of one in the service of all.”14 
All in all, the socialist state thus promised its citizens nothing less than a com-
plete form of harmony and unity – both for individuals and between people. is 
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was to be realized in the near future, because the main condition for its develop-
ment had already been fullled in the eastern part of Germany, where capitalist 
relation of production had been partly terminated, and large-scale nationalization 
of agriculture and industry had been implemented by the end of 1945. 
In a country that was in desperate need of optimism and faith in the future, 
and where recent history was being written around heroes, villains and victims, 
true recollections of events were not welcome – but repression was.15 e betrayal, 
pain, hatred, and envy that I described in the previous chapter remained unspo-
ken. ere was no room for people’s memories unless they were in line with the 
ocially propagated and sanctioned history. Open-minded investigation of the 
past was even more dicult when the country became one of the Soviet Union’s 
major partners in the Cold War. Openly posing questions about national social-
ism’s appeal remained practically impossible, unless they were approached in the 
obligatory, well-known standard of Marxist-Leninist rhetoric. Until the mid-
1970s there was only one way to write about the Nazi period: from the perspective 
of those who had already recognized the reprehensible character and aims of fas-
cism during the war. When in 1976 the rst novel appeared in which the author, 
Christa Wolf, openly admitted that she – as so many of her peers – had been under 
the spell of national socialist promises, the book was ercely criticized. Wolf was 
blamed for not being able to subordinate her own experiences to the progressive 
forces and developments in her country.16 
East German history’s rigorous rewriting must have resulted in broadly shared 
experiences of alienation, as has been aptly worded by German cultural historian 
Frank Trommler: “Whatever the experience, it cannot even claim an appropriate 
understanding of the events of which it has been part.”17 But apart from being 
estranging, it was probably also reassuring not to be able to think and talk about 
the past in other than the mythical way described above – with heroes, villains and 
victims. Because the ocially approved perspective on the past was not only im-
portant for the establishment and legitimacy of East German socialist politics but 
was also used “to instill a sense of political commitment which was to be beyond 
valid questioning,” there was simply no room for objection. All possible means 
were used to steer East Germans’ emotions in support of the imposed politics of 
the time. A false dichotomy was created: if you are against fascism, then you are for 
the GDR; if you are critical of the GDR, then you are essentially a fascist.18 
As a result, it appears to have always been dicult for East Germans to hear 
(let alone voice) criticism of the GDR – because of the presumed antifascist nature 
of the state. Fulbrook calls this the “psychological coercion” the inhabitants of the 
GDR fell victim to.19 A 68-year-old judge, whom I regularly visited during my 
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stay in Rudolstadt and who was usually quite critical about the former socialist 
state, once sighed: “In spite of everything, the GDR’s original goals and assump-
tions were very good and worthwhile.” Any critique of the GDR was implicitly a 
critique of antifascism, and as such highly suspicious. e use of morally loaded 
ideological claims was the main way “to capture the public political imagination 
by tapping into its wells of moral conscience” – a frequently used tactic by moraliz-
ing states.20 For the new East German state, antifascism functioned as a fetish. e 
signs, vocabulary and narratives it produced were not meant to be mere symbols; 
they were ocially invested with a surplus of meanings which were not negotiable 
and which one was ocially forbidden to depart from or challenge.21
Although the “legend of the good beginning,” which was so important for 
the new state’s legitimacy, was forced upon the East German population, Mary 
Fulbrook has concluded that “the myth of innocence of the workers and peas-
ants…appears to have gone down relatively well with the vast mass of the East 
German population.”22 is is not as surprising as it may seem, because it must 
have been quite an attractive myth for many people. First of all, it promised to real-
ize a fully harmonious society, without social tensions.23 Secondly, the GDR’s pro-
claimed antifascist nature oered the population a perfect escape route to avoid 
personal confrontations, responsibility and involvement with the rise of national 
socialism, the war and the ensuing void. By presenting these issues as the sole 
result of capitalism’s evils (successfully dismantled in the GDR), the East German 
state presented its population a story of collective innocence for the recent past’s 
disasters. Personal misgivings and internal dierences were erased in light of the 
bright future of mutual solidarity and security awaiting the East German people. 
e myth of the new beginning has had a deep impact on the development of 
the future GDR. By presenting 1945 as an overall watershed, East German society 
was built on a collective denial of past experiences. It was also built on an undis-
closed gap in which experiences of mutual distrust, betrayal and the failure of soli-
darity were hidden, covered up with beautiful promises of mutual solidarity. Both 
the state and the population had a rm interest in concealing this gap, brushing 
socially disruptive experiences under the carpet, while emphasizing the better fu-
ture on the horizon. e combination of a state-sanctioned, collective amnesia and 
a rigorous reinterpretation of real memories has been very eective “for achieving 
a constrained loyalty” to the state.24 In spite of general skepticism amongst East 
Germans with regard to the socialist cause, an unsaid, partly unwitting consensus 
developed between people’s desires, motives and endeavors on the one hand, and 
the claimed antifascist, socialist state ideology on the other. e image of 1945 as 
a rm dividing line functioned as the nation’s ideological core, helping to create a 
 e GDR: Future Promises 69
semblance of national unity and command internal loyalty. “Our loyalty towards 
the GDR contained irrational, almost mythical dimensions. All those at, worn 
out stories have in one way or another had a deep, subconscious impact on all of 
us. It was certainly no coincidence that the Wall was called an ‘antifascist protec-
tion wall.’ ”25
e antifascist, socialist doctrine functioned as a mask, which both the popula-
tion and the government were keen to wear. One result of the widespread, state-
sanctioned “Schluszstrich” [draw a line under] mentality was that “the most im-
portant issues on the country’s past, like national-socialism’s broad popular base, 
were ignored along with questions about the population’s involvement in the re-
gime’s politics of persecution and destruction.”26 
Comparable reactions of silently and industriously sweeping away the past as 
soon as possible were displayed in the western part of Germany, but these patterns 
changed over time. Especially aer the violent riots in the late 1960s, the darkest 
period in German history became an undeniable part of West Germany’s self-
representation – a development which was unthinkable in the GDR. 
e establishment of democracy in the west also meant that, in sharp 
contrast to the dictatorship in the east, the decisions of the early years 
were not nal. East Germans were able to freeze political memory…In 
West Germany, political freedom and open debate fostered criticism of 
the shortcomings of the Adenauer era and a growing knowledge about 
the Nazi era.27
In the GDR, the ruinous experiences remained suppressed and hidden, on which 
the bright future was to be built. e question of how this has inuenced East 
German society’s social texture will be answered in the coming chapters. ere, 
I will also show what collective stockpiles were developed for the containment of 
experiences and memories that did not t in with the past’s ocially sanctioned 
representations. At an individual level, people created dierent stockpiles. My 
70-year-old neighbor in Rudolstadt appeared to be revealing her memories in the 
songs she sang every time she was drunk, allowing her to return to her lost Heimat. 
She lived next to me in an old apartment on Rudolstadt’s market square. Just like me, she 
had to go down to the courtyard every day in autumn and winter in order to gather coal 
and kindling for the re. But whereas my apartment had hot running water, a shower, and 
a private toilet, she had to heat water on the stove and put it in a tub before she could wash 
herself, and her toilet was in the communal corridor. She was lonely. Apart from her son, 
who reluctantly visited her every three or four weeks, she seemed to have no social contacts 
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at all. Sometimes we had a little chat when we met in the corridor, but she always seemed a 
bit absentminded. She originally came from Silesia, a part of Germany that was assigned to 
Poland aer the war. She probably le her home town in the spring of 1945 in a hurry. I don’t 
know whether her son was already born by then. Like the millions of others who were driven 
from their homesteads at that time, she probably walked all the way to uringia (400 miles).
When she arrived in Rudolstadt, people probably frowned disapprovingly at her because she 
needed the food and shelter that were in such short supply. I don’t know for sure whether she 
ever really managed to feel at home. My impression was that she did not. ere was a small 
landscape painting on the wall of our communal hallway. e scenery resembled the area 
around Rudolstadt, but I always imagined it to be her native Silesia. 
During the time I lived next to her, she came home really drunk several times a week, stum-
bling noisily to the door of our hallway. Sometimes she didn’t even make it that far, and I 
would nd her downstairs, lying in her urine. She had fallen down and was too drunk to 
get up. Once I heard her fall – it was a hard thump. I went down and saw her lying in a pool 
of blood, her legs in a strange position under her body. An ambulance took her to hospital 
where she stayed for some weeks. When she returned, she had lost some weight, but it wasn’t 
long before she began drinking again. And yet again, she came home drunk a few times a 
week, hardly able to reach the door of her apartment or get the key in the lock. Once she was 
inside, the evenings always elapsed in the same way. e walls were so thin that I could hear 
her singing, sometimes till deep at night. One time I was able to work out some of the words 
and then I realized it was always the same theme: Heimat, Heimat, it sounded melancholi-
cally. 
Every town has its alcoholics, but it struck me that my aged neighbor returned to 
her native country every night, having le it y years earlier. Her history con-
tained many elements that had been written out of ocial East German histori-
ography. e story of her life was taboo: socialists do not recognize homesickness 
for the area where you were born, certainly not when there were sound political 
reasons to allocate it to a befriended, bordering nation. 
A New Future: Material Well-Being
Concentrating on the socialist leaders’ general promises allowed me to sketch the 
wonderful perspective that was presented to the war-beaten East German popula-
tion aer 1945. A complete break with the past would automatically bring about a 
community of new people, living together in great harmony and solidarity. Or as 
the rst line of the East German anthem went: “Auferstanden aus Ruinen und der 
 e GDR: Future Promises 71
Zukun zugewandt [Risen from ruins and facing the future].” is prospect must 
have been extremely attractive. However, as I showed in the previous chapter, the 
German population was searching for a new symbolic order, not only by silencing 
past social ssures, but also by materially rebuilding society. e question is to 
what extent the socialist state accommodated this search. 
In theory, the answer to this question is very simple: according to Marxist 
theory, a radical change in the material basis of East German society would bring 
about the desired socialist utopia. Transforming society’s material basis would lead 
to a fundamental transformation in people’s attitude towards work, re-establishing 
it as the central, constitutive element of their existence: “Work is joy, volunteering 
and responsibility; it is courage, diligence, heroism, success, specialty, and plan. 
e worker recognizes his productive activities as the purpose of his life and his 
patriotic duty.”28 e destruction of capitalist “non-culture” would liberate people, 
allowing them to invest all their energy, hope and faith in “securing the uttermost 
welfare and the free development of all members of society.”29
Although the obvious question of course is to what extent these general axi-
oms were achieved, it is important to recognize that by allowing material circum-
stances to bring ultimate fulllment for all in mutual harmony, the socialist leaders 
endowed the material domain with capacities far beyond economic recovery and 
material resurrection. In this respect, their promises came close to the general 
hopes and ambitions of the East German population, leading to a further merging 
of people’s needs and wants on the one hand, and the main promises of the social-
ist state on the other. 
During the rst decade aer the Second World War, the East German regime 
was internally divided on the issue of consumption. e central importance of 
meeting the needs of the consumer in order to establish state legitimacy was not 
generally recognized.30 Until the end of the 1940s, the material situation in the 
GDR was extremely bad; hunger and scarcity dominated daily life. East Germans’ 
attitude towards the new political course in their country uctuated along the lines 
of material improvement. With East and West Germans keeping a close watch on 
the developments in both parts of the country and comparing the advances in 
each country’s consumption, it goes without saying that when the material situ-
ation in the western part seemed to recover more rapidly, this had a devastating 
impact on the credibility of the GDR’s socialist project.31 
In 1946 and 1947 the population of Saxony (a province in East Germany) was 
relatively favorably disposed towards the political decisions of the new leaders. 
However, when material circumstances deteriorated, partly due to the long and 
harsh winters of 1947 and 1948, popular support eroded immediately, reaching 
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rock bottom in mid-1948 once people learned that ration cards had been abol-
ished in West Germany. e impact was tremendous. From that moment on, the 
West German population was able to pay with real money when they went to 
shops that actually had something worth buying. erefore, in West Germany, 
the end of rationing “symbolized the end of the war years and times of depriva-
tion. It was the beginning of the long-expected return to ‘normality,’ security and 
welfare.”32 For the East German population, the abolition of rationing in the west 
was equally important, albeit in a negative way. Many then concluded that “life is 
simply better in the west.”33
e symbolic and political signicance of full shops was insuciently recog-
nized by all East German politicians. Many still considered the politics of con-
sumption subordinate to the recovery of heavy industry. ey would soon nd out 
that improvement in the sphere of consumption was fundamentally important for 
legitimatizing their political course.
From the early 1950s onwards, increasing numbers of East Germans le their 
hearth and home to build up a new life in the western part of the country. e g-
ures are telling: in 1950 almost 77,000 people le the territory of the GDR, in 1953 
the number of exiles amounted to over 317,000.34 Most East German party leaders 
viewed these developments suspiciously but seemed condent that they would be 
able to turn the economic tide at short notice and bring an end to the country’s 
material and consumption problems. is condence was based on two assump-
tions. Firstly, they believed that the collectivization of agriculture would produce 
“a surplus in foodstus and [increase] the overall availability of goods.”35 Secondly, 
they assumed that the socialist mode of production would eventually far outrank 
the capitalist mode of production. At the second party congress in 1952, party 
leader Walter Ulbricht announced the acceleration in socialism’s development: 
“As a result of the double enslavement by American and West German monopoly 
capitalism, the living standards of the West German population will continue to 
fall, whereas in the GDR and the democratic sector of Berlin, material and cultural 
conditions for the workers will improve according to plan.”36
In spite of these promising words, consumer developments in the GDR were 
sluggish in comparison with the west, and the resulting dissatisfaction played a 
fundamental role in the only revolt worth mentioning that occurred in the GDR, 
which took place on June 17, 1953. 
e immediate cause of the revolt was the ongoing increase in production de-
mands, which was not compensated by an improvement in consumption potential 
or a reduction in prices. By the beginning of June, workers took to the streets to 
voice their dissent. When the party leadership did not respond satisfactorily, dem-
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onstrations were announced for the next day, under the motto “butter instead of 
canons.”37 On June 17, the entire country was hit by strikes and demonstrations, 
and the uprising was a fact. It was harshly crushed by the local Soviet forces, but 
the message to the party leaders was clear: state legitimacy depended very much 
on how well the material situation improved. “e lessons about the power of con-
sumer opinion in sowing concord or dissent had been drummed into the minds of 
the new elite in East Germany with the uprising of June 17, 1953.”38 In an attempt 
to improve the food shortages and lack of consumer goods, the SED gave the re-
maining private industries more freedom. e result was an immediate improve-
ment,39 and the numbers of emigrants are telling: whereas in 1953 over 317,000 
people le the GDR, this number dropped to 114,000 in 1954, again illustrating 
the importance of material improvement for the establishment of state legitimacy. 
e socialist German state struggled with the problem that its existence was 
not supported by time-honored national sentiments. e socialist leadership was 
therefore unable to foster a state with the “powerful force of national emotions.”40 
When the government nally understood to what extent the state’s legitimacy de-
pended on satisfying consumer demand, it “seriously strove to improve the popu-
lation’s standard of living, in order to be ensured of its loyalty.”41 Although compa-
rable issues haunted the new West German state, its restructuring soon appeared 
to be an all-out success, nally resulting in the famous Economic Miracle. 
e collective attempt to banish the traumas of the Second World War by cov-
ering them up with beautiful examples of prosperity was one of the critical stakes 
in West Germany’s 1968-generation’s revolt. Since then, Germany’s war traumas 
have been laid bare and never disappeared from the public stage in the FRG again. 
But by that time, the new German democracy’s legitimacy was beyond doubt, 
thanks to its marvelous economic achievements.
Such developments were impossible in the GDR. Until the state ceased to exist, 
silence reigned regarding the socially unsettling experiences of the past. In chap-
ter six I will show that in time, the silence related not just to matters of the past, 
it was generally impossible to publicly name or discuss socially disruptive issues. 
ey were covered up with the beautiful story about mutual equality and solidar-
ity in the wake of transforming the socialist state’s material basis. is story was 
not just relevant for the new state and its leadership, it also had a great emotional 
and social impact on the East German population. Collectively aiming for a new 
and materially improved life diverted their attention from traumatic experiences. 
In this way, state and citizens came to a kind of agreement in which consumption 
and material developments had far-reaching powers. 
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is agreement has had a deep and long-lasting eect on the GDR.42 e post-
war habit of silently denying social disasters and the state-ordered taboo on break-
ing the silence continued to exist in East German society. Not only did it nourish 
the belief in an ideal society without social ssures or tensions, it also met East 
Germans’ widespread hopes and expectations that material improvement was the 
most appropriate solution to social problems. “e communist system was built 
on unambiguous promises of material progress. e [inhabitants]…were perpetu-
ally on the threshold of the promised land. Socialism...aroused the desire to con-
sume by its promises of material improvement.”43
When I refer to the pact between state and citizenry in the GDR, I highlight 
how the state’s ideology became enmeshed with the needs of the traumatized pop-
ulation not only to build a materially safe future, but also to deny and remove 
experiences that were at odds with the newly-to-be-formed communal ties. Key 
elements of this ideology would form the basis for the new symbolic order in the 
eastern part of Germany. e socialist state’s promises that seamlessly matched the 
lessons of life which were as important as they were taboo became the silenced 
core of a secret collusion between state and citizenry.
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Chapter 4  
Material Realizations
 What we are thus arguing is not simply that ideology permeates the alleged extra-
ideological strata of everyday life, but that this materialization of ideology in the external 
materiality renders visible inherent antagonisms that the explicit formulation of ideology 
cannot aord to acknowledge (Slavoj Žižek, 1996).1
Sometimes posing a question is the same as answering it. At rst glance, this cer-
tainly applies to the question of how well the East German state succeeded in de-
livering its materialist promises. We all know what transpired. We have seen the 
images of grimy streets, long queues in front of shops, and people so happy to 
nally get their hands on a few oranges. We have heard them grumbling about 
the country’s material and consumer situation. It was primarily these complaints 
that drove so many people to the streets in the autumn of 1989. And one year 
later, these complaints motivated them yet again when it came to deciding their 
country’s future. By voting for German unity, most people were opting for well-
equipped shops and the ability to buy fresh fruit all year around. ey wanted to 
end the continual shortages and lack of materials. 
Since the East German state was apparently not able to provide acceptable ma-
terial conditions, it seems obvious to assume that the pact between government 
and populace did not hold out. Although hard to believe, the contrary was true. 
is chapter will show that the GDR’s dicult material situation actually func-
tioned as one of the main pillars sustaining the alliance between state and citizenry.
Severe, Rational, and Centrally Planned 
In the autumn of 1992, when I was in search of an appropriate eldwork location, 
I made a short trip to the former GDR during which I visited various towns and 
cities. Apart from the appointments I had made in advance, my rst impressions 
of the country were mainly visual. Wherever I came, I curiously viewed the streets, 
the public spaces, the tall apartment blocks in the suburbs, the interiors of the 
Figure 4.1 and 4.2 – Rudolstadt, 1994, pile of rubbish
Source: Pictures by the author.
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libraries and town halls, the decoration in the few shops not yet renovated, and 
the little East German neon signs that were still there. I happened to visit Weimar 
on the day when the municipal rubbish collectors picked up large items, thus al-
lowing me a glimpse of the remnants of people’s interiors that were now piled up 
on the side of the street. e overall scene le an impression similar to the ones I 
had encountered in the waiting rooms of public buildings. e colors were rather 
dreary. Most objects were rectangular, hardly adorned or plain, and rather drab. 
As far as the objects were decorated, these decorations did not seem to match the 
overall rectangular shapes of the objects. When I returned home, my general im-
pression was that the GDR had had a rather severe material culture. When I later 
bought a catalogue with pictures of former East German consumer goods, this 
impression was conrmed.2 
Almost a year later, when I had settled in Rudolstadt, the same severity struck 
me once more. e interiors of public buildings, shops and apartments, and the 
piles of rubbish on this town’s side streets all showed the same combination of 
frugality, severity, and scanty ornamentation that did not match the overall lines 
and forms.
Figure 4.3 – Rudolstadt, 1993, sh-shop
Source: Picture by the author.
Figure 4.4 – Rudolstadt, 1994, pile of rubbish
Source: Picture by the author.
Figure 4.5 – Eisenhüttenstadt, Leninallee, lamp and electric ap-
pliances shop, undated, 1970s 
Source: Collection HO advertisement, Dokumentationszentrum 
Alltagskultur der DDR, Eisenhüttenstadt.
 Material Realizations 77
78 Material Fantasies
To me, a western outsider, the overall image came across as rather inconsistent 
and poor. Fortunately, a number of East Germans’ statements claried that this 
impression was not solely down to (western) prejudices or my position as outsider. 
“East German objects represent the world at that time: it was a small world, a sad 
world,” remarked Stefan (a thirty-year-old student) when he saw something that 
reminded him of the old days while we were walking through the city of Jena. A 
similar connection was also suggested by Rudolstadt’s museum director. “Former 
East German society can be seen through its objects,” he said, showing me his 
little collection of East German consumer goods: a bar of soap, a packet of coee, 
a bottle of hair tonic, and other everyday items, which he had hastily bought dur-
ing 1989’s hectic autumn. Foreseeing that the GDR’s material world would soon 
disappear, he had found it important to store some of its everyday items. He did 
not know what to do with them, but future generations of historians might want to 
further investigate the relationship between objects of the period. 
I later regretted neglecting to ask his opinion on that relationship. On the basis 
of what I had seen until then, I had come to associate the former GDR with sever-
ity and puritan rigidity. When I began to search for literature on home furnishings 
and design, it soon became clear that my associations were not purely coinciden-
tal. e East German material world appeared indeed to have been designed on 
the basis of ideas and convictions that could denitely be called severe. 
Corresponding with the classical Marxist axiom that the material basis of so-
ciety determines the social relations and mentality of a people, much thought was 
given to nding the right forms for East Germans’ daily lives. It was considered 
important for their further development to surround them with the right, social-
ist-proof material world. is was not only relevant for the public sphere (urban 
development and architecture), but also for people’s private lives, as highlighted 
by the editors of the popular house and interior design magazine, Kultur im Heim: 
If people’s living space was only the passive copy of their subjective quali-
ties, ideas and tastes, we would not have to look at it from a social per-
spective; it would merely be a private aair. But because people’s living 
space plays such an important role in both the further development of 
human essence and the expression of socialist relationships, and because 
it has such a fundamental function within social psychology, its forms and 
shapes deserve to be dealt with in public. ey are ‘res publica.’3
According to the East German socialist doctrine, people’s material surroundings 
were not only the actual product of economic relations and human labor, they also 
played a signicant role in encouraging the further development of people and 
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society. is dialectic between subject and object was not considered to be a neu-
tral or value-free fact; its resulting development was seen as progressive, leading 
to mankind’s further enlightenment. “Our living space is much more than just a 
shield, a skin, or our life’s visual scenery – it is part of our essence, which develops 
with us and through which we nd and achieve ourselves.”4 
In order for people to nd the right material environment, they had to learn 
how to align their tastes and desires with what was needed to further develop 
society at large. Personal taste and society’s needs could only be matched once 
people had learned to recognize communal interests as their own. is could be 
accomplished by constantly instructing them to give up their acquired habits, pri-
mary impulses and individual desires, and question how they related to the needs 
of society at large. e main instrument to achieve this was the power of reason. 
“Empirical observation is not enough to understand reality in such a way that 
you grasp the total direction of historical movement and development in order 
to achieve the whole truth. For this, a high level of thinking is needed which can 
never be accomplished without a scientically based world view.”5
Although Marxist dialectics assumed that East Germans’ tastes would almost 
automatically develop along the lines sketched above – because “the enlightened 
human subject” would inevitably tend to favor “objects which are parallel to his 
essence” – this appears not always to have been the case.6 In order to help East 
German citizen-consumers nd “forms of expression that are lebensbejahend [life-
conrming], honest and true,” social scientists, philosophers, and designers stud-
ied the relationship between socialism, aesthetics, and taste.7 eir insights were 
popularized and disseminated by Kultur im Heim’s editors to reach and counsel 
the East German public. For more than thirty years, the editors explained to East 
Germans which forms and living room interiors were acceptable and which were 
not.8
Going through entire volumes of the magazine shows that certain mistakes 
in taste were almost ineradicable. is particularly pertained to the preference 
for so-called old antique-looking objects and for things so abundantly adorned 
with frills, obtrusive splendor and neries that they could be described as kitsch. 
Up until 1989, both phenomena were regularly subjected to critical scrutiny by 
Kultur im Heim’s editors. Time and again they tried to inform their readers that 
the “desire for decorations” and by-gone styles were expressions of a “deformed 
aesthetic consciousness,” which would have a far-reaching “inhibiting” eect on 
people individually and on society at large.9
According to the editors, it was “tasteless, absurd, and kitschy to produce a salt-
shaker in the form of an animal or mushroom.” What is more: it was “inappropri-
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ate, and thus superuous” to even decorate salt-shakers. Comparable statements 
reappeared quite regularly in a column to educate readers, called “the school of 
taste.” is column featured the right form and answered questions about a spe-
cic object. When, for instance, various stoves were illustrated, the reader was rst 
asked to make a choice and then turn some pages further to read whether he had 
chosen the correct object or not, and why this was so. e preference for stove 
number seven, for instance, was right because “the structure and proportions of 
stove number seven are good.” If one opted for stove number eight, they explained 
that “this stove’s form is unacceptable.” Preferring a fake, old-looking object was 
wrong because this choice was usually not based on a true understanding of the 
object. If people’s preference for old-looking objects was based on real knowledge 
(of the era when the object was made and used), it was acceptable. In such cases, 
the person’s preference was well informed, because he knew that “old objects ex-
press the heritage of crasmanship and older generations’ taste, incorporating the 
mentality and way of life at that time.” e owner of the old-looking object was 
considered to have “a clear attitude towards yesterday’s objects,” enabling him to 
“ascribe the object its proper place, which is where it optimally serves its goal.” If 
such knowledge and insight did not exist, the attractiveness of old-looking objects 
was merely based on “immature understandings.” As it was obvious that most East 
Germans’ preferences were not based on true historical knowledge, the editors 
of the journal never tired of explaining why this was wrong. Sometimes this was 
done rather ironically: “Many people state that old is old and therefore beautiful. 
Some even respectably call that ‘antique.’ But please, be consistent and turn o the 
lights, put two long twigs in your mouth and use them as a torch while you do the 
housekeeping.”10
e editors of course fully understood that no one really wanted to return to 
these so-called cosy forms of illumination, because they were the silent witnesses 
of the miserable and exploited lives most people then lived. ere was thus no 
objective reason, they went on to explain, to emotionally associate old-looking 
objects with positive notions – such as warmth or romanticism. People had to 
learn that their uninformed eye betrayed them when tempted to buy objects that 
were really “unnatural, meaningless, superuous, unpractical, and overloaded” 
and “sugary, false, unreal, plagiaristic, badly faked, functionless, counterfeit.”11 
Similar reproaches also applied to objects that were not appropriate for East 
German circumstances at that time: objects whose production was extremely ex-
pensive for instance (because they were too big or unwieldy to use), or objects that 
were adorned in order to be adorned, that attracted attention in order to attract 
attention, that were dierent in order to be dierent, new in order to be new, or 
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derived their assumed beauty merely from the fact that they were supposed to 
be fashionable. Such taste preferences, according to the editors of the magazine, 
were dangerous because they made clear that too much importance was attached 
to material objects. In 1982 the magazine featured an article inviting readers to 
take a closer look inside a typical bourgeois home. e description of the interior 
includes a number of classical Marxist ideas: 
Bald regt es sich die kurzen Wände entlang von allerlei verrenkten, misz-
farbig gebeizten, heidenmäszig mit Kupfer beschlagenen Kasten und 
Kästchen, die wildbaumelnde Herde der Beleuchtungskörper rückt lär-
mend ein, das ‘Künstgewerbe’ überutet alle wehrlosen Standächen. 
Schlangenlinien und Lilienwindungen wimmeln auf Tischdecken und 
Buchrücken; und drinnen, mitten in all dem schneidendfalschen Getön 
der ärgerlichsten Willkür, waltet die…Hausfrau [Soon the walls will be 
crammed with all kinds of cabinets and caskets in mismatched color stains 
and with dreadful copper ttings, the wildly dangling ock of lights over-
hanging blatantly, and the arts and cras ooding the helpless oor space. 
Squiggly lines and scrolling lilies will abound on tablecloths and book 
spines; and within, in the midst of all the incisively false tone of highly 
irritating self-righteousness, reigns...the housewife]12 
is popularized version of Marxist ideas on the fetishist relationship between 
people and objects in bourgeois, capitalist societies showed East German read-
ers that their preference for fashionable, so-called chic things actually conveyed a 
form of alienation that characterized life in capitalist societies. In these societies, 
so the argument went, the urge to obtain ever more possessions went hand in hand 
with growing rivalry, and there was no room for sincere relationships between 
people. “e constitutive moment of bourgeois enjoyment...is exclusiveness, the 
exclusion of others,” according to the East German philosopher Lothar Kühne in 
his book on aesthetics.13 It was up to East German designers and intellectuals to 
clarify these processes and explain to East German consumers that this was what 
would happen if they tried to surround themselves with objects that were dishon-
est and insincere, from an enlightened design point of view.
East German rhetoric on design and material culture was dominated by rigid 
and absolute terms, by phrases about the essence of things, true and insincere 
desires, and an honest taste. Reason was the only relevant yardstick, and East 
Germans had to relate rationally towards their material surroundings. Any other 
orientation, like emotions, senses, or fantasy, should be subjected to logical scru-
tiny. Even aesthetics and taste had to be based on a well-balanced rational analysis. 
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People’s existing and former preferences were deemed irrelevant, except as starting 
points for further clarication and enlightenment.
In order to show how these abstract considerations were achieved in practice 
and what concrete objects they generated, it is necessary to rst explain how the 
GDR’s production process was organized. 
Production in East Germany aimed to optimally develop socialist society. As 
explained by the East German Minister of Culture in 1958: “True progress is what 
allows for or coerces further development.”14 Because general interests were best 
served when all available means, knowledge and capacities were used optimally, 
all East German production was centrally planned and mutually aligned: “East 
German economics is socialist, planned economics.”15 e production of con-
sumer goods was centrally planned by the national planning commission and 
based on regional reports. Aer planning, the commission delegated dierent 
tasks (research, design, production, and sales) to the various production units and 
companies. Whenever problems occurred, the national planning commission as-
signed a study group to examine the situation and nd a solution. 
To show why this central organization best served general interests, reference 
was made to capitalism’s inecient, extravagant legacy – an example of which was 
the production of light switches.16 In 1945, the region that was to become the GDR 
counted no fewer than seventeen dierent companies producing 1300 dierent 
light switches. Innumerable people throughout the country were thus involved 
with the same tasks, regarding the production of the same type of product. As this 
was considered an enormous waste of energy, manpower and nancial means, the 
situation had to be changed as soon as possible. Aer careful examination, the 
amount of light switches was set at 178, which were no longer to be produced by 
seventeen, but only by two companies. 
Mutual alignment not only took place at the national level, but also interna-
tionally. e socialist bloc countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid co-
operated in production and trading. eir cooperation was largely based on forms 
of exchange in which money played a subordinate role. “It was almost medieval; 
we simply exchanged commodities,” an East German philosopher explained ironi-
cally. ese international agreements caused a great deal of problems. Frequently, 
the GDR did not receive the agreed amount of commodities, or they were not 
delivered in time, or their quality was worse than expected. When, for instance, 
Hungary did not deliver the ordered number of batteries in time, there was no 
other option but to wait, because Hungary produced batteries and the GDR did 
not. At a national level, such problems were the order of the day. In spite of such 
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shortcomings, the system of central (national and international) planning was not 
open to discussion. 
An additional advantage of the plan system for the national economy was that 
product design could also be monitored centrally. Because, as sketched above, 
it was considered important for the inhabitants of the socialist state to be sur-
rounded by the right forms, it was convenient to develop a national style that was 
in keeping with material culture’s educative and progressive function. Professional 
designers were asked to take the lead in clearing the existing product-landscape 
and searching for a new, truly socialist form. In this way, they played an important 
role in restructuring East German material culture and adjusting it to the new 
state’s demands. 
e main task given to East German designers was to reduce the variety of 
forms and end the “form-wilderness” of objects.17 Starting in the late 1950s, the or-
ders were for an all-encompassing “assortment clearance.”18 is meant designers 
had to critically study all sorts of items, from coeepots and washing-up bowls to 
socks, in order to select the most appropriately designed objects, which were then 
chosen for further production. e selection criteria were the same as discussed 
above: there was no room for bourgeois taste preferences or objects that expressed 
people’s “desire for prestige” or “petty bourgeois ambitions.”19 Showing o or mak-
ing others envious was inappropriate and did not conform to socialist society’s 
egalitarian ideals.20 Objects considered as kitschy were also deemed inappropri-
ate for production. If an object was designed in such a way that its function was 
hidden behind an irrelevant decoration, the object was considered dishonest, be-
cause it renounced its primary aim – to serve a specic goal. Usually, such objects 
also renounced their origin because their appearance suggested another area of 
production than the one in which they were actually made. Comparable critique 
applied to richly decorated objects, whose adornments disguised their industrial 
origins. People who preferred to be surrounded by such things were actually try-
ing to escape from the present time.
ese points of departure underpinned East German designers’ search for 
forms that expressed contemporary, industrial means of production, and that were 
in keeping with the innermost functions and aims of the products concerned. All 
this was to be done as economically as possible, because all available means had to 
be used in a sensible and responsible way.
ri thus became the leading principle. It was regarded as an important vir-
tue – not just for purely economic reasons (the amount of money, raw materi-
als, and manpower used during production), but also from a more qualitative 
perspective. Too much adornment diverted attention from an object’s function. 
Figure 4.6 – East German living room, late 1960s
Source: Collection “Kultur im Heim,” Dokumentationszentrum Alltagskultur der DDR, 
Eisenhüttenstadt.
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Uneconomically designed objects in general tended to overwhelm and belittle 
their users.21 In time, a material culture of frugality developed in the GDR. Both 
for economic reasons and inspired by an idealistic search for honest forms in line 
with present-day reality, designers tried to nd forms and objects that were little 
more than their function’s packaging. Because an object’s appearance had to be 
subordinate to the people who used it, the ideal form resembled a wrapping or 
cover. en the object could show what it was meant for: for closing, sealing and 
covering (technical) functions.22 is perspective gave rise to an economically in-
spired aesthetics.
e result was a rigidly functionalist design, in which objects with straight 
lines and angles were preferred to rounded or curved forms. Producing rectan-
gular objects was easier and more ecient (with little loss of material) and they 
were easier to transport and store. It is therefore no wonder that kits became im-
portant “symbols of progress” in the GDR, since they “rationalize[d] production 
and show[ed] the world to be manufacturable.”23 e ultimate aim was to develop 
a “rational engagement with furniture parts” that would “turn all elements into a 
uniform system.”24
Figure 4.7 – East German living room, undated, late 1960s
Source: Collection “Kultur im Heim,” Dokumentationszentrum Alltagskultur der DDR, 
Eisenhüttenstadt.
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In time, objects came to be merely recognized as parts of a larger whole, and 
the highest praise was reserved for objects that were perfectly able to “adjust – to 
an ensemble, an assortment, a collection, a kit, a room.” Because it would not work 
to combine a straight bed with a curved cabinet, more and more object forms were 
adjusted to suit each other. e possibility to stack objects became a form quality 
in its own right, and ever more designers opted for straight, clear lines and forms, 
and for a neutral and plain color: grey.25 
e fact that more and more objects tended to look alike was not deemed a 
disadvantage, because the key search was for “design qualities that were not deter-
mined by originality, but by objectivity.” e idea was to develop forms “of which 
even the smallest detail was rationally determined,” with a mutual alignment of all 
outer characteristics. Such forms were the result of scientic thinking. In them, 
“science and rationality found their formal expression...even though they were 
mediated by the designer’s subjectivity.”26
While doing all they could for the continual adjustment, merging and ex-
changeability of separate elements and parts, East German designers were ordered 
to investigate how “built-in furniture” could further save space. And by the end of 
the 1960s, the “link between furniture and architecture” was being investigated in 
order to discover how separate parts of housing accommodation could be turned 
into “dierent elements of a uniform system.” Sometimes the entire interior of 
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a at, the furniture and its lay-out were aligned. In such cases it was crucial to 
execute the “formal coherence” of all parts, down to the tiniest details. “Separate 
products were to show their family resemblance very clearly, details of form were 
to recur, colors were to be adapted to each another, standardized parts were to be 
used, and the whole thing should be subject to a modular system.”27
Rational, functional, enlightened, in accordance with present-day reality, no 
deceit, no insincere seduction, mutual alignment, and as economical as possible: 
those were East German design’s main tenets to optimally serve society’s further 
development. e overall image is overwhelmingly consistent, with everything be-
ing subordinate to reason. If a form was right, one could learn to appreciate it. 
Because modernist designers’ vision seamlessly embraced the government’s cost-
cutting aims, the two parties naturally found each other in an outspokenly frugal 
material culture.
Because, as mentioned before, all decisions in the East German planned econ-
omy were taken or conrmed centrally, the overview presented above certainly 
suggests that the state ultimately even decided how people were allowed to furnish 
their apartments. However, one of the main reasons why East German history is 
so fascinating to study is that, in spite of its rigid ideology and seemingly rigid 
economic structure, it was characterized throughout by internal contradictions. 
Nothing was what it seemed, and this certainly applied to the material world, 
which in a number of ways came to look slightly dierent than what is sketched 
above. 
e main reason why everyday reality did not match the previously mentioned 
ideal lies in the fact that the designers’ role in the production process, which al-
though denitely greater than in market economies, was frequently frustrated by 
two dierent factors.28 First, there were the ineradicable, bourgeois taste prefer-
ences of the people with whom they collaborated during production, and second 
they had to deal with the rigid, international economic circumstances. us, many 
designers’ propositions frequently crashed before they were even taken into pro-
duction. By describing and analyzing this process in the following section, I give 
a concrete illustration of what East Germany’s “constitutive contradictoriness” re-
fers to in the domain of material culture. 
“Far Too Modern for Our People,” and Economic Gaps 
East German designers oen had a hard task, for they were actually battling two 
fronts at the same time. While attempting to adjust East Germans’ taste preferences 
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to present-day circumstances and challenges, they were constantly hindered at the 
production site. When a particular design was ready for production, it regularly 
happened that the factory suddenly decided that other interests had to prevail, or 
a party-member with a good position at the factory suddenly decided to change 
the design according to his own liking. is happened quite frequently, sometimes 
because he did not like the product or did not know anything about design. One 
designer told me about an older female party-member who held a high position at 
the factory where one of his products was to be made. When the designer showed 
her cloth samples, she crankily remarked: “Oh no! We don’t want those materials! 
No, this is far too modern for our people! at one is too daring, and that one is 
too colorful. No. is is what we will do.” She then simply swept his plans o the 
table. Another designer explained in more detail that designs were oen discarded 
or changed because East German policymakers, party-members and people with 
a high position in industry usually had a totally dierent taste than professional 
designers:
e former category was oen from a poor, working class background, 
where there was only enough money for the bare necessities. For a long 
time those people had looked up to a somewhat ashy form of comfort, 
which for them was the ultimate ideal. e interiors they had seen at the 
mayor and the notary’s house – that was what they wanted: a shiny cabi-
net with glass doors, enabling one to see the beautiful glass-ware and the 
fancy dishes inside, a beautifully adorned candelabra on top, and a copi-
ous sofa next to it, with beautiful and richly decorated upholstery. at 
was their petty bourgeois image of an ideal home and how things were 
done by people in a certain position. at was the image of prosperity they 
would strive for if they obtained such a position themselves and what they 
wanted to spend their money on. So those were the kinds of objects that 
had to be made. When confronted with something that was too modern, 
too simple, and too plain – for instance a white tea service without golden 
edging or enrichments – they told us: “at is not what our people want.” 
And maybe that was correct, but they themselves did not want it in the 
rst place. e petty bourgeois ideal always remained intact in our coun-
try, and whenever some high-ranking party member had something to 
say, he could change the plans to suit his own wishes.29 
is story shows that at the local level, those who were responsible for the state’s 
frugal policy only subscribed to the economic aspects of its thriy ideology on 
material culture and design. e match between the economic necessity of thri 
Figure 4.8 – Multiple room wall system ‘Frankfurt,’ undated, early 1970s
Source: Collection “Kultur im Heim,” Dokumentationszentrum Alltagskultur der DDR, 
Eisenhüttenstadt. Photo by Michael Weimer.
Figure 4.9 – East German living room interior with wall system ‘Carat,’ 1972
Source: Collection “Kultur im Heim,” Dokumentationszentrum Alltagskultur der DDR, 
Eisenhüttenstadt.
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and most designers’ frugal ideas, which was pledged at the national level, was lo-
cally frustrated by party bosses and others in power who clung to their old taste 
preferences, even though they were not sensible or socialistically sound. If even 
loyal party members’ tastes were not susceptible to rational consideration, we 
might safely conclude that East German material reality was less open for change 
and enlightenment than the lucid socialist ideals would suggest. 
is was exactly my experience on visiting the former GDR for the rst time, 
when I was struck by the odd combination of strict lines and mismatched or-
namentation. e furniture on Weimar’s streets showed a striking compromise 
between designers’ functionalist-inspired and economically reasonable ideas on 
the one hand, and falling behind, petty bourgeois taste preferences of party-bosses 
and most consumers on the other – a compromise between modern lines and a 
cozy-looking decor.
A comparable compromise manifested itself in the way chipboard was used. 
e product as such perfectly suited the socialist state’s ideals: it exemplied the 
optimal use of raw materials, was visibly industrially produced and thus perfectly 
present-day. Remarkably, most chipboard objects and furniture that were pro-
duced and used in the GDR were covered with plastic foil with a wood design, thus 
disguising the manufactured product, making it look like natural wood. Just like 
the party-bosses, who adjusted modern objects to old-fashioned taste preferences, 
the chipboard embellishments also proved that the sound socialist ideas on design 
were not as widely appreciated as well-meaning idealists hoped.
Most designers knew that their ideas for functional products were relatively 
unpopular. “Many people didn’t like objects that clearly showed their function. 
ey wanted to have richly embellished things, with for instance a owery edg-
ing and elegant nish,” a middle-aged female designer told me. Her remark was 
substantiated by many East German consumers. “In our country, everything al-
ways looked the same: straightforward and unadorned. We didn’t like that. We 
preferred objects with a little adornment here, and a little trimming there,” people 
explained to me. But trimmings and adornments were not in line with socialist 
policy, and designers stuck to a rational, more or less ageless ideal, where form 
follows function. 
At the academy, students even learned to design contrary to the somewhat 
soer, rounded, fashionable (and western-looking) forms that so many East 
German consumers desired, as Karin, a 35-year-old designer, explained:
ese forms were regarded as a genuection for naive consumers, whereas 
consumers needed to be educated. And that was what we were for. It was 
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not our task to make what people wanted or liked. Because what they liked 
and wanted was no design. It had nothing to do with design at all – that 
was what we learned.
But frequently she too had to accept that once her well-considered designs were 
being produced, they would be embellished with colorful, owery motives. 
e material objects that came to dominate the East German product world 
were the result of an interesting combination of factors and forces: the modernist 
ideas of relatively highly educated designers who were supported by national poli-
cies (if only for economic reasons), but constantly frustrated by the unenlightened 
taste preferences of consumers, some of whom had the power and capacity to ac-
tually obstruct designers’ work. 
e third force that had a major inuence on the East German material land-
scape was money. When discussing material culture’s everyday form and social-
ist ideals with a highly educated, prominent party member, he snarled curtly: 
“Ideology?? Socialist personality??? Come on! It was all a matter of money! Our 
objects were ugly because we couldn’t aord anything else. Besides, there was no 
need to please the eye; people bought everything anyway.” All the beautiful, edu-
cative ideas on design discussed above were swept aside as completely irrelevant. 
e GDR’s material appearance and decor had primarily been determined by the 
country’s poor economic situation. His remark further claried what I had seen 
on the side streets of Weimar and Rudolstadt: an impossible compromise between 
modern-enlightened and traditional-bourgeois, that was further compromised by 
the GDR’s permanent lack of money and raw materials.
e impact of East Germany’s economic developments on its material culture 
can hardly be overstated – especially with regard to the period from the end of 
the1970s. “In fact,” a retired doctor explained to me, “East German economics 
were characterized by gaps. ere was a constant succession of gaps and shortages, 
and in fact this was pre-programmed in the socialist economic system.” To illus-
trate his point, he referred to the area he knew best: the pharmaceutical industry. 
Today we have about eighty thousand dierent medicines. Some of them 
chemically work the same, curing the same symptoms. is variety was 
considered undesirable in the GDR. erefore, the amount of medication 
was limited to about two thousand types: there was one medication for 
each symptom. is could have worked well, but the problems were insur-
mountable when one of the ingredients was not available. en the whole 
plan went haywire, and certain medicines were simply not available. is 
Figure 4.10 – Ökometer
Source: Dokumentationszentrum 
Alltagskultur der DDR.
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was almost perpetually the case: then there were no medicines for head-
aches, and then there was nothing for rheumatics or corns, etc. 
In spite of the country’s continual shortages and planning deciencies, ocial pol-
icy never openly revealed or discussed the less than rosy economic situation. Time 
and time again, people were confronted with announcements applauding the lat-
est positive developments in the eld of production and public welfare. 
In 1978, for instance, a picture of the so-called Ecometer was displayed on 
every street corner (see gure 4.10). Its message read: “Out of every working hour, 
every mark [the GDR’s currency, mv], and every gram of raw material, we obtain 
more useful products.” In light of the ongoing shortages that plagued East German 
planning and production at the time, the message comes across as an outright lie. 
But as I mentioned before, nothing was what it seemed in the GDR, and that also 
applied to this message. For it was indeed true that East Germany managed to 
produce ever more with ever fewer materials. An employee of a furniture manu-
facturer told me laughingly how this came about: “You want to know how we man-
aged to make more pasta out of less wheat? We simply enlarged the holes in our 
macaroni!” It was a joke, but when she explained how the furniture industry man-
aged to continuously raise its production levels, the reality was no laughing matter. 
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ere were plenty of ways to increase production. If, for instance, we 
used more expensive materials, we didn’t have to produce as many items. 
Another trick was to send the products back and forth. For example, we 
bought chair components from company X, assembled them at our com-
pany, then sent them – still as separate components – to a rm to uphol-
ster them, aer which the items were returned to us, and we produced 
the chair that was then sent to yet another company which packaged the 
products. By continually sending objects back and forth, their price went 
up and so did our turnover. Once we had bad luck: the Russians delivered 
the materials we had ordered at a lower price than expected. is made 
our production cheaper than planned, reducing our turnover. e party 
summoned us to explain what had happened, and we were reprimanded. 
Nowadays this is inconceivable – we would be delighted to obtain cheap 
materials! From a market-economic perspective, it is a clear example of 
things being turned upside down.
e story not only exemplies some of the planned economy’s main failures. It 
also shows how much eort people put into upholding the beautiful-sounding 
promises despite the stubborn and disappointing reality confronting them. 
“In fact it was impossible,” a woman explained, “to make plans, let alone achieve 
them.” She had been responsible for making and checking the economic plans for 
Rudolstadt region’s thirty bookshops, but she pointed out how impossible it was 
to know in advance how many books would be sold in each shop in the following 
year. One could not make solid plans, but it was a public secret that the plans were 
creatively adjusted aerwards. 
Sometimes this happened in public. en, reference was made to the objective 
reasons (i.e. caused somewhere else) for why the plan was not accomplished. For 
instance, an archive record of an Exquisit shop’s plan states: “Because there are ob-
jective reasons for insucient fulllment of the plan, trading gures for February 
have dropped statistically by one-and-a-half million.”30 Usually, however, the plans 
were adjusted less discernably – by creative accounting. In Rudolstadt’s Allotment 
Association’s plans for the year 1975, one column mentions that the small stock 
gures had not improved since last year, whereas another column mentions a 10 
percent rise.31 When I asked her to explain, the archives assistant said this was 
probably correct: she assumed that the gardeners had acquired fewer animals, but 
slaughtered more than in the previous year. 
ese examples show, each in their own way, that people did their utmost best 
to uphold the positive tone so characteristic of the GDR’s public sphere. Apart 
Figure 4.11a and b – East German drugstore products
Source: Georg C. Bertsch, Ernst Hedler, and Matthias Dietz. SED. Schönes Einheits Design. 
Köln: Benedikt Taschen Verlag, 1990.
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from creative accounting, understatements and other forms of beautication were 
frequently used to atter developments. If it was impossible to leave out a nega-
tive development, people oen enveloped it in beautiful-sounding phrases. A con-
dential archive document from 1963 about trading and supplies in Rudolstadt 
mentions the following: “e women of our area are still very much engaged in all 
the issues pertaining to the maintenance of peace and the problems of the Moscow 
Agreement, but also in matters of supply.”32 e document is telling: twenty-six 
positive words, followed by an almost negligible six-worded remark. e same 
applies to the following message on the state of aairs concerning food supplies, 
which dates from the year 1983 and has a positive ring:
e available amount of potatoes guarantees the population a stable sup-
ply in the nearby future. Problems exist in the preservation of quality, due 
to increasing Schwarzeckigkeit [black spot]. In the vegetables category we 
are able to provide sucient lettuce, rhubarb, onions, white cabbage and 
sauerkraut. ere are also enough apples.33 
e positive tone of the message is so dominant, that it takes a second read to real-
ize that the population of Rudolstadt had to be satised, in the middle of June, with 
a rather limited choice of vegetables, while the potatoes had black spots. 
Figure 4.12 – Packing of a Heli-Radio reciever. Regular corrugated card board was used in 
combination with a tag showing the company’s brand label. Heli-Radio, a private company 
until 1972, was famous for the professionally designed corporate design of the mid-1960s as 
well as for their functionalist radio designs. Undated, probably 1970s or 1980s
Source: Packaging collection, Dokumentationszentrum Alltagskultur der DDR, 
Eisenhüttenstadt. Photo: Andreas Ludwig.
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Besides quality, the appearance of most consumer goods also suered from 
the poor economic circumstances, the director of Gera’s Museum of Applied Arts 
explained, while showing me the museum’s East German packaging and consumer 
goods collection. Going past the material remains of the old days, he repeatedly 
drew my attention to the poor and loveless appearance of the products. “And then 
always this serial production,” he sighed, pointing to the drugstore products.
e color of the label was the only way to tell whether you were holding a 
bottle of pills for headaches, diarrhea, or stomach-ache, or if it was a bottle 
of shampoo, nail polish remover, or hair lotion. But even the colors were 
dicult to distinguish. ey were all of the same dull hue. In this country, 
yellow was never really yellow and blue was never really blue. ere was 
simply no money to obtain good, richly pigmented coloring. 
Since East German packaging was usually of a rather coarse, thick paper that bore 
some resemblance to cardboard and typically had a very loose structure, the co-
loured ink was almost entirely absorbed into the paper’s pores. Most packaging 
was therefore reminiscent of today’s vaguely colored, eco-friendly toilet paper. 
It oen had a simple white sticker with “light bulb, 40 Watts” written on it. e 
general image was extremely disconsolate. e director showed me a packet of 
biscuits, and judging by its appearance, it could have contained anything – from 
elastic bands to rat poison – except biscuits.34 
Figure 4.13 – Chairs in a waiting room in 
Rudolstadt, 1994
Source: Picture by the author.
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e GDR had insucient nancial resources to produce vibrantly colored 
paint, good paper, or a variety of packaging.35 Sometimes the overall shortages 
were such that extreme measures were necessary. An inhabitant of a hamlet near 
Rudolstadt told me that one day, when the Soviet Union was unable to deliver the 
agreed amount of maize, the whole country was ordered to plant maize. Even the 
garden of the small local school did not grow anything but maize that year. 
In order to rid itself of international dependency, East German industry was 
continually encouraged to “cut back and intensify the use of indigenous resources” 
and “abgestimmte Veredlungskonzepte [coordinated renement concepts].”36 No 
matter how beautiful the words, in practice it meant that the holes in the macaroni 
were bigger, or that chair-leg producers used so little metal that chairs could easily 
sag under the slightest weight or movement (see gure 4.13).
e quality of East German products became worse and worse, the country 
was simply runtergerubelt [Russicism, literally: roubled down], and ever more 
people began complaining: about the bottles of beer – which people used to turn 
upside down to check whether they contained akes, as beer was made from sur-
rogates instead of real malt and hops; about the clothes made of surrogate cotton, 
which caused excessive perspiration when worn; about the chocolate produced 
with almost no cacao; about the butter that contained too much water; about the 
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chewing gum that fell apart when you chewed it and later became so hard that 
it almost broke your teeth; about the jeans-surrogate which the GDR eventually 
managed to develop, but which did not even look like the original; about the fur-
niture made from pressed paper, which miraculously did not fall apart spontane-
ously; about the water taps made of plastic, and the cars made of paper; about 
the sandals that were made of pressed paper instead of leather, with plastic soles 
instead of rubber.37 
As these examples show, East German products were to a certain extent fake: 
fake chocolate, fake cotton, fake rubber, beer, butter, cars and wooden furniture. 
Dissatisfaction was growing. People not only complained about the quality, but 
also about products’ appearance, their availability, variety and price. In one of 
Rudolstadt’s Exquisit shops, female customers were unsatised with the garments 
on display: they were not enticed by “trousers made of polyester-silk with bright 
glittery eects.” ey did not want to spend half their wages on stuy winter jack-
ets, for they wanted “elegant, cotton, fur-trimmed coats.”38 But they were not avail-
able. 
Billboards along East German highways never stopped showing that: Chemie 
gibt Brot, Wohlstand und Schönheit [the chemical industry will provide bread, wel-
fare and beauty]. is motto, which once expressed a promising future optimism, 
in the end was merely cynical, unable to conceal the fact that there was not enough 
money for cotton, metal, hops and malt. But none of this could really be said out 
loud.39 If there was no butter, newspapers published articles explaining in detail 
that butter was actually not very healthy and that margarine was preferable. 
In the GDR, the reality was always embellished. e media outdid each other 
with their jubilant declarations: “Year aer year the planning goals for the pro-
duction of consumer goods are fullled and improved” or “the rate of agrarian 
production has grown during the year 1986 and is ve times higher than in the 
period 1981-1985.”40 Shops aimed to “cream o more money [in the next year] and 
in the years thereaer,” and economic diagrams always showed a rising trend.41 
Whenever Honecker or another important politician travelled through the coun-
try, the houses along his route were painted afresh and the eld in front of the 
factory he was going to visit was sprayed with green paint.42 
In the course of East Germany’s entire history, the optimistic and cheerful mes-
sages remained the same: it won’t take long, we’re doing our best, and it is getting 
better. East German public life was dominated by positive words, whereas every-
body could see with their own eyes how dreadful the economic situation actually 
was. Because every level of East German bureaucracy messed around with facts 
and gures, trying to enhance reality on paper, Mary Fulbrook concludes that 
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Honecker and his colleagues lived in a “hall of mirrors, where the messages that 
were reected from the center came back from the provinces in a slightly moder-
ated form.”43 
I always wondered what it would have been like to live amidst beautiful prom-
ises and the harsh reality of beer with akes and chocolate without cacao. I have 
given a few examples of the complaints and dissatisfaction this caused. It would 
not have been dicult to extend the list and ll many pages. One would therefore 
expect East Germans to have increasingly turned away from the state, de-identi-
fying with it and its false promises. One would expect the pact between state and 
citizens, which was based on high hopes and far-reaching promises in the wake of 
material improvement, to be crushed by the disappointing East German material 
conditions. To a certain extent, that was indeed the case. It is no coincidence that 
when German historian Lutz Niethammer was doing an oral history project in 
the GDR in 1988, he was particularly struck by the omnipresent critiques on the 
country’s material situation.44 And of course, these critiques played a central role 
in East Germans’ mounting desires vis-à-vis the western consumer world.
At the same time, however, it soon became clear to me that the material and 
economic hardships people suered also generated behavior and forms of social 
contact that characterized East German life in a positive way. It may be hard to 
believe, but the pact between state and citizens seems to have partly survived – in 
spite of the frustrations about unfullled promises – because the promises were 
not fullled. 
Queuing and Mutual Equality
Material shortages were a recurrent theme in my conversations with East Germans. 
Many people told me that in the old days, experience simply taught them that it 
was not wise to go shopping with specic items in mind. Aer all, you could never 
be sure which goods would be available or not. Sometimes there was no wash-
ing powder, sometimes no milk. Aer the Wende, Matthias Biskupek, a writer 
from Rudolstadt, described the GDR as the country inhabited by Beuteldeutschen 
[shopping-bag Germans].45 Due to the permanent shortages, East Germans always 
had a shopping bag with them. One never knew in advance what would happen – 
one might even run into something that one just happened to need...
People were therefore always preoccupied with being able to buy certain things. 
is is not to say that they were constantly buying things. ey were constantly 
trying to make deals that would allow them to buy or obtain things in the future. 
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For an outsider like me, it was fascinating to hear their stories. Not just because 
they opened up a world I did not know, but also for more theoretical reasons. 
e constant shortages made the East German economy function according to 
a completely dierent set of values than I knew. Whereas the value of money de-
clined, social contacts were invaluable. But the deplorable material situation also 
triggered forms of behavior that had profound eects on East German social life. 
I overheard innumerable stories about the dierent methods people used in 
order to acquire all their bare necessities. People were constantly exchanging and 
arranging necessary purchases. At work, women frequently circulated notes so 
that they could all write down what they needed from the supermarket, the gro-
cery store and the butcher. en they allocated the tasks, and one went to queue 
here, the other there. “As soon as we heard that they had a specic kind of meat 
somewhere, everyone le work in order to get a place in the queue. But even then, 
you oen came home empty-handed, because the saleswoman had put it aside for 
her acquaintances,” a middle-aged civil servant recalled. Because shopping in the 
socialist bloc was so unpredictable, the Polish psychologist Zbigniew Czwartosz 
has compared socialist consumers with hunters: 
e Poles go shopping like hunters go hunting. Just like hunters, they do 
not know precisely ‘what’ they will manage to track down. ey do get a 
clear hint when to start the action. And that is the sight of a queue. We 
react to the queue like a sherman to a jerk on his bait. We get a thrill of 
emotion and enter the stage of our everyday life theatre.46
As soon as there was a queue somewhere, people joined it – even if they did not 
know what they were queuing for. All they knew was that at the end of the queue 
something was for sale, and it hardly mattered what that was: rare goods were al-
ways useful. So instead of asking what was for sale and whether one needed it, the 
automatic reaction when seeing a queue was simply to think “buy it.” Czwartosz’s 
ve-year-old son once came home very disappointed, saying that he had not been 
able to buy parsley, because there was no queue anywhere. “e lack of a queue 
met a gap in his knowledge about shopping.”47
Czwartosz’s article illustrates that people’s desires were to a great extent deter-
mined by the (un)availability of goods. is conclusion corresponded with the 
stories I heard. One of my acquaintances in Rudolstadt told me the following story:
Whenever the supermarkets put signs on a certain product to indicate 
that individual customers were only entitled to buy a limited amount, it 
was obvious that this product was in short supply. Just for fun, we then 
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placed the sign somewhere else – on a product that was widely available. 
Within no time that product was sold out, whereas the product that was 
really in short supply was not sold at all!! 
Another woman told me: “Because we were always running aer goods, the GDR 
was frequently referred to as the running-club.” Oen people started to stock 
Christmas presents around September already, for if you started in December, you 
would certainly not nd everything you needed in time. e same applied to the 
ingredients for baking Christmas cakes – almonds, for instance, or raisins, or co-
conut. Such foodstus were always scarce, and whenever they were available, they 
were sold out within a few hours, “because people do their utmost best to meet 
their year-round needs.”48 Hoarding was common practice in the GDR. People 
did not buy what they needed but what they were allowed to (sales of so-called 
deciency goods were limited).49 
An older woman from a village close to Rudolstadt once told me about the 
day her daughter wanted to buy a winter coat. Her husband and daughter went 
into town together to nd a coat. She had told them not to worry about money: 
the most important thing was that they buy a good, warm coat. When they came 
home later that aernoon, they appeared not to have a coat, but a bathing suit. 
ey had not seen any winter coats at all, but as soon as they saw the bathing suits, 
there was no doubt in their minds at all, and they instantly decided to buy one. 
Aer all, you never knew whether bathing suits would be available next summer. 
e father in this story knew that his daughter actually needed a bathing suit, 
but oen people simply bought an item just because it was hard to get – even if 
they knew they were not going to need it themselves. Such haphazardly bought 
items did not necessarily end up in the attic. Frequently, something turned out to 
be useful in an unexpected way, for instance when you ran into an acquaintance 
who appeared to be in need of that specic item and who was happy to exchange 
it for something you yourself needed. 
Due to the continual shortage of a wide range of goods, the customer was 
never king in the GDR, but treated as beggar. e opposite applied to people who 
worked in a shop or restaurant. ey were extremely powerful. “I never had such a 
large circle of friends as zu DDR-Zeiten [the days of the GDR], when I worked in a 
shop selling household goods,” a young man told me. Everybody came up to him 
asking: “Do you happen to have a so-and-so, can you arrange this or that for me?” 
A similar story came from a woman who worked in a restaurant. She explained 
that she was regularly exchanging restaurant seats for goods. On special occasions 
she and her colleagues reserved tables for special guests – the women working 
Figure 4.14 a and b – Houses in (the vicinity of) Rudolstadt, 1994
Source: Pictures by the author.
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in the children’s wear shop, for instance, who could have a seat in exchange for 
babies’ nappies. 
As these stories show, it paid to have a job in a shop or other access to scarce 
goods and services. Many people grew strawberries or asparagus in their garden as 
exchange-capital. Such luxury goods were always scarce, and being unnecessary, 
they were unaordable and therefore very suitable exchange objects. “Goods are 
the real currency in this country. ose with something to give have the potential 
to obtain.”50 Certain goods such as spare parts for cars and building materials were 
always hard to get. ey were invaluable: once you obtained such goods, every-
thing else was accessible. One way to obtain them was by maintaining an extensive 
exchange network. e signicance of such networks was highlighted in a story 
told by Mr. Linke, a middle-aged man who used to work as a taxi-driver. He man-
aged to build his own house which, considering the permanent shortages of build-
ing materials, had certainly not been easy. He bought only a small amount of the 
required materials in shops – the rest he had managed to acquire through all kinds 
of unocial arrangements. It had taken him only eight years to build the house, 
which was a relatively short period. He could only achieve this, he explained, be-
cause he had done nothing else but work and build, and because he knew a lot of 
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people (through his work) who were able to get him what he needed. He some-
times refused to drive people unless they brought him a bag of sand, stones or 
mortar. He explained that this was the reason why so many houses in the GDR 
looked as if they were made from dierent scraps of materials. “Everything was 
so scarce, that you were happy to get at least something; the question of whether 
it tted in with the rest was completely irrelevant. e result usually looked rather 
hotchpotch: dierent sizes of kitchen tiles, and general mismatching in almost 
every domain.”
e permanent shortages and waiting-lists also led to widescale bribery and 
corruption.51 e man who owned the only furniture shop in Rudolstadt that was 
still successful aer the Wende told me that he believed the reason for his success 
was that he was the only one who had always traded fairly. at is: he had al-
ways divided up the available furniture in an honest way. Even when high-ranking 
party-members came to the shop and asked if he could arrange a certain couch 
or side table, he treated them in exactly the same way as he treated others: they 
could put their name on a list, and then they had to wait. In most shops, things 
went dierently. A woman told me about her attempts to acquire a new television 
set. She was on the waiting list, and one day a saleswoman told her that a deliv-
ery of new televisions was expected the next morning. Because she really wanted 
one, she arranged for some of her family to spend the night on the pavement in 
front of the store. In the end, she was able to buy a television, but even so, she had 
seriously reckoned with the possibility of coming away empty-handed. Certain 
goods were so scarce and so desired, she explained, that they were usually sold 
under the counter. As soon as they arrived, the salespeople put them under the 
proverbial counter in order to sell them to the person with whom they had made 
an agreement (usually a person who happened to have something the saleswoman 
needed). When the specic customer arrived to buy the so-called Bückwaren [ar-
ticles sold under the counter], the saleswoman bent down to get the objects from 
under the counter and sold them. Referring to these practices, many shopkeepers 
said that their job actually did not involve selling goods, but redistributing them. 
e same situation applied to services. Sometimes, people even traded places 
on a waiting list – for example when buying a car. e continual shortages led 
to the habit of moonlighting, and East Germans developed other creative tactics. 
Under the motto “private above adversity,” people frequently stole materials from 
their workplace in order to trade them amongst each other. ese practices were 
generally known – business crime was even recorded in the plan.52 A form of brib-
ery was even used by the state from time to time – for instance, when the political 
situation was tense, or when something special was about to occur (elections). 
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Such situations were designated as versorgungspolitischen Schwerpunkte [supply-
political main points].53 In order to secure a calm and reasonably satised mood 
amongst the population, scarce goods were made available in order to buy popular 
support. A few extra truckloads of oranges were enough to obtain a satisfactory 
result or, as was stated in a report on the local political situation in the year 1983: 
“Further progress was attained [through] politically inuencing the availability of 
extra consumer goods for popular supply.”54 
East Germany’s widescale corruption undoubtedly had far-reaching nega-
tive economic consequences, but from a social point of view, the consequences 
were markedly positive. As sketched above, social life in the GDR was upheld by 
large-scale exchange networks which kept people informed of each other’s wishes, 
needs, frustrations and searches. eatre tickets were exchanged for stockings, 
baby clothes were bartered for a bathroom-mat, and if you knew someone who 
kept rabbits or worked at a butcher’s shop, you would certainly be tucking into 
rabbit or goose at Christmas. Money played a subordinate role in these networks. 
Whereas national economics were plagued by continual nancial shortages, the 
majority of the East German population had enough money at its disposal. eir 
main problem was the inability to spend it on things they really wanted. 
Traditional economic thinking has long seen barter as the forerunner or breed-
ing ground for nancial deals. e East German situation actually showed the 
opposite: here, barter functioned as a way to solve the problems originating in the 
nancial economy.55 e stories I recorded in Rudolstadt show that barter should 
certainly not be seen as a non-monetary form of trade. Even if people negotiated 
the goods and amounts to be exchanged, there were no external, objective criteria 
to calculate the value of exchanged goods. Value was determined solely by both 
parties’ interests in the other’s possession. And when goods and desires happened 
to match, an exchange was made. ere was no nancial gain, and the entire pro-
cess was set in motion by people trying to satisfy their own desires, helping each 
other along the way. e social element was a welcome side-eect, independently 
adding value to the interaction. Because the implicit rule that you get something 
from me and I get something from you is a far more social aair than an exchange 
organized according to externally recognized values (money), barter is a form of 
exchange “which creates social relations in its own mode.”56
e anecdotes about barter and exchange I encountered in Rudolstadt clearly 
illustrate Mauss’s widely accepted idea that the exchange of goods encourages mu-
tual solidarity. A wide web of social relationships was woven throughout the town, 
linking everyone to countless others through countless strands. rough the pro-
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cess of bartering and exchanging goods, people were in touch with and linked up 
with others. 
e other major consequence of permanent shortages, that is to say queuing, 
had a similar eect. Standing in line together, waiting for scarce goods, led to a cer-
tain commonality amongst the queuing people. Existing social-economic dieren-
tiations faded temporarily – everyone had to queue up for oranges, the doctor just 
as much as the worker and the party-member just as much as the critical teenager.
While standing and grumbling together, people experienced something com-
munal that surpassed the mutual dierences prevailing elsewhere. Although peo-
ple with a rich network of acquaintances or a higher social position probably spent 
less time queuing than others, they also had to stand and wait until they were 
served, or to see what was for sale. If they wanted to obtain scarce goods, they 
were also dependent on factors beyond their power. us, queuing also had a cer-
tain leveling, democratizing eect and: “[A]rticulated (in grumbling) were oen 
interests that transcended the individual…in being annoyed they were one.”57 e 
fact that people knew each other’s needs and wants also helped to create a certain 
intimacy or community feeling, which was the direct result of the GDR’s continual 
scarcities and economic misery. 
Interestingly, solidarity amongst the East German population, which the 
socialist state had promised, was indeed a result of the material situation – not 
because it had improved, but because it failed to improve. Anthropologist Chris 
Hann draws a comparable conclusion about Polish farmers before the upheaval 
of 1989-1990. e highly praised mutual solidarity, which the Polish state made a 
great ideological song and dance about, was primarily experienced when people 
were queuing together in front of a shop: “[A] true spirit of solidarity developed 
during the hours (sometimes days) they spent waiting at the shop for the delivery 
truck to arrive.”58
More generally, one could even conclude that, in as much as solidarity and 
feelings of commonality did characterize East German daily life, they were to a 
certain extent the result of the state’s inability to fulll its material and consumer 
promises. People suered the same shortages, almost everyone (except the small 
circle at the head of the socialist unity party) had to stand in the same queues, 
and scarcity compelled people to develop a much larger social network than they 
otherwise would have had. All those very practical, everyday forms of sharing and 
social contact generated a feeling of commonality, solidarity and mutual equality 
that people dearly missed aer the Wende. 
Life in the GDR was dominated by a huge discrepancy between the state’s 
claims and everyday reality. Nothing was what it was said to be. Newspapers 
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merely presented beautiful promises that hardly anyone gave credence to. e re-
tired judge mentioned before, who had remained a loyal party-member, recalled a 
party conference in the mid-1980s. While socialist praises were again being sung 
in the most beautiful words, he shoved a note to one of his party colleagues stating: 
“Sure, things are great in this country! at’s why the shops are always empty, and 
there is nothing for sale.” Looking back, he compared the GDR with the fairytale 
of the emperor’s new clothes: “Everyone had to be jubilant about things no one 
could see.”
Although ultimately no one believed that the beautiful-sounding words would 
ever become reality, people still cooperated in reproducing them – perhaps not 
wholeheartedly, but grumbling and complaining, secretly sending notes to each 
other, but still... at all bureaucratic levels people beautied reality. Everyone helped 
to uphold a reality no one believed in.
It is reminiscent of the situation in Syria, evocatively described and analyzed 
by political scientist Lisa Wedeen. She describes a country where the inhabitants 
collectively act as if they believe in the language of power. e insincerity is so 
evident that the question arises of why politics are based “on the external and eas-
ily falsied trappings of loyalty, rather than on people’s internal beliefs.”59 Wedeen’s 
comments are highly relevant when trying to understand why the pact between 
East German citizens and the state remained intact in spite of material promises 
not being fullled. 
According to Wedeen, people participating in actions they do not believe in 
contribute to a mentality of powerlessness, thus implicitly proving and helping to 
realize the power of the state.60 Participating and acting as if reality was as beautiful 
as described on paper shows that “the regime can make most people obey most of 
the time.”61 is binds people. It incriminates them, making them “aware of their 
willingness to comply.”62 In doing so, they become enmeshed with and part of the 
state apparatus. 
Wedeen’s conclusions aptly capture what I have tried to show empirically in 
this chapter: that it was impossible to draw a line between the East German state 
and its citizens. Everyone helped to enhance the printed version of reality. Party 
bosses and ordinary people – everyone complained about unadorned tea services 
and empty shops. And as Mary Fulbrook showed: the beautiful-sounding prom-
ises were sent from the center to the rest of the country, aer which almost equally 
beautiful messages were sent back from the regions to the administrative center. It 
was almost impossible to think of a position “strictly outside or inside the state.”63 
East Germans were not only subordinate to the power and language of the socialist 
state, in myriad ways they also reproduced them themselves; by writing that plans 
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had been achieved again, and that the women in the Rudolstadt area were primar-
ily occupied with “issues pertaining to the maintenance of peace.”64
Instead of studying East German society as one in which everything was deter-
mined and orchestrated by the centre, it is more benecial to focus on the constant 
“interaction and mutual dependence between rulers and ruled.”65 e next chapter 
will deal with this interaction and mutual dependence. ere I will show that it 
was specically the East German state’s omnipresence which eventually privatized 
the state: “[P]recisely because [the state] had lost its limits, in a certain sense [it] 
became increasingly vergesellschaet [indistinguishable from society].”66 is cer-
tainly plays a role in explaining why during my eldwork so many East Germans 




e East German Dictatorship
e classication of political ideas into only two categories, dominance and resistance, 
gives analytic life to a mythical reduction of the complexity and multifacetedness of hu-
man thought. ere can be many more than two sides, many more than two postures, 
many more than two ideas of ‘reality’ (Sally Falk-Moore, 1993).1
One of the most interesting themes which emerged from my conversations with 
people was the way the power of the state featured in their past. On the one hand, 
people wholeheartedly admitted that the state had exerted a far-reaching inuence 
on their existence. In their stories, the state was generally portrayed as a distant 
entity, responsible for everything that had gone wrong in the GDR: “em at the 
top, they were always thinking up such strange things...” At the same time, the in-
uence of the state was perceived in a highly relative way, with phrases such as: “It 
wasn’t that bad, we didn’t take it seriously.” Furthermore, as will be shown in this 
chapter, it was precisely thanks to the bond between state and citizenry that the 
majority of the people I met had not seen the state as a threat, but on the contrary 
as a force that had actually played a rather positive role in daily life. It was partly 
due to the state’s omnipresence that the general atmosphere in the GDR had been 
so warm and friendly.
Initially, I found this inconceivable. Why did people’s stories about the past 
sound so mild, sometimes even entirely positive, and nearly always defensive – as 
for instance in the frequently heard sentence “es war nicht alles schlecht damals [it 
wasn’t all that bad].” Two of the most frequently mentioned positive aspects people 
recalled were the warmth and mutual equality that had supposedly characterized 
their former lives. Yet another comment that many people repeated about their 
past was: “We were all in the same boat then.” Spoken in a somewhat defensive 
manner, like an excuse, the same boat apparently represented the security brought 
about by mutual equality.2 
Although I did occasionally hear critical comments about the past, they were 
negligible compared to the amount of protective and positive accounts. e main 
criticism was limited to material consumption. e major problems and limita-
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tions that I as westerner was used to associating with living in a dictatorship ap-
peared to have been relatively insignicant for most East Germans, as they were 
only mentioned by a relatively small number of people. I could not understand 
this. In my eyes, the GDR had been above all a state where deprived liberty, op-
pression, and restriction were the order of the day. And the neutral and positive 
way in which East Germans identied their former existence was a mystery to me.
Naturally, I could appreciate that it must be hard for East Germans to be con-
stantly confronted with westerners’ negative, one-sided perspective of their past. 
And I also appreciated that my attempts to understand their history were greatly 
hindered by the erce conict concerning East Germany’s past that had been rag-
ing between East and West Germans since the Wende in 1989. e people I met 
were accustomed to westerners being nothing but judgmental about the past. As 
they assumed beforehand that my questions would be based on western disap-
proval, I saw their positive comments about bygone days primarily as a reaction 
to this negativity. However, time and time again people tried to explain to me that 
this was not the only issue, and that I did not understand anything about life in the 
GDR if I was not able to appreciate that there were positive sides to their lives, also 
as a result of the dictatorship. It was stalemate: whilst I could not help approaching 
East Germany’s past in a rather negative way, my informants tried to convince me 
that it was not so bad. “at’s just the way it was,” was the third most oen repeated 
sentence, emphasizing that what westerners saw as horric was merely a way of 
life for East Germans. 
us, these three sentences used by East Germans to ward o criticism from 
westerners show that there were positive sides to life in East Germany which have 
never been understood by the west. 
1. “Es war nicht alles schlecht damals [It wasn’t all bad in the past].”
 I wondered, in silence: “Wasn’t it? Tell me one thing that can withstand critical 
scrutiny!”
2. “Damals saβen wir allen im gleichen Boot [We were all in the same boat 
then].” 
 I wondered, in silence: “at’s what I mean: imagine nding consolation be-
cause everyone is equally badly o!”
3. “Es war nun mal so [at’s just the way it was].” 
 I wondered, in silence: “Right! Precisely the fact that nobody could change 
anything was what made it so awful!”
For me as a westerner, the signicance of the above-mentioned statements was 
shaped entirely by the all-devouring perspective of the GDR as dictatorship. But 
time and time again people tried to persuade me that I could not maintain this 
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perspective if I wanted to understand how East Germans had experienced their 
past.
Finally, people managed to convince me that their attitude towards the past 
was more than just a reaction to the huge changes that had taken place in their 
lives since 1989, or to the west’s condemnation. ey made it clear that there 
were also intrinsic reasons why they felt sad when thinking about bygone days. I 
came to realize that in order to understand why so many East Germans, despite 
everything, had such a strong sense of belonging to the GDR and described its 
warmth in such nostalgic terms, a radical change in perspective was necessary. 
I would have to learn to dierentiate my views on the relationship between the 
East German powers and the country’s inhabitants. In this chapter I describe my 
struggle to understand their perception of their past, including the conict going 
on in the media and among intellectuals and historians (especially German ones). 
Theorizing Dictatorship
Historians and intellectuals have long been debating how East Germany’s past 
should be viewed and to what extent the notion of dictatorship was helpful to 
understand it. For a long time experts in various disciplines have viewed and an-
alyzed socialist societies in Central and Eastern Europe – especially the Soviet 
Union – as being totalitarian dictatorships. ey applied the term totalitarian in an 
attempt to explain that the powers in such societies were indeed total and capable 
of penetrating all of their citizens’ existence. 
In the 1960s, the totalitarian concept passed into disuse mainly due to a num-
ber of academic and social developments. First of all, academic thinking on politi-
cal systems changed. Whereas formerly much emphasis had been placed on the 
role and actions of individuals or relatively small groups of powerful people as 
decisive historical and/or social actors, now attention was more focused on the po-
litical and social structures in which these actors were operating. Second, people 
were becoming more aware that there was also criticism and opposition in what 
up until then had been called totalitarian societies. Claims of power, for example 
in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, may have been total and totalitarian but 
that did not automatically mean they had been realized or were as successful as 
planned. As a result of these insights and doubts, the totalitarian concept lost its 
analytic value.
At the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s, however, the concept of to-
talitarianism began to raise its head again, thanks to the inuence of dissident 
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East European thinkers. But the way this concept was being applied by them was 
considerably dierent. First of all, western thinkers generally viewed the concept 
as being clearly anti-socialist, whereas Central and East European dissidents like 
Václav Havel leaned more to the political le, and their criticism was not directed 
at the socialist structure of society as such, but more to the fact that socialist prin-
ciples and values had been discredited by those in power in the so-called social-
ist states. Second, they applied the concept of totalitarianism to demonstrate the 
dierence between European socialist dictatorships on the one hand and normal 
dictatorships on the other. 
Unlike in traditional dictatorships (for example in Central and South America), 
they felt that the socialist claims and characteristics of the Central and East 
European dictatorships benetted from a long ideational tradition which gave 
these systems “a sense of durability and permanence that dictatorships oen lack.”3 
At the same time, the South American dictatorships could only exist due to the 
explicit and omnipresent threat of physical violence. It goes without saying that 
there were also instances of violence and threats in Central and Eastern Europe, 
but life on the street was not aected as much as in South American military dic-
tatorships. e basis of the relationship between rulers and ruled in socialist dic-
tatorships was therefore totally dierent. Fear of violence was not really the main 
reason why people obeyed. It was more a case of conformity, which according to 
some could only be explained as an expression of successful totalitarianism.
As an example, Havel pointed to the masses of ags ying during socialist cel-
ebrations. Although this clearly demonstrated a kind of consensus between rulers 
and ruled, it raised the question of how far this consensus went and how it should 
be interpreted. According to Havel, the ag was a sort of talisman. e person who 
decides to hang it does so, says Havel, “because he thinks that by doing so, he will 
appear loyal to those around him, to ocials, and, ultimately, to the police.” In this 
context, hanging out a ag should be seen as a form of camouage as “it helps him 
[to] slip quietly into the background of daily life.”4
In Havel’s opinion, power was maintained in Central and East European so-
cialist societies not so much by the use of weapons, but “through each citizen feel-
ing the ‘existential pressure’ to conform.” is led to a type of conformity which, 
although motivated by pressure, achieved “a tacit agreement between citizen and 
regime.”5 According to some (though not Havel), this ‘agreement’ in fact boiled 
down to a form of brainwashing by the regime: “e most totalitarian system is 
the one where the penetration of the regime into the soul of the individual is com-
plete.”6 
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Since 1989, several East German academics and intellectuals have analyzed 
East Germans’ former existence in a similar fashion. One of the most outspoken 
voices in these debates is the East German psychiatrist Hans-Joachim Maaz. In 
many of his books, he has tried to clarify what an extraordinarily deep and de-
structive inuence the dictatorship had on everyday life in East Germany. In his 
work Der Gefühlsstau, he claims that: “Finally everyone in the GDR was infected 
by a virus which caused a pathological destruction of society.”7 Similar comments 
can be found on nearly every page. Because, according to Maaz, repression inl-
trated every aspect of East German (social) life, the GDR should be regarded as a 
totalitarian dictatorship.8 From a socio-historical perspective, similar conclusions 
were drawn by historians Armin Mitter and Stefan Wolle.9 ey also concluded 
that from the outset, the GDR has been an entirely illegal society based on violence 
and repression, which could only continue to exist due to the presence of Russian 
bayonets.
eir statements conrmed the predominant western view of Central and East 
European dictatorships. Aer 1989 that view was signicantly reinforced once it 
became evident how much the socialist states in Central and Eastern Europe had 
depended on the operations of their secret services. For this reason many western 
observers tend to reduce the entire existence in socialist countries to the dictato-
rial aims of those in power. Due to the regime’s totalitarian claims, people assumed 
that life in such societies was primarily colored by the political aims of their lead-
ers. 
Comparable conclusions were reached by the enquiry commission set up by 
the German government to investigate how the East German dictatorship oper-
ated. According to this commission, East Germany had been a dictatorship based 
on violence and injustice.10 In June 1994 the inhabitants of Rudolstadt were in-
formed through one of their local newspapers that from the outset the GDR had 
been a totalitarian dictatorship, “in which the powers of the ruling party, that is 
to say: its leaders, inltrated and...controlled every aspect of life,” thus sentencing 
the inhabitants of the country to “life-long imprisonment.”11 During my stay in 
Rudolstadt, these statements caused great anger. People were almost unanimous 
in their opinion that the way former East Germany was represented was generally 
far too prejudiced and absolutely incomplete. 
Anyone with insight into East German society’s structure would not nd the 
conclusions reached by the commission and by Maaz farfetched. e socialist 
state’s inuence and control penetrated so deeply into the private lives of GDR 
citizens that the concept of totalitarianism springs to mind almost automatically – 
a short introduction will be presented below.
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One of the most signicant pillars which upheld the socialist promises in the 
GDR was its social security system. Every East German had a right to education, 
accommodation, a job, and child care. at sounds wonderful, but apart from the 
fact that in the long run it was unaordable, one of the main eects of this exten-
sive social provision was that it enabled far-reaching forms of ideological inuence 
and indoctrination. Nowhere was this more evident than in education. People 
who worked in education told me that schools focused especially on developing 
skills and values which were classed as socialist, for example being able to sub-
ordinate oneself to the greater good, the Kollektiv [the collective].12 Independent 
(not to mention critical) thinking was not encouraged, creativity was soon labeled 
disruptive, and the curriculum (with the exception of applying Marxist-Leninist 
theories) was geared to learning factual knowledge. Obedience was considered a 
major character trait, and the same applied to the ability to adhere to rules and 
regulations. According to some intellectuals, education had a disastrous eect on 
the attitude and mentality of many East German inhabitants.13 
It was generally known that teachers kept a close eye on which children (and 
thereby also which parents) were loyal to the socialist party. Teaching sta ensured 
that pupils did not vent any criticism of the GDR. Children were admonished in 
public if they wore western clothes or carried their school stu in western plastic 
bags. One young woman who worked at the museum in Rudolstadt recalled that a 
teacher once snapped at her: “You’re surely not advertising für westliche Ausbeuter-
Konzerne? [for western companies that abuse people].” And a well-known trick 
to nd out which families watched West German television programs was to ask 
the children if the clock on the television showed the hours in dots or in lines – 
allowing the teacher to nd out which families could be accused of being more 
or less critical of the state.14 Social engagement was also one of the factors which 
determined who could and who could not go to university. Obviously a scholar’s 
intellectual capabilities had to be sucient, but if an excellent student wanted to 
become a doctor, his parents’ loyalty to the state was very much taken into ac-
count. Another factor which played a decisive role was social background. If the 
parents belonged to the so-called Intelligenz [intelligentsia], he had less chance 
than if his parents were workers or farmers. 
Besides this indoctrination by the schools themselves, the socialist youth orga-
nizations – respectively the Jung Pioniere [Young Pioneers, for the youngest], the 
Pioniere [Pioneers, six and older], and the Freie Deutsche Jugend [Free German 
Youth, 14 and older] – played a signicant role in East German school-life. If sec-
ondary school children did not join the FDJ, not only were they confronted by rep-
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resentatives of the organization itself but also by their teachers.15 It was one of the 
most apparent signs of subversion and indicative of parents’ loyalty to the state.16 
As the FDJ was also responsible for young people’s cultural and leisure activi-
ties, part of how East Germans spent their free time was indirectly controlled by 
the state. Obviously, the FDJ focused a great deal of attention on “gesellschas-
politische Arbeit [socio-political work],” consisting of military exercises and po-
litical debates.17 But the ideological indoctrination began even earlier, as children 
were made aware of the lessons of international class conict in young children’s 
organizations. A relevant article from 1959 found in the SBZ archives described 
a group of youngsters playing a game of Verteidigung der Republik [defending the 
republic] one early Sunday morning.18 e youngsters were divided into various 
Kampfgruppen [battalions]; there were Gruppenkommandeuren [group command-
ers] and in order “to teach the children to be socialist people…they wear red paper 
armbands on their le arms.”19 
All work and leisure organizations functioned the same way. Every inhabit-
ant of the GDR was expected to join the Deutsch Sowjetische Freundschasbund 
[Society for German-Soviet Friendship] and one of the numerous socialist organi-
zations in order to engage in public life. Even though people could choose which 
organization they wanted to join, in reality it made no dierence: everything had 
been aligned to the party, and party members were present everywhere to enforce 
adherence to the party line and deal with social themes. Church membership was 
certainly not encouraged, and if parents wished to have their child baptized, that 
was seen by the government as a sign of their suspect loyalty to the state. e exact 
implications varied, but the choice would not be benecial for that particular fam-
ily’s career prospects. 
When tracing how and to what extent the state tried to govern its citizens’ lives, 
the measure which had the deepest and most direct eect was of course the Wall. 
e exact rules regarding trac across the border between East and West Germany 
changed many times over the years, but right up to the end it was only possible 
to visit West German relatives for so-called urgent family matters. A request for 
such a visit could be denied without an explanation, which happened very oen. 
Aer all, a visit to the FRG was a privilege, not a right. An elderly man recalled that 
he was the only member of his family not allowed to attend his older sister’s 50th 
birthday in West Germany. Unlike many others who never found out why their 
request was denied, he was told. Because he worked in the telex department of a 
large company and had to store details of employees’ wages, he had access to secret 
knowledge which he could have passed to the class enemy. An older woman, who 
had submitted a request to attend her aunt’s funeral, said that they had snarled 
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at her: “e most important thing in life is certainly not the aunt or uncle in the 
west. Most important is that peace is maintained” – hereby referring to the ocial 
reason for erecting the Wall, namely as Schützwall des Friedens [wall for defend-
ing peace]. e only people who were allowed to visit West Germany once a year 
were East German pensioners. e reason for this leniency was that they no longer 
represented any economic value for the GDR. Should they decide not to return to 
the Heimstatt des Friedens und Geborgenheit [secure and peaceful homeland], this 
would not constitute a loss for the country’s production or nances.
Most of the other measures and rules which illustrate the dictatorial nature of 
the GDR are known: telephone conversations between East and West Germans 
were tapped, visits from West German relatives and friends were watched closely, 
letters and parcels from the west were opened and searched. Strict security mea-
sures were in force at the border zone, including visibly armed policemen. Someone 
who wanted to visit people living in the border zone had to submit a request long 
beforehand. If those who lived in the villages and towns around the border wanted 
to receive visitors, they had to request this several weeks in advance. Everyone 
walking around in the border area could be stopped by the police and detained, 
frisked, and even shot for no ocial reason. For the same reasons it was impossible 
for most East Germans to have a holiday on the east coast: being part of the bor-
der area, the coast could not be freely visited by everyone. Any holiday there had 
to be requested well in advance, and usually the hotels and holiday homes were 
entirely reserved for members of the SED and other organizations that formed the 
National Front. A holiday on the Baltic Sea was one of the most enjoyable ways to 
be rewarded for political loyalty in the GDR.
Although East Germans were scarcely able to leave their country, West 
Germans were allowed to visit the GDR. e principal reason for not restricting 
the number of visitors was an economic one. Because they were obliged to change 
25 West German marks for East German marks at an exchange rate of one to one 
every day, West Germans were bringing in hard cash.
It is well-known that westerners visiting the GDR were not allowed to bring 
certain categories of magazines (opinion and pulp) and books (critical or so-called 
decadent ones). As the criteria governing what was and what was not allowed to be 
imported were never published anywhere, and moreover seemed to alter regularly 
over time, it was always a tense situation waiting to see what could or could not be 
taken over the border. One such incident was experienced by the owner of a ower 
shop in Rudolstadt. While working at a orist in the former GDR, she wanted to 
take home a large yucca (indoor plant) from West Germany. at was forbidden. 
She had to leave it at the border, because:
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e ocial explanation was that there might have been bacteria in the 
soil. But I knew that was not what it was about. In my opinion, the real 
reason was that we did not have plants like that. And so that plant was not 
only a symbol of the west, more importantly it epitomized an enjoyment 
of life that our state could not and would not give us. Seeing such a plant 
would cause dissension.
Although she was probably right, it is of course ironic that nearly all East Germans 
could see what life was like in West Germany every day by watching television in 
their own living room. Understandably, this transfer of information was a thorn in 
the face of the GDR government, particularly because the programs on the West 
German channels were generally considered much more appealing than those on 
East German television. is led to a large-scale action in 1961, whereby the mem-
bers of the aforementioned FDJ climbed onto East Germans’ roofs in order to turn 
round all the TV aerials that were facing west.20 
ere are many more examples which could demonstrate how strongly the 
state aected and determined the daily lives of people living in the GDR. What 
went on at school also went on at work, at university, and in the army. Even at 
home people could not escape interference from the government. Every district 
and block of ats had its own Hausgemeinscha [housing association], which not 
only ensured that ats were kept clean and homely but was also meant to stimu-
late the correct ideological climate in the direct vicinity of people’s homes. Even 
the allotment gardens, where people liked to withdraw – mainly so they did not 
need to be involved in anything and could nally get some peace and quiet – were 
made part of the state’s politically ideological framework. e annual reports of 
Rudolstadt’s Allotment Association were bulging with ideological wording and 
political lip service. is association apparently concerned itself with “the peace 
policies of oensive socialist states,” for the sake of “the oncoming military-strate-
gic balance, despite the confrontational political stance of NATO,” and with “the 
German history regarding war and suering.”21
e state’s inuence penetrated every aspect of East Germans’ existence, and 
their entire lives were coated with a thick political and ideological wash. All the 
social and cultural activities people undertook were embedded in a politically 
ideological framework, and people’s behavior in the various social organizations 
and arenas was closely scrutinized. Every inhabitant of the GDR also had a per-
sonal le. is contained people’s class background, as well as what and where they 
had studied, what results they had achieved, which organizations they had joined, 
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what role they had played as member, where they worked, their prole at work, 
how they related to the Kollektiv of which they were a part, and so forth. 
Based on the above, it is clear that the inhabitants of the GDR were monitored 
and indoctrinated in numerous ways. is occurred both publicly, under the man-
tle of specic laws, rules and regulations, as well as under implicit, less obviously 
apparent pressure, which made people comply with rules and regulations that had 
not been laid down anywhere. All in all, East Germans’ existence appears to have 
been so swamped with state orders, interference and regulations that the totalitar-
ian concept seems very apt. 
It is therefore remarkable, as mentioned earlier, that the majority of the people 
I met tried to convince me that their earlier lives were for the most part removed 
from the regime’s political claims and intentions, and that even they should be 
taken with a pinch of salt. As Mrs. Pätzold, the retired owner of one the few clothes 
shops that remained in private ownership at the time of the GDR, explained to me: 
Supercially, of course, everything here was dictated by the state, but at the 
same time, many more things were possible. If you had the right contacts, 
stood your ground, kept on grumbling a bit, or simply refused, taking care 
of course not to overstep the law or do anything that was strictly forbid-
den, there were plenty of opportunities. And so many things happened 
dierently or were more exible than ocially stated. Formally, there was 
the ocial line which was the same for everyone, and under, alongside, 
and in between that, there was a bit of xing here and a bit of rustling 
there. Everyone knew it, and everyone did it.
German historian Martin Sabrow also concluded that most of the GDR’s inhabit-
ants did not really experience their country as a dictatorship.22 Along with him, 
other historians have denounced the conclusions of the enquiry commission, that 
the GDR was a totalitarian dictatorship based on violence and injustice, as being 
very biased and supercial. According to them, it is important to develop a more 
balanced perspective of East Germany’s history.
American historian James McAdams was ercely critical of the enquiry com-
mission’s conclusions: in his opinion they reminded him more of “contending 
campaign platforms than thoughtful enquiries into the East German past.”23 British 
historian Mary Fulbrook came to a similar conclusion aer reading a great num-
ber of historical studies on the GDR, which according to her are unjustly “deeply 
immersed in an accusatory undertone.”24 She warns in powerful terms against 
criminalizing East Germany’s society and history. Renowned German ethnolo-
gist Ina Merkel has also noted that historical accounts of the GDR are extremely 
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cliché, mostly written from a judgmental western perspective, in which “[d]ie 
Schlüsselworte Stasi, Totalitarismus und Kommandowirtscha ein Bermuda-
Dreieck [formen], in dem die Vergangenheit der ehemaligen DDR-Bürger/innen 
zu verschwinden droht [the key concepts of Stasi, totalitarianism and controlled 
economy form a Bermuda Triangle, threatening to erase East German citizens’ 
past].”25 American anthropologist John Borneman concluded that “totalitarianism 
never existed in the GDR. To confuse the theory of totalitarianism with everyday 
life is to mistake ideal type for an empirical reality.”26 And British historian Mark 
Allinson states that East Germany’s existence cannot be identied with its political 
context. Despite the Wall and the fact that people were not allowed to leave the 
country, he concludes: “e GDR was quite a normal country, despite its unusual 
international and domestic political setting…its citizens for the most part led nor-
mal lives, dominated as in most countries by family life and concerns about work 
and material welfare.”27 
e previous scholars warn against identifying the East German political con-
text with the lives that had developed there, and they advocate that historical per-
spectives on the GDR should include the accounts of those involved, and take 
them seriously. Although in theory I rmly agree with them, in practice it proved 
more dicult than I thought to use the very experiences of those concerned as a 
starting point. is was aected by more than just my inability and/or unwilling-
ness to relativize the previously described dictatorial structure and characteristics. 
Another inuential factor was the mounting tension since the Wende over East 
Germany’s past, which had sparked heated debates, especially between East and 
West Germans. As a result, many East Germans were pretty well convinced that 
their perspective of their past would never be understood and therefore adopted a 
hardened, defensive attitude towards inquisitive outsiders.
Local Conversations on Dictatorship
Many people reacted defensively to my attempts to talk to them about their past, 
but by far the most extreme reaction to my curiosity was displayed by omas, 
who ran the bar near my lodgings. From the very rst time I visited that bar, he 
had been on his guard. Aer a while he seemed to thaw a bit, but one day when 
I started asking one of the regulars about the GDR, he burst into a tirade, leaving 
no doubt about what he thought of me. He did not trust me at all. I was an actor. 
I tricked people and ridiculed them behind their backs. All that inquiring of mine 
was just not right, and the only reason I asked questions was to degrade people. I 
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was much cleverer than I would have them believe with all those questions. It goes 
without saying that this exchange did not go unnoticed. A number of regulars 
joined in the debate and said that they were just as suspicious of me.
at day I actually managed to calm things down and continued to visit the 
bar. Sometime later, while chatting to a West German one evening, I laughed out 
loud: “You Germans, it’s unbelievable,” and that sparked things o. Although af-
terwards I could not remember in which order the accusations were hurled at me, 
I do remember omas’s face when he confronted me. It was contorted with fury, 
and he almost spat at me: he had always known that I was deceiving the whole 
caboodle. He knew all along: I was far smarter than I acted. “I knew right from the 
start that you were not to be trusted. I told you already that you’re a thoroughly 
bad person. You act as if you’re superior, with your nose in the air!” Totally ab-
bergasted at this unexpected attack, I told him he was crazy, and he laughed as if 
he had nally caught me in the act: “Oh yeah, so I’m crazy? I’m just small, right!? 
is small? Well, I don’t have to listen to you. You’re leaving here in two months, 
and we’ll never see you again. I don’t need anything from you, and you don’t need 
anything from me, so I can tell you what I think of you: deine Augen lügen [your 
eyes are lying]!” I le the bar and never went back, which was apparently his inten-
tion. My continual questioning made me unreliable in his eyes, and his reaction 
revealed why this was the case: my questions about the past made him feel small. 
In the rst instance, such reactions may seem to conrm Maaz’s ideas about the 
impact of forty years of dictatorship on his countrymen’s “collective psyche.” In my 
view, however, omas’s anger did not so much relate to an East German legacy as 
to the argument that had been going on in Germany since 1989. During the time 
I was doing my research, one could not open a newspaper or magazine without 
reading something negative about the former GDR. One could not switch on the 
television without seeing a program in which aspects of former East Germany 
were being raked up and condemned: from Stasi scandals to horrifying reports on 
East German nursery schools. East Germans’ entire past was being reduced to a 
pitiful tale of repression, adjustment and petty bourgeoisie. Similarly, sociological 
studies had shown that people laughed less in the GDR than in the FRG, drank 
more than their counterparts in the FRG, and despite all their boasting about mu-
tual helpfulness, the average East German had fewer friends than the average West 
German or Dutch. Even the Protestant Church, always assumed to be a stronghold 
of resistance, was proved to have been deeply involved with the Stasi and the state 
of East Germany. In the same condemnatory tone, the local newspaper portrayed 
the country as Trümmerfeld DDR [scene of devastation GDR].28 
 e East German Dictatorship 119
In the conict surrounding East Germany’s past, many West Germans equated 
life in the former GDR with its wrongful state form, they “felt that the lives of East 
Germans were a failure because their state was a failure.”29 e defensive attitude 
towards me was rst of all a completely understandable reaction to the general 
condemnation. Secondly, many people were probably also reluctant to respond to 
my questions because they concerned matters of material consumption. One of 
the reasons why my research was so sensitive was the fact that the material aspects 
of East Germans’ existence featured so strongly in westerners’ utterly negative im-
age of East Germany’s past.
e rst time I realized what a direct eect the subject of my research had on 
the reactions I triggered was when I asked a woman in Berlin for directions. Aer 
she had pointed out where to go, I asked her about the building (a tall, rectangular 
concrete building with yellowish-brown plate-glass windows) on the other side of 
the street. She replied that it was the Palast der Republik [Palace of the Republic]. 
I had read about people and materials being brought from all over the GDR to 
Berlin in order to build that palace and so I tried to nd out from her if all that 
eort to erect an imposing structure in the eastern section of the city was perhaps 
to show western visitors something like “we can produce something good too, you 
know.” However, when I put it to her tentatively: “Was that meant to be a show-
piece?,” she burst out: 
No! is was a real Palace for the People! With huge halls and everyone 
could always go in. It was truly built by and for the people. And it was 
all open to the public, except of course during important conferences. 
roughout the building there were restaurants where you could get 
cheap meals (a scarcely veiled reproach of the era since the Wende, when 
although restaurants were set up everywhere, they were unaordable), a 
coee bar and ice-cream parlor, and vast halls that held thousands of peo-
ple: it was all there. But now it has to go, nur weil man etwas gegen DDR-
Bauen hat [just because people have something against GDR buildings]. 
According to her, the city council had initially tried to have the building demol-
ished, referring to its traces of asbestos, but that excuse did not work aer it ap-
peared that the same was true for a considerable number of buildings in the west-
ern section of the city (one building on the west side was even eight times more 
contaminated than this one!). So then they had to think up another way to get rid 
of the building. Now the latest plan was to pull down the front and just leave the 
interior intact. She was furious about it. Her GDR was being demolished under 
false pretenses, and only because it was the GDR!
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In the previous chapter I showed that the GDR’s material environment was cer-
tainly not neutral: it was explicitly meant to express socialist ideals. Whereas the 
close relationship between these ideals and the forms it induced did not really work 
out the way it was planned then, the association between socialism and its mate-
rial culture has been rmly established since the Wende. What is more: the GDR’s 
material remains have played a major role in the conict over East Germany’s 
past. is was not only suggested by the angry outburst from the woman giving 
me directions, but on arrival at my destination something happened that further 
conrmed the impression that my focus on material culture was one of the main 
reasons for people’s reluctance.
I was on my way to meet the director of a museum with a collection of items of 
the GDR heritage. e museum turned out to be hidden in one of Berlin’s court-
yards. Inside, the large space was lled with piles of furniture, objects, boxes and 
cabinets which I immediately recognized as the old East German style. e direc-
tor shook my hand and asked the exact reason for my visit. I told him about my 
research on the changed signicance of western consumer goods in the former 
GDR. As if stung by a horsey, his panic reaction was: “Oh no, not another of those 
studies showing how functionalism didn’t work, is it? Just like all the criticism we 
got in the Fiies?” 
Before we could go any further, his retort had already doubly discredited me 
and the subject of my research: my potentially critical conclusions did not just con-
tain the wrong criticism, but they were moreover completely irrelevant. I hardly 
dared to open my mouth any more. He asked if I knew who he was: former Editor-
in-Chief of the design magazine Form und Zweck. He explained that I could read 
all about the old (by now completely out-of-date) discussions in this magazine. 
Anyway, he did not have much time, but he would show me the permanent collec-
tion of East German objects.
We walked into the room where the objects were exhibited. e rst cabinets 
displayed items from just aer the war: enamel pans, igelit (articial leather) shoes. 
en there were some beautiful objects, obviously inspired by the famous Bauhaus 
style, which by this time I had learned were hardly ever for sale in the GDR. Aer 
that were a few displays of impressive machinery and technical gadgets. And next 
was a cabinet with everyday objects such as plastic ice-cream bowls, egg-cups 
shaped like chickens, etc. It was obvious that my guide would have preferred to 
usher me past all this, but as that was not possible, he remarked in a rather cyni-
cal, half-bored tone: “Yes, well, of course these are the things westerners always 
nd very interesting. ey think this is typical of the GDR! ey assume that this 
was the only type of thing we were capable of manufacturing!” With unmistak-
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able disdain, he moved on to the next cabinet full of lovely objects that were never 
available in the GDR. 
His words were crystal clear and achieved the desired eect. I did not ask about 
anything else in the cabinet and let him guide me to the next exhibit. At the end 
of the tour when I enquired about the records he kept, he was rather vague. e 
archives had not yet been properly led, he was not always here, and besides he 
was not being paid because the town council did not recognize the museum or the 
archives. One thing was for sure, he would never lend out a GDR object again. He 
had done that once with a Fiies poster which in his opinion exemplied the col-
lective German-German image and design of the period. However, the poster was 
used at an exhibition to illustrate that even in the early days, the notion of a rigidly 
controlled state-aesthetics had been brewing in East Germany. I should perhaps 
have asked him again to see the archives, but I did not bother. It was obvious that 
we would never be able to have a normal conversation on this or any other subject. 
e failed interview with the director really irritated me – not just because it 
was denitely discouraging to be continually confronted with such unwilling and 
defensive reactions, but also because I had hoped to nd interesting information 
in his archive about material goods at the time of the GDR and how the public 
perceived them. However, while on my way back from Berlin to Rudolstadt, I be-
gan to understand his unwillingness a bit better. When my travel companion, a 
West German architect, saw the picture of the egg-cups which the director had not 
wanted to discuss with me, his reaction said it all: “Great,” he laughed, “real GDR!” 
In one stroke, his words highlighted why the director was unwilling to discuss East 
Germany’s past with western outsiders: in the eyes of many westerners, the mate-
rial legacy of the GDR was not only ugly, but also inferior, stripped, and grey. As 
such, it was above all the visible symbol of the widespread misery in that country’s 
past and therefore deserving of westerners’ sneering condemnation. 
Another signicant illustration of this perspective is the way Michael Moeller, 
West German psychiatrist, described his journey by train through the former GDR 
sometime aer the Wende. Both the images he sketched and the associations they 
evoked in him were probably less personal than they might seem at rst glance: 
I had boarded the by western standards rather ramshackle and gloomy 
train from Leipzig to Halle. Initially, it felt exciting sitting in the train, 
entering unknown territory, but aer travelling through the dark evening 
for three-quarters of an hour, I noticed the houses, and my heart sank. 
What I saw before me was a forlorn world. I was unwittingly witnessing 
what I already knew: everything has fallen into decay; no-one has looked 
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aer the houses or the elds…At the same time I realized what a long time 
it had been: all these forty, y years of unlived life! What all had been 
neglected, repressed and given no lease of life? is question had a deep 
eect on me, possibly because I was a child during the war.30
It is surprising how the noticeable decay – from a shabby train in a barren land-
scape – gradually began to color his entire perspective until what he saw was a 
totally neglected country where little had been able to grow. e countryside’s ap-
pearance evoked associations with a greater, all-embracing stagnation. Many West 
Germans experienced the same when they visited the former GDR for the rst 
time: “Just like in the Forties and Fiies!” they oen called it.31 And it was obvi-
ous they were not just referring to the cobbled streets and crumbling houses. is 
remark summed up their association with the country’s social, cultural and mental 
stagnation – le behind, undeveloped, conservative, ridiculous and less. Dutch 
historian Willem Melching uses a poignant example to illustrate his conclusion 
that in the eyes of West Germans, the lives of East Germans had failed because 
their state had failed: “is feeling was eloquently described by the East German 
writer Sparschuh, whose novel…tells of a westerner (‘Wessi’) drawing the follow-
ing conclusions: ‘You didn’t have a life there!…e elections weren’t real elections, 
the streets weren’t streets. Even the cars weren’t cars’.”32
In the eyes of westerners, a direct line can be traced from the outward appear-
ance of the GDR, via the reprehensible political system, to the deplorable (and 
failed) existence said to have been developed there. Due to these dominant as-
sociations, East Germans’ existence threatens to be recorded as a pitiful tale of 
dismal, dilapidated houses and plastic egg-cups.
e main reason why people reacted so defensively to my querying their mate-
rial surroundings now and in the past was that to East Germans’ ears, such ques-
tions were by denition neither innocent nor inquiring but indicative of a general 
condemnation of their past. It conrmed their suspicions of feelings of satisfac-
tion on the part of West Germans; satisfaction that East Germans’ existence was 
nally exposed in the crumbling remains aer 1989. If a westerner asked about 
East German egg-cups, state palaces or heaps of furniture on pavements, an East 
German would interpret this question as: Can’t you see that your lives are a mess? 
You think so too, don’t you? Don’t deny it, because as soon as you can, you will put 
your past on the pavement as well. We always knew it; the GDR was ugly, broke 
and rotten. And you are just as small and pitiable as your past. “You were psycho-
logically pressed together, just like far too narrow beds.”33
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is is the image that East Germans defended en masse: some by keeping quiet, 
most by stressing again and again that their past should be viewed in a dier-
ent light: more dierentiated, less general and judgmental, and with more under-
standing and frankness. “e past was not all that bad!” was the saying or – in 
a somewhat jaded tone: “It is all much more dierentiated.” e weariness and 
frustration were not so much due to the negative attitude towards aspects of East 
Germany’s former material consumption (for this criticism was mostly underlined 
by East Germans), but more to the implied criticism of the past in general.
For many East Germans, although they complained a great deal about the ma-
terial conditions of East German life, these conditions had also brought about the 
well-known warmth and community spirit which were a feature of East German 
society. “In the old days you felt closer to people,” said Heinz, a somewhat alterna-
tive young man. And he gave me an example of what he meant. “Hardly anybody 
had a car, and if for example we went to a concert and there were no trains go-
ing back, we just spent the night at each other’s houses. Now we all go home in 
our own cars, but we miss the togetherness.” Another youth, Heiko, told a similar 
story: “In the past we didn’t have much, and there wasn’t much to do. So you had 
to make the best of it. Everyone did that, but at least you had each other, and you 
were happy to be together. Partly born out of necessity, there was more of a com-
munity spirit between people.” Every time, when listening to their stories of how 
they made a virtue out of necessity, I tended to hear just the necessity, whereas they 
tried to bring across the virtues. e same happened when Claudia, a student at 
Rudolstadt’s secondary school, tried to explain why especially the past’s hardships 
sometimes had such positive results:
All those Wessis say that everything about the past was bad, but that’s not 
right. In the old days, people were closer to each other. For instance in 
the classroom. If the teacher happened to make a critical comment about 
Honecker, we were highly impressed: ‘For him to say that! He must re-
ally trust us to tell us that!’ at created a bond, and I am certain that no 
one ever revealed any of that. But now? Now everyone only thinks about 
themselves.
Here again my cynicism tended to prevail (because how could she be so sure no 
one had ever reported some of this conversation), but the anecdote is signicant. 
It demonstrates that Claudia was not denying or disguising the dictatorial circum-
stances, nor did she deny or tone down the inuence of the state. On the contrary: 
it was in fact the dictatorial circumstances and omnipresence of the state – the two 
aspects which underpinned the west’s disapproval of dictatorial society – which in 
124 Material Fantasies
her account attributed to the community spirit and warmth. ere was a feeling of 
community because we couldn’t say much. ere was warmth because we couldn’t 
do much.
Although I kept getting the impression from listening to these stories that life 
under a dictatorial form of government was uncommunicative, a number of as-
pects seemed to be responsible for the fact that the East German dictatorship was 
experienced so dierently from what outsiders imagined.34 Anticipating the de-
scription and analysis I will present below: they had learned to tolerate the power 
of the state in a fundamentally dierent way than outsiders could envisage.
Irony, a Caring State, and the Nische
Many people I spoke to reminded me that East Germany reality, as enforced on 
paper, was not something I should take too seriously. At the time of the GDR there 
were of course rules and regulations for everything. People knew them and had 
to abide by them. at is to say: for show. But in between all that, a great deal was 
possible. “And it was like a game, learning how to live with the rules and the bans,” 
as Sigrid (a high-ranking local government ocial in the cultural department) and 
Jörg (youth worker), explained: 
Naturally, the game was a serious one, and sometimes it was played so 
hard that it was no longer funny, but in fact everyone knew that there was 
a game going on between the state and the people. ‘We are not allowed to 
say this, but we will say it anyway, and although we know you understand 
exactly what we are saying, you pretend it is not true, and we act as if we 
believe that.’ 
e party, for instance, dictated what was deemed correct socialist literature and 
what was not, and it was able to actually impose and maintain these rules by cen-
sorship. However, many people explained to me that this actually resulted in writ-
ers doing their utmost best to slightly disguise things which did not conform. As a 
side-eect of censorship, people learned how to write and read between the lines. 
Consequently, literature was one of the mainstays in many East Germans’ daily 
lives. And as soon as a certain author’s latest book was published, it was sold out 
in no time. Everyone wanted to read it so that they could discuss it together: What 
has he been saying now, did you see that ‘they’ have not even noticed his implicit 
criticism of... Although a negative fact in itself, the Romanian philosopher and 
literary critic Andrei Plesu showed that “the existence of censorship led to the 
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elaboration of ingenious subtexts, allusions, and camouage, techniques practiced 
with great virtuosity by writers and assimilated promptly by the mass of readers.”35 
e same was true in the GDR, where many people considered it a sport to nd 
out what had actually been said. anks to the close relationship between certain 
writers and their readership, the role of literature in East Germans’ public lives was 
comparable to the signicance of religion or psychotherapy elsewhere.36 And the 
same applied to the theatre.
People needed to camouage what they were saying, yet they at the same time 
wanted to call things by their name, and this gave rise to a huge number of jokes 
in the GDR. Sigrid remembered:
It was a dierent language: jokes were being told all the time, so that peo-
ple could at least explain things to each other. Obviously, this language 
had been prompted by necessity because ocially so much could not be 
said, but meanwhile it was really good. When the Wende came about, the 
entire culture of telling jokes disappeared at once, and there is nothing 
le. Now and again someone tells a joke, but somehow it doesn’t work. 
Because nowadays you can say whatever you want, nothing has to be dis-
guised. And what is funny about saying that Kohl is an Arschloch [a rot-
ter]?37
East Germans’ habit of making jokes about the political and ideological environ-
ment in which they were forced to live is aptly described by the term used by 
a German journalist: “conspiratorial irony.”38 is term conjures up Dutch soci-
ologist Wim Wertheim’s work on forms of resistance amongst repressed groups, 
in which he frequently used the term counterpoints.39 American anthropologist 
James Scott provided the following examples of counterpoints: “Such deviant val-
ues may take the form of myths, jokes, songs, linguistic usage, or religion.”40 
Apart from explaining the critically ironic role of jokes, Sigrid’s comments 
also showed that there was a huge dierence in the GDR between reality as it ap-
peared on the surface and the ironic, somewhat long-suering way people dealt 
with it. People were used to not taking seriously the authorized reality that was 
decreed and outlined by politics. ey read between the lines and laughed about 
it together, thereby endorsing that it was extremely questionable whether the state 
“that never stop[ped] talking” was ever really heard.41 In domestic circles people of 
course laughed more freely and heartily about the state than in public, but in the 
public arena, irony had a place as well. ere, people laughed – albeit carefully and 
sneakily – at the exhilarating, positive phrases which dominated public life. It is a 
well-known way to ridicule the almighty powers of the state, by “separating words 
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or phrases from their conventional meanings and using them in quite another 
sense.” 42 People do conform, but through their ironic stance, they nevertheless 
maintain “a kind of inner autonomy, holding o the ceremonial order by the very 
act of upholding it.”43
Although prompted by necessity, such “quasi konspirativen Kommunika-
tionsformen [mock, conspiring forms of communication]” rst of all lightened 
people’s lives because the oppression and loss of freedom forced on them by the 
state was soened a little bit.44 Second, these forms of irony also united people in 
their semi-conspiring attitude towards the mighty state which was able to exert 
such an extreme inuence on their daily lives. By ridiculing the coercive condi-
tions they had to live in, East Germans were mentally toning down part of the 
social and material limitations inicted on them. Moreover, the fact that ‘everyone’ 
laughed and made jokes about the same things created a kind of mutual under-
standing, unity and equality among people. 
Looking back on things in this light, I began to understand that while I only 
took certain phenomena to be characteristic of the state’s coercive force, Claudia 
and so many others were actually trying to convey the opposite: it was precisely the 
dictatorial circumstances that had created a form of mutual belonging.
Earlier I showed that even the allotments in the GDR were wrapped up in po-
litical phrases. e people who were so pleased to have a garden assured me that 
they were very ordinary gardens where you went on your day o, mostly in order 
not to be involved with anything. In the beginning there was some resistance from 
the government against these petty bourgeoisie tendencies, as the director of the 
Allotment Association explained. And naturally the state was against people re-
treating from public life in that way. But when it nally became clear that there 
was nothing they could do, the allotments were tolerated, and in exchange the 
association paid lip service to the state. us, the director weaved the well-known 
hollow phrases into his speeches. “But,” he told me, “meanwhile we withdrew to 
our gardens, where we produced the honey and fruit which the state had no other 
means of producing and which we could sell for a great deal of money (to state 
trade organizations, mv). But the plots had nothing whatsoever to do with politics: 
it was simply enjoyable and relaxing, and the party knew that.”45 When I re-read 
the minutes of the allotment association’s meetings, a completely dierent type of 
interaction between citizen and state emerged than the coercive, dictatorial rela-
tionship I had initially recognized. 
For instance I read one report in which – aer the obligatory political and ideo-
logical statements – a request was made to obtain more beehives. It was recorded 
that things could not continue as they were. More and more honey was being 
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produced and inevitably from time to time beehives got broken. Besides, some 
hives were too old. ese discarded hives were not being replaced, even though 
it was well known that the production of honey was of such importance to the 
population.
Reading this report, I came to realize that the omnipresence of the state had 
not only been coercive and threatening, but also very quotidian and even caring: 
the problems involved in acquiring new beehives (in my view, relatively minor de-
tails in the private life of a beekeeper) were brought to the attention of the district 
councilors by the chairman of the allotment association. Because beekeeping was 
encapsulated in the political-ideological framework of the state, like everything 
else in the GDR, it had become a matter of social relevance and was imperative for 
the population’s provisioning. It was therefore also the responsibility of the state 
to provide the material prerequisites. As the state tried to invade every aspect of 
people’s existence, its power was not just a component of their daily lives, but car-
ing for people’s daily needs had also become a necessary task. Citizens put up with 
the invading powers, and the arising contact worked both ways. is meant that 
the powers were partly responsible for resolving people’s everyday problems, such 
as the material prerequisites to continue with their hobbies.
e omnipotence of the state, which at rst I only saw as threatening, suddenly 
seemed mundane in a touching kind of way. A similar impression struck me on 
re-reading someone’s personal le. Beforehand, I had really only considered the 
phenomenon of an ocial le in relation to the omnipotence of the East German 
state, but reading it a second time made it look more like a school report from a 
concerned teacher than dictatorial power reected in writing.
Coll.[eague, mv] L. always does his best to further qualify himself in order 
to be in complete control of the tasks for which he is responsible. He car-
ries out his duties conscientiously…his appearance is always positive…
Despite coll. L.’s positive qualities as supervisor and his good achieve-
ments, there is room for improvement. He must demonstrate more and 
greater eort in adjusting to future tasks, and seek possibilities and im-
provements as well as put forward suggestions as to how additional tasks 
can best be incorporated in the organization. He should not be satised 
with the current state of his department…Coll. L has been promised sup-
port in this area from the social representatives.46
e text gave new meaning to the term father state, for precisely thanks to its au-
thoritative power, it acquired something intimate.47 
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In the GDR, the (language of the) state’s power was everywhere. It permeated 
existence in every feasible way, and daily life was imbued with its ideological a-
vouring. If I asked people about it, they said that they were used to looking and 
reading past the language in order to nd the tangible and necessary information. 
“We didn’t read the paper,” Claudia said, “only the weather forecasts and news that 
was directly relevant to Rudolstadt. at’s what everyone did.”48 Because everyone 
glossed over the same words in the knowledge that everyone had to live by and 
with these words, a community of people existed who knew that the deceiving, 
though originally well intended language formed the structure of their existence: 
no one could escape, everyone simply had to live with it. 
“In those days we were all in the same boat.” People used this sentence to con-
vey the fact that everyone being in the same situation led to a feeling of security, 
calm and a certain warmth. For a long time I found this a particularly sad expres-
sion, for it told me that people had found consolation in a bad situation because it 
was experienced by all. It took a while before I realized that their words signied 
something totally dierent.49 Above all, they expressed a feeling that had nothing 
to do with the values dominating my (western) frame of reference. e expression 
refers to the experience that what we tend to call misery is simply a fact, and no 
matter what you think about it, it is a mutually experienced fate.50 
e phrase about the same boat was meant to show that, irrespective of the 
value one attributed to it, the omnipotent language of power was a decisive factor 
in East Germans’ existence. e state’s rhetoric was “the great enframer of [their] 
lives.”51 Aecting everyone to the same extent, the daily recurring language soaked 
in ideology was one of the main binding factors in East Germans’ lives. A compa-
rable conclusion is drawn by American political scientist Lisa Wedeen with regard 
to the symbolic language of power in Syria:
Every Syrian…is uent in this symbolic language, if only because all are 
subjected to a constant barrage of its rhetorical iterations. To be Syrian 
means, in part, to be able to operate, either rebelliously…or obediently…
within the universe of the ocial rhetoric. is generalized familiarity 
with the regime’s language and iconography operates to integrate Syrians, 
because every citizen in every location of the political landscape, from 
those who admire Asad’s political savvy, to those who despise him, have 
been required to share in this experience of Asad’s rule.52 
In analyzing the relationship between the inhabitants and authoritarian states in 
Africa, Cameroonian political scientist Achille Mbembe used a similar expres-
sion when describing that both inhabited “the same living space.”53 He refers to 
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the same involuntary form of unity as expressed by my interviewees – one that is 
brought about by people inhabiting the same material (the land) and ideational 
(the language of power) structure. When talking about the same boat, people 
were not so much alluding to the fact that they could not leave the country, but to 
the simple fact that everyone had to make the best of it within the same, clearly 
circumscribed space.54 at was the fundament of what some have called East 
Germans’ “symbiosis born of necessity.”55 
e relatively positive way East Germans looked back on their past appeared 
to be closely bound with the fact that the dictatorial state manifested itself more 
ambiguously in their daily lives than I would have thought possible. Remarkably, 
it was precisely the totalitarian characteristics of the power of the state which were 
partly responsible for the neutral-positive way they were depicted retrospectively. 
rough a complex, layered, bureaucratic system, the state asserted its powers 
over every aspect of life, and although this meant that there was scarcely a place 
to be found which the state could not access, it presented itself in rather trivial 
ways. e state was, for example, the neighbor who continued to cajole you to be 
more committed. Or it was the person who compiled the beekeepers’ annual re-
port – incorporating a number of obligatory sentences that made people chuckle 
together. Precisely due to the fact that the power of the state had penetrated society 
so deeply, its omnipotence, seen to be extremely threatening from the outside, was 
largely neutralized. Its very omnipresence was the reason why people were able 
to negotiate with the state in so many situations, it looked aer them, and they so 
oen laughed about it together – albeit sneakily.
What struck me most about peoples’ stories were the innocent, amusing and 
caring features. Although the more threatening and liberty-depriving character-
istics of the East German powers were not named as such, they were of course 
implicitly present in the stories I referred to. e story told by Claudia, the school 
pupil, about the ‘dissident’ comments of her teacher is the most obvious example. 
e reason Claudia and her classmates had a bond of trust with their teacher was 
because he said something critical even though this was not allowed. is ‘not 
allowed’ only featured implicitly in the stories East Germans told me about their 
former society. In the following chapter I will go into more detail about what in 
my opinion has been omitted and why. For the remainder of this chapter, I will 
concentrate on the mechanisms that ensured the state’s liberty-depriving charac-
teristics remained invisible – to a certain extent. 
e story Reiner (director of one of Rudolstadt’s main cultural institution) told 
me about his personal life in de GDR oers a good start: He had become a party 
member out of idealism, because he was critically involved with the society he 
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happened to live in. He hoped that if many more people would dedicate them-
selves to it, East German reality could perhaps be brought more in line with social-
ist ideals in the future. Finally, however, so little was le of his initial enthusiasm 
and dedication that he ended up just trying – as he put it – “to survive as a kind of 
jester.” Yet he remained a party member. Partly because he was rather lazy – as he 
himself described it – but also because he always cherished the hope that someday 
things here would change for the better...And that hope was also fed, he recalled. 
ere always were these enthusing remarks, like ‘Mensch, wir brauchen 
dich! Wir brauchen Leute so wie dich, die einfach mit ein kritisches 
Selbstverständnis an die Sachen ‘ran gehen [Hey folks, come on, we need 
you! We need people like you who critically help things to progress].’ And 
of course, the ideal of a classless society, as it was so cleverly put, with 
equal rights for all…well, who would not identify with that?!
Still, he did not become politically active again until aer the Wende. At the time 
of the GDR, he merely sat out his party membership. Fortunately, he went on to 
tell me, he was surrounded by a group of people at work who mostly shared the 
same attitudes, and who got on well together. For him, his work was really a sort of 
Nische; an island to which he and his colleagues could withdraw together: “there 
we shut ourselves o from the outside world, which we tried to keep out as much 
as possible. Many people had their own Nische, their own island to which they 
withdrew: there was always a group within which people felt as one.” Within the 
Nischen, there was no room for party attire, for that was where real life took place.
His story illustrates three elements which are typical of the complex relation-
ship between the citizens and the power of the state in the GDR, two of which 
have already been discussed. First of all, Reiner’s story shows that his relationship 
towards the power of the state was quite ambiguous. His attitude contained ele-
ments of idealism, disappointment, irony, and opportunism in equal measures. 
Ultimately, he saw himself as a jester – a term which not only sounds opportunistic 
but also mocking, so typical of the attitude many East Germans adopted towards 
the state. Second, his story also demonstrates how the power of the state was in-
tertwined with his personal life in an entirely imperceptible way. Although he suf-
fered from political pressure in his daily life, it was in the form of an acquaintance 
reproaching him for his lack of political commitment, encouraging him to show 
his face more oen. In Reiner’s retrospective view, the state’s pressure was hardly 
experienced as threatening or oppressive. is much we know.
What is new in Reiner’s story is the separation between public and private, be-
tween the public arena and the Nische to which people retreated together. Besides 
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personalizing the state and ironically distancing themselves from it, this was the third 
way East Germans managed to avoid the dictatorial pressure confronting them. 
Separating the public domain from private life was characteristic for life in the 
GDR. It was prompted by the need for honesty. For however nice it was to sneak 
a laugh together at the lies which dominated the public domain, the cle between 
ne words and visible reality was such a characterizing feature of everyday life in 
the GDR that people felt urged to deal with it in a less ritualized manner. Because 
true openness in these matters was not possible in public, people conned the 
expression of personal opinions to their private circles. East Germans’ existence 
was thus split; there was the public domain, where the lies governed that everyone 
laughed about together, and there was the private domain, where real life pre-
vailed. 
e Nische was a prominent feature of East Germans’ existence.56 For not only 
the factory worker, the taxi-driver, and the critical artist, but also the party secre-
tary, the head of the communal Handel und Versorgung [trade and maintenance] 
department, and the judge wanted to withdraw with like-minded people at the 
weekend, aer work or even at work. Even loyal party members wanted to remove 
their public face when in private, so that – in their own Nische – they could be 
really honest. Some people’s Nische might have been a group of colleagues, for 
another it was a group of friends. 
From an early age on, people thus learned to present themselves dierently 
in dierent situations. On the one side there was the private sphere where people 
generally trusted each other, and where in principle everything could be said.57 
en there was the public sphere, characterized by a massive gap between ne 
words and everyday reality, managed by people one usually knew, and joined by 
everyone who was able and willing to (re)produce the half-truths which were sub-
sequently ridiculed by everyone in public, but not too loudly. 
Obviously, people knew that a third domain existed alongside this, populated 
by “them up there.” It was not known what exactly went on there, and nobody 
wanted to have anything to do with it. at was the place where the ne words 
originated (and yes, other things as well, but it was better to keep this in brackets), 
and it was better to stay as far away from there as possible. Some people were af-
fected – like for instance Karl D., whom I met while he was working in the coun-
cil’s youth welfare and culture department. 
I really wanted to study, but that was not possible because I was not a 
party member. en I considered joining the party, but decided against 
this. Later, when it became more and more obvious to me how much was 
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wrong in the GDR, I did become a member. I thought: if that is where the 
power is, and I feel that things should change, then that is where I ought 
to be. at is why I became a member. Aer a while, however, I loathed 
it more and more. It began to dawn on me that the power did not lie with 
the party at all, but with a little, unknown, higher-ranked group, who in 
fact had the whole of society in their pocket. at sickened me, and so I 
le. e ocial statement was that I had been thrown out of the party, 
because obviously no one le the party of their own accord. at was just 
not possible. Shortly aerwards, a rumor circulated at work that one of 
our colleagues had been spying for the west. As time went by, it was made 
known that I was the one. en I was really afraid. I even considered leav-
ing the country.
A rumor, no more than that. But the underlying threat alone was enough to make 
Karl consider leaving the country. According to him, it was a little handful of high-
ranked people who had real power – threatening power. Most people had nothing 
to do with them, so they could simply carry on as if that handful did not exist 
and as if the state was mainly an encouraging neighbor. At the local level, power 
had such an everyday, accessible, and sometimes even caring face that it was not 
dicult to join in. In the ensuing solidarity, people laughed together, they read 
between the lines, and if they felt the need for real frankness, they withdrew into 
the Nische. In this way most people managed to banish the real power beyond the 
margins of existence (and consciousness). is led to “people feeling perfectly free 
and autonomous in their own little world and treating the domain of power as 
somewhere beyond the private sphere.”58 
us, although the omnipresent state might give the impression of keeping 
people small, most people did not experience it that way. e society that had 
evolved in the GDR was primarily remembered as one of warmth and solidarity. 
When people could not avoid recognizing another type of power than the friendly 
lady next door, this was demystied and banished to a faraway domain inhabited 
by the unknown category of them up there. 
e warmth and trust that existed in the Nischen and the community spirit 
were typical features of life in the GDR, and they are what people claim to miss 
since the Wende.59 e more or less secretive nature of these privation commu-
nities, the slightly subversive grumbling and laughing together and helping one 
another gave them something extra. People were united because they shared so 
much: they lived in the same area within the Wall, they lived with the same lan-
guage of power and developed a commonly shared ironic attitude. If East Germans 
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tried to explain positive feelings about their former existence, the western criti-
cism was devastating. In West German eyes, the GDR was barely a footnote in 
German history and even a criminal footnote at that,60 so who would want to be 
identied with such a footnote? 
Many westerners’ experience of the GDR’s outward appearance and material 
deterioration seems to have been the staunchest – because visible – reason for 
the country’s negative image in general. Although this explains the unenthusiastic 
reactions to my questions on the subject, it is remarkable that East Germans’ only 
outspoken criticism of their past was the material situation in their country (as 
will be discussed in chapter seven). is was a sore topic that I was not allowed to 
ask or talk about. Somewhat overstated, one could therefore say that I was not al-
lowed to say what they also felt. is illustrates that when talking to me about their 
past, they were making a selection. 
In this chapter, I have concentrated on the positive aspects of the relationship 
between the East German state and the population, in which irony played a sig-
nicant role. As the theoretical literature on jokes in relation to the social order 
illustrates, however, jokes can always be interpreted in two contrasting ways. ey 
can indeed be seen as a form of moral resistance or criticism against the existing 
social order. But one can also allege that such a strict ritualized form does not pose 
any threat whatsoever. As an “institutionalized and harmless form of symbolic 
protest,” the jester was allowed to joke about the royal court. Rather than being a 
threat towards the existing social order, his jokes merely consolidated it.61
Resisting or accepting the existing social order? However imprecise this may 
sound, in my opinion it was both. I will return to this subject in the conclusion. 
e simple fact, though, that hardly any criticism was accepted about their past 
and that so many East Germans presented it in such unequivocally neutral and 
positive tones clearly indicates that the complexity of East Germany’s past was not 





Every one of us...who has passed the last forty years (or part of them) between Elbe and 
Oder notices, when he turns around to oversee his path of life, sites or whole regions 
where he or his surroundings were a puppet in the hands of powers that only showed 
themselves in disguise, so that – even if he did not suer psychologically – he is still grop-
ing in the dark as to their exact workings (Günther de Bruyn, 1993).1
e stories East Germans told me about their former Nische-existence were all 
equally rosy. All the aspects that dominate westerners’ representations of East 
German life were ostensibly absent. Painful subjects, such as the threat and fear of 
the Stasi, mutual distrust, and people’s collaboration with the regime, were almost 
never mentioned. Even when I nally came to understand my informants’ positive 
representation of their past, I still found it amazing that they appeared to succeed 
so well in cleansing their stories and recollections of negative experiences. e 
subject Stasi, for instance, was never mentioned. Except when talking to someone 
who had been kept under close surveillance by the secret service, this dark side of 
East Germany’s past was only referred to in the form of a few standard remarks, 
some rumors and an incidental joke.
Only once did I hear an anecdote that gave me a solid clue to my assumption 
that people’s one-sided positive view of the past was part of a selection process, 
hiding other elements from view. e anecdote came from Helmut – a middle-
aged man who was active in local politics when I met him. 
Long before 1989, Helmut and his wife Lotte were part of a circle of friends who 
were very close. ey shared the same interests, frequently spent time together, 
and usually visited each other at weekends. ey were so close that they even 
reprimanded each other’s children when they did something wrong. Suddenly, 
however, the group fell apart – almost from one day to another. is happened 
when some of them applied for an exit visa. From that moment on, they seemed 
to feel superior to the others. ey befriended other people who wanted to leave 
the country as well – people with whom they would normally never have mixed 
socially – and they began to avoid their old circle of friends. 
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is happened more oen, Helmut explained. Many friendships broke up when 
people decided to leave the country. Somehow, they then felt superior. Leaving the 
GDR?! en one really was someone! 
e anecdote evokes many questions. How is it possible that such close friend-
ships fell apart so suddenly and rigorously when a number of people decided to 
leave the country? Why did they want to leave? Why did they not discuss their 
doubts with the others? And why was one “really someone” aer deciding to turn 
one’s back on the GDR? 
Apart from these questions, the anecdote also suggests that the East German 
Nische was not only a safe bulwark of warmth, mutual condence and geniality 
which allowed people to really be themselves when amongst each other. It suggests 
that the stories about the former Nischen were also the result of selective memory, 
and that the Nischen might not only have been the stronghold of mutual trust and 
condentiality they were alleged to be later. 
Much was not allowed in the GDR, much was forbidden by the state. Apart 
from that, East Germans themselves also chose to remain silent about certain sub-
jects. e question is whether this silence was merely the result of the selective 
memory process taking eect aerwards, or were my respondents aware that they 
were concealing the more painful elements of their past for their own sakes, as the 
famous East German writer Günther de Bruyn suggests in this chapter’s motto? 
De Bruyn describes how he and his fellow countrymen were puppets in the hands 
of powers that only manifested themselves in disguise, so that even aerwards, 
people were still in the dark about their exact functioning and eect. I feel there is 
a relationship between the disguised powers of the state on the one hand and the 
collective silence about the past’s painful subjects on the other – a relationship that 
could be summarized as conformity. 
I agree with De Bruyn as I believe that many East Germans were unaware of 
the extent to which their existence was entangled with the dictatorial context they 
lived in, primarily because this entanglement had assumed unrecognizable forms. 
In my opinion, the clearest sign of East Germans’ adjustment to the pressures of 
the state was the existence of the Nische – the social institution that was primarily 
accredited with anti-state connotations in daily life. In this chapter I will show that 
the Nische, celebrated as a buer of mutual trust beyond state inuence, was also 
the result of conformity with the state, in which social tensions were encapsulated 
and made indiscernible.
Helmut’s anecdote of the collapsing Nische was one of the very few stories I 
heard which proved that life in the GDR had not only been cozy and warm. is 
chapter is therefore mainly based on archival material and secondary sources.2 
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By focusing on the themes that were generally absent from East Germans’ recol-
lections, I will show that the warm and pleasant characteristics of East German 
society also functioned as a screen behind which the less attractive aspects of the 
“intimate tyranny” and the “tacit agreement” between rulers and ruled remained 
hidden. Together with the previous one, this chapter aims to show the inuence 
of the dictatorial regime on East German society. Although the themes of material 
goods and consumption may seem to disappear in the background in the follow-
ing pages, it will become clear that they were important instruments in enforcing 
adaption and conformity to the socialist state. 
Different Perspectives and Jokes about the Stasi
As I observed earlier, most media present a completely dierent perspective on 
East German history than the safe, warm and condence-inspiring existence 
sketched in the previous chapter. e theme that dominates western media ac-
counts of the former GDR is the atmosphere of fear and mistrust that was due to 
the omnipresence of the secret service – the Stasi. While I was doing eldwork, 
new Stasi scandals were uncovered quite regularly. Famous East German politi-
cians appeared to have worked for the service, spouses turned out to have spied 
on each other for years, and circles of close friends suddenly found out that one of 
them had been a Stasi informant. Even the past of the country’s most famous and 
respected writer, Christa Wolf, appeared not to have been completely clean. Such 
disclosures oen resulted in public mud-slinging, in which victims and perpetra-
tors disputed each other’s assertions. e public at large could delight in the rude 
accusations and insinuations spelled out in the popular media. 
In most cases the people spied-upon had held a critical stance towards the 
former socialist state. ey were members of an oppositional group, a religious 
community or discussion group, or were active environmentalists, pacists, criti-
cal intellectuals, journalists or artists. ese potential criticasters of the state were 
seen as a threat, and so the Stasi kept a sharp eye on them. Ordinary people had 
less reason to suspect they were being watched. is is not to say, however, that the 
Stasi did not inuence ordinary East Germans’ lives. According to the main cus-
todian of the Stasi archives, the former East German clergyman Joachim Gauck, 
the opposite was true. 
In his work, Gauck repeatedly made it clear that the secret service’s presence 
deeply inuenced the social, mental and psychological climate in the GDR: “e 
mentality of East German citizens was deeply inuenced by a permanent feeling 
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of threat.”3 He is not alone in this. Many prominent German intellectuals are also 
convinced that the Stasi dominated all of East Germans’ existence. Some claim 
that East German society was characterized by a regime of fear which imprisoned 
everyone – irrespective of whether one was actually watched by the Stasi or not.4 
e threatening presence of the secret service would have been like a hovering 
shadow, darkening all of East Germany. Maaz, for example, has frequently de-
scribed the GDR as a society in which it was almost impossible not to become 
completely estranged from oneself. According to him, the presence of the secret 
service stirred people’s latent feelings of fear, and from an early age on, they col-
lectively learned to only show their socially acceptable façades, behind which fear 
and insecurity remained hidden.5 De Bruyn’s nal verdict is equally negative when 
he describes East Germany as a society where people “had been kept restrained, 
locked up, and repressed for decades. Because of their repression they were com-
pletely entangled in guilt.”6 According to him, the climate in the post-Wende GDR 
is characterized by “a moral crisis or its repression...which is unable to issue a solid 
fundament for emotional wellbeing.”7
In light of these conclusions, it is even more remarkable that my discussion 
partners in Rudolstadt generally responded rather half-heartedly when the subject 
Stasi came up. Many were of the opinion that it was of course terrible, but that the 
subject was completely blown up in the western media. e representation of the 
GDR as a completely degenerated society, permeated by the secret service and the 
resulting threat, distrust and fear, was seen as a gross exaggeration. e elderly 
judge referred to before, whom I visited regularly, told me that of course he had 
always known that they existed, but even if they did watch him, he had no problem 
with that as he had nothing to hide. 
He expressed an opinion of the Stasi that many East Germans shared: of course 
it was bad, but it was not that awful. A fair summary of the widespread attitude 
would probably be something like: “We knew that they existed, and we suspected 
that their employees were everywhere, but it didn’t really bother us.” e only place 
ordinary East Germans felt a little wary about the Stasi was when they entered an 
Intershop. It was generally known that “they” were there to see who visited the 
shops and to take notes on what people bought, how much money they spent, how 
oen they came, etc. Since no-one really knew what the secret service was going to 
do with the information they gathered, people generally felt a little uneasy when 
entering those shops. But apart from that, it was not so bad. e Stasi really did not 
have so much inuence on East German life as is now suggested – so they claimed. 
Even Werner, a middle-aged intellectual who worked for the local administration 
in the cultural eld and who was generally quite willing to share his thoughts on 
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all kinds of topics with me, was a little reluctant when I asked him his opinion on 
the discussions taking place. It was so complicated, he answered evasively, that 
he advised me not to pursue the subject further – making it clear that he was not 
prepared to discuss it with me. 
Jokes were sometimes made on the subject. For instance, when I was standing 
in a bar, talking to Axel, and the bartender shoved a scrap of paper in my direc-
tion – ‘a secret note,’ written by someone else and signed with the designation IM 
Freund.8 Much later I heard that the person who wrote the note had been watched 
by the Stasi quite intensively and for a very long time. is also applied to the 
local politician who worked for Rudolstadt’s social democrat fraction and who, 
during a theatre performance by two famous East German cabaret artists, sud-
denly appeared on stage, dressed as a Stasi-collaborator with a big black hat, dark 
sunglasses and a long leather coat. e artists welcomed him, saying, “Ah, here is 
our regular guest. Please, sit down,” and oered him a chair in a corner of the stage. 
He sat there for the rest of the performance, making notes, listening to what was 
being said, and looking round very furtively. Sometimes the performers warned 
him that they were about to tell a joke which he had already heard at one of their 
earlier shows, so he could go to the toilet for the next ten minutes or so. 
His actions reminded me of myself in my role as anthropologist. I was there-
fore not surprised to be frequently introduced to people as follows: “Here is some-
one who wants to know everything about us, but who is not from the Stasi.” 
To the point and amusing. It was not so amusing when I once wanted to ask 
Michaëla – a close friend whom I met quite regularly – whether I could interview 
her father (a designer). I tentatively tried to ask: “Do you know whether your fa-
ther...” But she interrupted me: “Was with the Stasi? No, I don’t know and I don’t 
want to know either. I am not interested.” For an uninteresting theme, it seemed to 
be one that rather preoccupied her, but Michaëla stuck to it: she was not interested. 
According to Joachim Gauck, such reactions, and particularly the glossing-
over attitude towards the Stasi that was widespread in the former GDR, are the 
most serious consequences of the GDR’s “really solid dictatorship.”9 During a lec-
ture he gave at the Goethe Institute in Amsterdam in 1998, he explained that many 
East Germans “suered seriously from the dictatorship’s heritage.” is was not 
surprising, he explained, when one realized how omnipresent the secret service 
had been. Over 90,000 people had ocially worked for the Ministry, then there 
were at least 170,000 IMs, and the Ministry for the State Security Service had le 
more than y miles of archive records.10 Gauck explained that more than twice 
as many people had been involved in the East German state security service than 
under Hitler (in all of Germany). One out of every sixty East Germans had col-
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laborated with the Stasi. Below I will give a brief description of the activities they 
undertook and the kind of methods they used. 
e Stasi’s main task, apart from controlling East German post and telephone 
communications, was to gather detailed information on oen assumed opposition 
groups and individuals. In some cases this could take rather extreme forms. e 
Stasi archives contain records that show how the secret service did its utmost to 
upset and sometimes even destroy individuals’ lives. Spreading rumors was one of 
the most common techniques to disrupt people’s existence and to discredit them 
and their work, even in the close circle of their intimate relations. 
How this was done was explained to me by Georg. When I met him he was 
about 55 years old and lived in a hamlet near Rudolstadt. He told me that he had 
always suspected, and from a certain moment knew, that he was being watched 
by the Stasi. Nevertheless, he was shocked when going through his records aer 
the Wende. He had never imagined that they would go so far to bring him down. 
Looking back, suddenly all the bad luck and misfortune he had suered fell into 
place: everything that had gone wrong or not worked out the way he had planned, 
the promotions that did not happen, the research applications that were turned 
down, the friendships that suddenly broke up, the relationships that ended. Not 
until he read the Stasi reports did he realize that everything had been planned by 
them. ey had systematically tried to destroy his life and had succeeded quite 
well. 
Maybe he should have known and could have prevented some things by being 
more careful, he considered aerwards. But he did not want to be preoccupied 
with wondering whom he could trust and whom not all the time. He did not want 
to live like that, he explained.
I have always considered that because my heart and conscience were 
clear, they should act as they pleased. But then to nd out that one of the 
few people whom I really thought I could trust, had been an IM and had 
for years passed on information about me...ese notes were oen quite 
meaningless, like my pig’s weight at slaughter, and that I had bought this 
and that amount of coal for next winter...But that was not the issue.
e issue was that among the few people he really trusted, there had been one who 
had passed on information about him. e issue was that they had been able to 
come that close. 
According to an employee of the main Stasi archives in Berlin whom I inter-
viewed, the ocial aim of such activities was “to organize personal and professional 
failure up to the point of suicide.” In the Department of Operational Psychology 
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at Potsdam’s College of Law (the so-called Stasi University), people were not only 
taught how to instruct and lead IMs, how to hold on to them and even make them 
dependent on them, they also learned numerous tactics to combat hostile and op-
position groups and individuals, for instance by:
Systematically discrediting people’s public reputation, standing and pres-
tige on the basis of the intermingling of true, controllable and discredit-
ing statements with untrue, plausible, irrefutable and equally discrediting 
ones; systematic organization of professional and social failures in order 
to undermine individuals’ self-condence.11 
It is a short quotation. e list of suggestions on how to destroy people’s lives is 
much longer. e Stasi archive employee told me that the archives also contained 
statistics with all Stasi-orchestrated suicide attempts per year. When the attempt 
succeeded and people actually committed suicide, it was booked as a success. 
From the early 1960s, the MfS (Ministerium für Staatssicherkeit, Ministry of State 
Security) had been making plans for the establishment of concentration camps. 
Although they were never built, the Stasi kept records of all extremely suspect in-
dividuals who had to be interned within 24 hours, as soon as the situation threat-
ened to become politically explosive.12
ese are some of the most extreme examples of the notorious East German 
security service’s methods. Even putting them aside and only focusing on the 
Stasi’s more common activities, Joachim Gauck asserts that they have had a deep 
and lasting inuence on what in his lecture he called, “East German attitudes and 
conditions of life.” 
e Stasi’s general activities and their impact have been well portrayed by 
Christa Wolf. In a short novel, Was Bleibt [What remains], she describes prob-
ingly how the Stasi entered her life and knocked it o balance. She describes the 
little clicks during telephone conversations and the kind of codes she developed in 
order to speak a secret language. e paranoia that gradually took hold of her, the 
fear and the feeling of being taken over by others and estranged from herself are 
sketched in poignant and succinct terms. 
Apart from the general mood, I was particularly struck by a passage in which 
Wolf describes how and why she rst began to wonder whether a particular ac-
quaintance was gathering information on her. e rst time the thought entered 
her mind was when the man in question took her to a bar. While they were sit-
ting there, he made an unpleasant remark, aer which she asked him: “Have I 
ever done you an injustice?” Wolf then describes how the dam the man had built 
around himself suddenly broke. Although he did not say it explicitly, she detected 
142 Material Fantasies
a confession in his words. Amidst his outpouring, he also remarked that he found 
her arrogant: she thought she could get everything out of life without paying for it, 
without selling her soul. In order to break the tension, Wolf commented: “Come 
on, we are not living in the Middle Ages anymore.” en he exploded:
Not in the Middle Ages? Oh yes, Madam, we are living in the Middle 
Ages. Apart from some external things, not much has changed. And 
nothing will change, if people want to use their knowledge in order to 
rise above the ignorant masses – then they have to sell their souls, as al-
ways. And if I really wanted to know what this meant: it meant blood-
shed, even if it was not your own blood. Not always your own blood… 
Now I remember what I had instantly understood at the time: they have 
got to him. And I remember that my pride – in this he was probably right, 
he was a gied psychologist – compelled me to quietly ask him: ‘well, why 
don’t you quit?’ And how he then turned deathly pale, opened his eyes 
wide, put his face so close to mine that I could smell the beer on his breath, 
and then in a clear and stone-sober voice, he uttered three words: ‘I–am–
afraid.’ Immediately aer that he pretended to be drunk again, I stood up, 
tapped my knuckles on the table, and le. Aer that I did not see Jürgen 
M. for years. I have forgotten the scene that he will never forget, and now, 
he no longer has to know about me. He is in the house with the many 
telephones, where he happily collects all the material on me that no one 
else can obtain, every morning thanking providence that has brought him 
to a place where he can satisfy his passionate lust, while at the same time 
be of use to society.13 
e rst question this passage raised in my mind related to Wolf ’s remarks about 
the person who is watching her (the so-called perpetrator). She describes that per-
forming these activities enables him to “satisfy his passionate lust.” e second 
intriguing element is his reproach to her (the so-called victim) that she is arrogant 
because she wants to “rise above the masses” and “get everything out of life with-
out paying for it.” Also overwhelming and fascinating is Wolf ’s observation that 
not only she is afraid, but also the one spying on her. It made me wonder how this 
related to so many East Germans’ remarks that they had never been afraid of the 
Stasi at all.14 
In his lecture, Gauck asserted that it is almost impossible for outsiders to 
imagine how deep an impact the above-mentioned collective experiences have 
had on the people of the GDR. According to him, East Germans had in fact al-
ways lived in fear: fear was the basis of their existence. ree successive genera-
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tions had rst and foremost learned: “Bow your head, feel the fear, adapt, and 
you will be alright.” As a result of this repression and the concomitant ideologi-
cal indoctrination, people not only gave up their own conscience and individu-
ality, but according to Gauck, referring to Hannah Arendt, it also generated a 
collective “loss of reality.” 
Gauck did not elaborate on this conclusion during his lecture, but elsewhere he 
has made it clear that according to him, the omnipresence of the Stasi completely 
estranged East Germans from themselves.15 e main reason why the secret ser-
vice could have such a profound inuence on their existence was because no-one 
ever knew who they were. 
Amongst our colleagues, we knew who the party clerk and the union 
representative were. We knew them. We knew how to behave towards 
them, we knew what their assignment was, and what sort of threat they 
posed. But with regard to the Stasi…one never knew. In every big com-
pany, big apartment-complex, and even at a big party, one might be talk-
ing to someone from the Stasi without knowing it and without knowing 
what kind of information he was interested in. People generally wanted to 
be open towards each other, but because we never really knew who they 
were, it was impossible to relate to them. at was the really threatening 
thing about them.
It is an interesting and plausible argument which, although contrary to the one 
I presented in the previous chapter, follows a similar line of reasoning. In both 
cases the normality of a power’s disciplinary techniques is assumed to give or-
der and meaning to people’s lives.16 Following on from my informants’ comments, 
the previous chapter showed that the language of power was the all-inuencing 
framework of East Germans’ existence (an inuence which my informants valued 
rather positively). Gauck put forward a similar argument regarding the threaten-
ing aspects of power. In his view, it was precisely the secret service’s omnipresence 
which had a structuring – albeit largely unconscious – eect on the way people 
perceived and experienced the reality they lived in.
e argument sounds plausible and might oer an explanation as to why so 
many East Germans contended that fear hardly played a role in their lives. If cor-
rect, it would also shed new light on the narrative of mutual warmth, commitment 
and security that assumingly characterized so many East Germans’ lives. Perhaps 
even the nostalgically remembered Nische would look very dierent if seen from 
Gauck’s perspective. In order to get a better understanding of the Stasi’s inuence 
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on ordinary East Germans’ lives, I submitted a request to investigate the Stasi ar-
chives on Rudolstadt. 
The Stasi’s Methods and the Taboo on More 
Based on the previous arguments, I had quite a strong inkling of what kind of 
information I would probably nd in the Stasi archives. When I rst saw the con-
tents of the records on Rudolstadt that had been saved, I almost started to laugh: 
they were more like boys’ adventure books or the script of an old-fashioned, East 
German James Bond lm than the legacy of one of the world’s most threatening 
secret services. I was struck by the Cold War slogans, the suocating anxiety, and 
the constant warnings: People, take care, the class enemy is everywhere!! Although 
it was now and then amusing to go through the documents, they also presented 
a number of relevant issues (albeit at times only indirectly) for grasping the East 
German state’s means of maintaining power. 
One of the things I came across was a pamphlet on East German leisure ac-
tivities that was sent to all local Stasi departments in 1984. e pamphlet drew 
attention to a dilemma: although it was praiseworthy that holiday trac between 
the socialist countries had risen, creating better opportunities to get to know each 
other’s socialist ways of life, it was also important to realize the potentially danger-
ous consequences.17 More and more people were opting to spend some of their 
holidays at camping sites abroad, but it was generally known that western secret 
services used the camping sites in Czechoslovakia to win over East Germans to 
their side, or inuence them ideologically, making them dissatised with the East 
German state, party and politics. is was particularly threatening during the 
summer holidays, when people were in the mood to relax and be more open to-
wards others. In such situations, even the most politically correct people were at 
risk. By distributing printed matter, through personal conversations and “by ex-
hibiting certain aspects of the western way of life as subtle advertising for their life-
style and system,” the GDR’s opponents tried to win over East German citizens to 
“realize hostile activities.”18 Particularly by way of “direct contacts,” Czech camping 
sites oered the GDR’s opponents “[f]avorable opportunities for a dierentiated 
inuencing of our citizens…It is relatively easy to determine someone’s profession, 
work station, political attitude, family relationships, but also specic features, like 
for instance reticence, thoughtlessness, boasting, et cetera.”19
In all its banality, the memo is signicant: it shows that the Stasi preferred 
people not to leave the country at all, but if they did leave, to remain observant at 
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all times and in all circumstances. Noteworthy as well is the reference to “certain 
features” that could apply to some of East Germany’s holidaymakers abroad who 
thus could be abused by foreign secret services. As I will show further on in this 
chapter, the East German secret service was very well aware of the importance of 
certain features when it came to the extraction of relevant information. Reticence 
was therefore strongly preferred over openness and light-heartedness as far as East 
German citizens were concerned. Open-minded East Germans with good com-
munication skills might too easily be persuaded to divert from the socialist track. 
e memo consists of eighteen pages. e terminology that is used, the kind of 
problems it addresses, and the undiluted Cold War language are all characteristic 
of the entire Stasi legacy. A similar tone and contents could be found in the notes 
that were used to determine whether or not someone qualied to be admitted as 
member of the so-called Reisekader [travel executives]. When someone applied 
for permission to travel to capitalist countries for his work, it was necessary to nd 
out whether he was in fact “the right and reliable executive to maintain the neces-
sary contact with executives from the nicht sozialistische Wirtschasgebiet [non-
socialist economic area].”20 In order to meet this requirement accurately, several 
IMs were selected, with partly the same assignments so that they could check each 
other’s reliability and meticulousness.21 ey had a list of guidelines that served as 
a basis for the report they were to write, in which a wide-ranging series of issues 
had to be addressed. Relevant information was to be gathered, for instance, on the 
amount of mail someone received, what time he would get up and come home, his 
political and professional development, attitude towards the party and the state, 
and what kind of activities he undertook at his workplace. 
e resulting reports mentioned all the so-called weak spots of the people con-
cerned. When one of Rudolstadt’s residents wanted to visit a scientic conference 
in Rumania, it was reported that his uncle and aunt lived in the FRG, that his wife 
did not vote in 1967 (the report was written in December 1986), and in addition, 
that he appeared to have contact with West Germans. With regard to another man 
(X) who was to represent his company at Leipzig’s international fair, it was to be 
investigated whether the important position of trade-department manager was 
“suciently covered by comrade X” because although he was friendly, he was also 
“very self-aware” and had an “exaggerated degree of assertiveness.”22 
Once people were admitted to the highly desirable Reisekader and allowed to 
visit the class-enemy, they were carefully watched during their trips abroad. e 
notes and impressions below are written by a colleague of the person concerned, 
for whom the trip to France was his rst introduction to a capitalist country. I cite 
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this report quite extensively because some of the details provide a good overview 
of the Stasi’s concerns and points of interest.
He was very impressed by everything that the capitalist country was able 
to outwardly present. ank God he also witnessed a scene that showed 
capitalism’s other side, i.e. when a woman...was sheltering on a hot air 
vent, probably because she was homeless...He owns a weekend cottage...I 
presume his nancial position is very good...He is basically rather quiet, 
but he is also a sociable person and he is probably easier to interrogate 
than other people. is possibly also leads him to easily trust others...For 
obvious reasons he was very insecure during the entire journey...He has 
not made any personal contact with others during the trip. I have been 
able to conclude that he talks quite a lot. is is not automatically a nega-
tive evaluation, but he could be briefer – also in negotiations.23
e memo clearly illustrates the Stasi’s concerns for East German citizens’ abil-
ity and ideological perseverance in resisting the seductions of western prosperity. 
Furthermore, it is evident that the Stasi had a strong interest in people’s character 
and way of life and in their material and economic conditions. 
In view of this interest, it is hardly surprising that the secret service indeed 
had an unocial employee at every Intershop – as East Germans appeared to have 
rightly surmised – who passed on information about the people visiting the shops, 
mentioning who accompanied them, what they looked at, what they bought, who 
paid for the purchases, and how much money was spent. e notes which the 
secret service received from the IM working at the Intershop in Rudolstadt’s main 
hotel on the market square excelled in both their detail and apparent meaningless-
ness: “A female person, whom I do not know by name at this moment, purchases 
for about 100 DM a week. She is about 40 years old and 5½ feet tall. She usually 
has her child with her.”24
In spite of the apparent irrelevance of such statements, it is clear that the Stasi’s 
routines are comparable to those of an anthropologist in the eld. During their 
respective education, both professional categories learn to take notes of every pos-
sible piece of information, because even ostensibly meaningless details may later 
turn out to be valuable and telling. 
e Stasi’s task was to gather as much information as possible. When work-
ing on someone who was potentially dangerous or suspect, they should overlook 
nothing, and even the tiniest, petty details of someone’s personal particulars (his 
hobbies, relations, material situation and consumer preferences) were noted. Even 
when things appeared to be completely irrelevant at rst glance, they might prove 
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to be signicant (sometimes much later) for blackmail, bribery and extortion (if 
necessary, even of the secret service employees). e reason the Stasi was inter-
ested even in the minute details of people’s lives was because they might be useful 
in order to “have inuence over the candidates.” is is why the archives contain so 
many memos pertaining to suspect, extortable and otherwise striking or deviating 
behavior. Everything that might potentially be useful to put pressure on someone 
was carefully documented. Relevant traits were, for instance, too lively an interest 
in western goods, too strong a craving for luxury, or, as the clergyman in a small 
village in the Rudolstadt area discovered aer reading his les, someone’s inappro-
priate eating behavior; this man appeared to have burped and slurped.25 
e Stasi recorded people’s habits, allowing the party leadership to keep an 
eye on the population’s thoughts and moods. But the recorded information was 
also used to steer the population’s behavior – through blackmail and other forms 
of pressure. e records therefore oer an insight into the behavior, way of life, 
etiquette, and attitude that were desired from above.
Even the most nonsensical records therefor contain information that might be 
interesting and relevant for social scientists. I previously referred to memos per-
taining to an individual’s presumed character traits and way of life. It is remarkable 
that the Stasi’s observations were primarily focused on the extent to which people 
were ostentatious, sensitive to luxury and riches, desirous to have or appear more 
than others, wanted or dared to attract attention, were dierent or wanted to be 
dierent than others. e clergyman had strange eating habits, someone else was 
attracted to gold necklaces, another was very open, or self-assured, or markedly 
impressed by wealth. One man was noticed for being extremely ambitious. 
Going through the les, a certain prole becomes evident, based precisely on 
these kinds of small, hardly noticeable details, which aer a while reveal a rather 
puritan frame of reference. For instance, it was always recorded if someone was 
sociable, conspicuous, dierent, eager to make friends, talking loudly and fre-
quently, uncivilized or voluptuous, gaudy, susceptible to comfort, self-assured, etc. 
Although it was also noted whether people were modest or quiet, subordinate, 
insecure or correct, the way such valuations were documented demonstrates that 
the secret service assessed the latter category as safe, in contrast to those who be-
haved in a more conspicuous manner. It seems that people who attracted attention 
– even if they were not suspected of oppositional or GDR-critical activities and 
attitudes – also risked attracting the Stasi’s attention. 
Interesting in this respect is that the same category of people who attracted 
attention also risked being regarded as Stasi collaborators by their fellow country-
men. e clergyman whose uncivilized eating behavior was mentioned tried to 
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put into words what the secret service’s presence had brought about in his country 
in a poem – the Song of Distrust – of which especially the last line (the only line 
where the author used capitals) is signicant:
die war dies jahr schon zwei mal im westen 
 she already visited the west twice this year
das geht sicher nicht mit rechten dingen zu 
 she is obviously not righteous
und ihr bild hängt in der straβe unsrer besten 
 her image hangs in our leaders’ streets 
damit ist bewiesen die gehört dazu 
 which proves: she is a part, she belongs
ach miβtraut euch freunde ach miβtraut euch nicht
 oh, mistrust my friends, do not mistrust each other
die verbrecher sind nicht wir in diesem land
 we inhabitants of this country are not the criminals here
knei die augen zu doch schaut euch ins gesicht
 turn a blind eye, but look each other in the face
denn nicht jeder BESTE ist ein denunziant
 because not every BEST ONE is a squealer
e last two lines of the next two verses are consecutively: “because not every 
NEW ONE,” and “because not every DIFFERENT ONE is a squealer.”26 With these 
lines Winter suggests that everyone who appeared to be better, new, or dierent 
risked being regarded with suspicion because he could be a Stasi collaborator. 
During my eldwork, this conclusion was conrmed one time in a very strange 
way. e immediate cause was a question I had asked Helga, who worked at the 
little bar below my apartment, about a certain Gerhard Richter and his restaurant. 
Until 1993, Gerhard and his wife Bärbel had owned a restaurant in a little vil-
lage near Rudolstadt. e restaurant had a good reputation, and on Sundays many 
residents of Rudolstadt used to go for a walk to the little village to eat and drink 
something at the restaurant and then walk back. When I rst came to Rudolstadt, 
I stayed at the Richters for two weeks. Aer that, I continued to visit them regu-
larly. For me, they somehow represented the many unpretentious, hard-working 
East Germans I met. eir daughter was married to a butcher, and their son was 
a dedicated socialist who deeply regretted the GDR’s downfall. Every Sunday the 
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whole family met for lunch at Gerhard and Bärbel’s place. She always prepared a 
ne piece of meat with uringian dumplings. 
Both of them liked to talk about the old days, and because they had worked in 
the catering industry, I found their stories very interesting: it was fascinating to 
hear how they constantly had to x and wangle to obtain an extra barrel of beer or 
a little more meat than they were allotted.
At one point aer having visited them, I realized that there was one specic 
detail of Gerhard’s stories which I did not understand. He had told me that in the 
old days when a group booked a table at his restaurant, he had always been obliged 
to report that beforehand to the Rat des Kreises [district council] and aerwards 
write a report about it. I could not understand the reason for this obligation and 
was curious what such a report should be about, so when I came home, I decided 
to ask Helga, the lady who worked in the pub near my apartment. During the 
GDR, Helga had also worked in the catering industry, so she might be able to 
clarify Gerhard’s story. 
Helga did not understand what I was talking about: write a report about groups 
before and aer their visit? She had never heard about it and turned to talk to her 
friend Astrid, who had previously worked for the Rat des Kreises. While discuss-
ing the matter, both women suddenly exchanged a meaningful look: of course, 
now they understood! is could mean only one thing: Gerhard had been with 
the Stasi! When I said that I could not believe that, the women sniggered. How 
could I know!? It was generally known that in the old days Gerhard had always 
managed to oer something extra with his dishes: there were always tomatoes and 
cucumber with his pork chops, and had he not been able to build an extension on 
his house?! Wasn’t that telling enough: he apparently had acquaintances... Yes, they 
were certain: he had been with the Stasi! 
Gerhard had been with the Stasi because of the extra services he had oered. 
As ridiculous as the conclusion may seem, it is slightly reminiscent of the Stasi 
report about the danger of going to a barbecue on a Czech camping site. e asso-
ciation made by the two women is striking. It is a telling illustration of clergyman 
Winter’s words and the impression I gained while going through the Stasi les: 
in the GDR it had been imperative not to attract attention. One should certainly 
not try to be dierent, seem dierent or stand out. at attitude had worked in 
Gerhard’s favor when he still had a restaurant and made the eort to organize extra 
vegetables with his dishes. is had attracted people. But aerwards, when he said 
something strange or incomprehensible, people still nailed him to the Stasi pillory 
because of his vegetables. 
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Although this was almost the only time that I was informed (without having 
to ask) about the way the Stasi’s presence had inuenced daily life in the GDR, the 
anecdote conrmed that it had been important not to act conspicuously but to just 
adjust oneself. People who acted conspicuously seemed to have risked becoming 
ensnared in the Stasi webs: either because they were being watched by the secret 
service or because others considered them to be part of it. is impression is indi-
rectly conrmed by Joachim Gauck’s conclusions on what he considered the most 
dicult question regarding the Stasi phenomenon: “Who were the perpetrators?” 
– more on this issue below.27 
Contrary to what one would expect, only a small minority of those who worked 
as IMs for the Stasi did so because they considered it their civic duty to help the 
secret service.28 e majority of those who appear as IM in the Stasi les decided to 
cooperate aer having been approached and put under pressure by the secret ser-
vice.In most cases, the decisive factor was that not cooperating could have harmful 
consequences for someone’s future career. A story I recorded in Rudolstadt is a 
clear illustration of this. Reiner, a young man who came to work as press spokes-
man at the town hall aer the Wende, told me that, long ago, a good friend of his 
conded that he had once been approached by the Stasi to supply information 
about Reiner. e friend had promised to do so, and he also told Reiner why: he 
was a photographer and wanted to achieve something in life. He wanted to leave 
the GDR, to be allowed to go abroad and cover major stories, which would only be 
possible if he was cooperative. 
It is a well-known, very profane and imaginable argument, where someone’s 
personal responsibility and part of his conscience are set aside for fear of social 
decline or desire for social advancement. A similar motive was highlighted by 
Christa Wolf in the passage referred to earlier. When Wolf lets her IM speak, he ac-
cuses her of being arrogant because she wants to stand out from the masses. She, in 
turn, suspects him of being driven by a “passionate lust,” later on described as his 
desire to “outdo” her. According to her interpretation, he wanted to prove to her 
that he was “the real master, the true king.”29 Wolf furthermore describes that she 
was somehow susceptible to this challenge and took up the gauntlet. She entered 
the struggle for power and noticed that she somehow enjoyed the fact that she was 
apparently so worthy that they wanted to know all about her. 
As will be clear by now, the vanity she discovers in herself is to a certain ex-
tent comparable to what she suspects in Jürgen M. He wanted to win by outdoing 
her. Not only was she vain enough to (also) like that, she even entered the power 
struggle in order to prove that it was impossible to beat her. Both seem to have 
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been driven by a comparable motive or desire, which could be described as stand-
ing out above the crowd. 
Apart from the categories described so far, Gauck points out that a small group 
also existed that was driven by idealism to collaborate with the Stasi. Interestingly, 
they were mainly people with a rather critical stance towards the GDR who con-
cluded that change was only possible from the inside. For outsiders this sounds 
unbelievable. I might not have believed it myself, had I not discovered that I hap-
pened to know someone to whom this applied. It came as a shock to nd out that 
Werner’s wife Paula (Werner being the middle-aged intellectual who refused to 
talk to me about the Stasi) had worked as an IM. I knew Paula as an intelligent 
woman who had been socially active in a critical way – both then and aer the 
Wende. In an anonymous letter, she revealed some of her motivations to become 
an IM.30 In the letter she explains that she decided to cooperate with the Stasi be-
cause in that way she hoped to contribute to “the reform of socialism” by exerting 
pressure on the Stasi through her Führungsozier [ocer in charge].31 She contin-
ues that only aerwards did she come to realize how grossly she had overestimated 
herself. e designation Selbstüberschatzung [overestimation of oneself] is telling 
and relevant in order to better understand the mechanisms of the Stasi.
Paula is critical about misjudging herself. No matter how individual and per-
sonal this desire may have been, there is a certain connection between Paula’s 
Selbstüberschatzung and Wolf ’s description of herself and her IM as people who 
both wanted to stand out from the crowd. As also remarked by Gauck, under-
taking espionage activities for the MfS oen made people feel meaningful and 
important.32 Or, according to Maaz: in order to be a good IM, people had to have 
“a clear desire to throw their weight around, and be regarded as important and 
signicant.”33 Although phrased in individual terms, it refers not to an individual, 
psychological characterization but to a deeply social phenomenon: the only way 
one achieves standing is in the eyes of the outside world. 
Wanting (to have, to be, to mean, to achieve) more than others was dicult 
in the GDR. It did not t in with socialist equality principles, and a pliant, doc-
ile population was imperative for a well-functioning East German dictatorship. 
People were made “to choose” not to attract too much attention. “From an early 
age, it was instilled into East German citizens that they must...never stand out in 
any way that might attract attention.”34 If people were unwilling or unable to do so, 
they entered a domain controlled by the Stasi. When someone claimed the right 
to be dierent, they risked being watched by people (in their capacity as IM) who 
were selected because they themselves also wanted more (career opportunities) 
than was otherwise possible in the normal way. e example given by Wolf about 
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her spying acquaintance showed that people also became IM because they secretly 
enjoyed scoring o their countrymen. 
I certainly do not mean that people were driven by pleasure to become an IM 
–on the contrary. As Wolf pointed out, both she (the victim) and her IM (the per-
petrator) were afraid. is is conrmed by Gauck. He gives poignant examples: of 
people who were imprisoned aer trying to ee the country, and who then were 
set up against their spouses; of boys who were caught drinking alcohol during 
military service and were told that this was the denite end of their future career, 
only to hear a couple of days later that something might be done for them, if only... 
they were willing to convincingly show their loyalty to the state.
Fear of being blackmailed, fear of extortion, fear that a secret might be re-
vealed, fear that one’s spouse would be confronted with compromising pictures…
Aer the Wende, Stasi ocers oen claimed that if they had wanted, they would 
have been able to “win everyone over to cooperate.”35 is may be somewhat exag-
gerated, but almost any inhabitant of the GDR could be extorted – if only because 
so much was forbidden. One could therefore say that those who were not involved 
in the Stasi in any way simply had the good fortune that they, their life or their 
acquaintances were not threatening, striking or dierent enough to have been ap-
proached by the service: “Many may not have become spies for the Stasi because 
they were useless for ‘the rm’.”36
Partly due to the threats of the security service, forms of behavior were exacted 
in the GDR that I referred to above as puritan; public displays of modesty and 
moderation were its most striking characteristics. ose who demanded the right 
to publicly attract attention or be dierent entered a climate of fear that Wolf has 
portrayed so poignantly. Wolf was afraid, always afraid.37 But when one was able 
to adjust, there was no reason for that.
is explains why my informants collectively stated that fear was not really an 
ingredient in their former lives. By adjusting to what they thought was expected 
of them, most people avoided a direct confrontation with the (potentially threat-
ening) dictatorial powers and were thus able to uphold the notion that their lives 
were unfolding quite normally, unhindered by repressive factors. Because not at-
tracting attention was probably not a tall order for most people, they could think 
that they were merely living their lives, without acknowledging to what extent 
these latter were enmeshed with the regime and the state. 
Although it is probably true that most people never experienced any real fear, 
I do think that a regime of fear existed in the GDR. Because a deeply ingrained 
attitude prevented the majority of East Germans from having reasons to be afraid, 
fear was actually the mental framework within which they arranged their lives. 
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East German psychologist Annette Simon describes this very well, when explain-
ing how it was possible that, whereas she was never afraid while the GDR still 
existed, aer the Wende she began to recognize and feel the fear which she appar-
ently had been able to elude before.38 And Mary Fulbrook also concluded that “e 
climate of fear was the outer parameter of existence…it did not have to be a feature 
of everyday life.”39 
e conclusion that life in the GDR was characterized by the urge not to attract 
attention because it could result in Stasi monitoring demands another reading of 
East Germans’ sniggering laughter and the Nische. e simple fact that the secre-
tive, universal laughter could not be expressed publicly reveals to what extent most 
people adjusted to the demands of the state. Something similar applies to people’s 
withdrawal in their Nische, where they were said to be true to themselves. e 
mere fact, however, that this so-called true self could only be manifested indoors 
and not in public is a clear indication of the extent to which East Germans’ exis-
tence was colored by dictatorial rule. 
Both East Germans’ Nische and their sniggering (albeit incomparably dier-
ent phenomena) speak of secrecy and surreptitiousness. e same applies to East 
Germans’ main adjustment mechanism: not to attract attention. All three mecha-
nisms imply a careful attitude to life.
In the former chapter I described my personal struggle to understand the in-
variably repeated es war nun mal so, expressing the existential fact of living with 
a lie. Because this fact applied equally to all, it functioned as a unifying element, 
indirectly forming the basis for feelings of warmth and solidarity. Regarded more 
negatively, the phrase es war nun mal so also expresses a dull resignation, a “men-
talité of popular powerlessness...of people who have internalized their own sur-
veillance.”40 e warmth East Germans said to have shared was the warmth of peo-
ple who had learned from childhood to accept that they had no other choice but to 
adjust, and to make the most of it within the connes set by the state. is does not 
mean that everything people made of it was pitiful, but the connes within which 
they were able to act were set by the state.
Several authors, including Vaclav Havel, have shown that in dictatorial societ-
ies, adjustment is not only achieved by the state but also by social processes within 
society itself. When people openly refuse to accept that the connes of their ex-
istence are set by the state, their fellow countrymen tend to expel them from the 
community, treating “any non-involvement as an abnormality, as arrogance, as an 
attack on themselves, as a form of dropping out of society.”41
Inspired by Marx and Gramsci, social scientists still struggle to understand how 
it is that subordinated people to a certain extent come to support their own sub-
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ordination. is question is central in French anthropologist Maurice Godelier’s 
work. In his famous ethnography on Baruya women’s subordination by men, e 
Making of Great Men, Godelier states: “Men’s greatest strength lies not in the exer-
cise of violence but in women’s consent to their domination; and this consent can 
only exist if both sexes share the same conceptions, which here legitimize male 
domination.”42 Godelier’s thesis is that shared ideological convictions or a shared 
ideological domain between oppressors and subordinates help to legitimize exist-
ing relations of inequality. e same may have been true in the former GDR. ere 
as well, suppression was not only enforced by the state, it was also the result of 
people’s widespread adjustment, partly inspired by the acceptance that they had 
no other choice. 
But they did have another choice. Although it was dicult, it was possible not 
to adjust. e consequences were such that it may rightfully be called “a Faustian 
choice…the choice confronting each individual is really no choice at all and that 
is why the system is able to keep itself in being.”43 Apart from adjustment, it was 
possible to apply for an exit visa, as Helmut and Lotte’s friends did. By deciding 
to leave, people were demonstrating not only that they wanted to get more out of 
life than was possible and allowed within the borders set by the state, but also that 
there were other acceptable options. is revealed that the mutual involvement 
was to a certain extent the result of adjustment and fear. 
ose who decided to leave thus not only confronted those staying behind with 
their willingness to comply, their failing integrity and their sluggishness, but also 
with the fact that their friendship was partly the result of external conditions.44 By 
bringing into the open that the mutual involvement and warmth were partly the 
result of the unspoken necessity to make the best of it, their decision implicitly 
also showed that if conditions had been dierent, they could have made more of 
their lives than up till then they had done together. is ruined the friendship. 
e warmth resulting from a jointly shared fate seems to have implicated a ban 
on mutual dierentiation as well. e fact that this ban was broken when part of 
the group decided to leave suggests that mutual dierentiation, competition, and 
jealousy were smothered in and through the Nisches’ warmth.
Egalitarianism, Crab Antics, and Adjustment 
e anthropologist George Foster has written extensively on what he calls “the 
image of limited good” that oen thrives in peasant societies. e implicit assump-
tion in these societies is that there is only a limited amount available of all the 
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good things in life. With one person’s gain automatically being seen as another 
person’s loss, the result is an inherently unstable social structure, permanently 
threatened by the undermining impact of jealousy. According to Foster, it is no 
coincidence that this “cognitive orientation” oen goes hand in hand with a strong 
egalitarian ideology; striving for equality is one of the mechanisms to reduce jeal-
ousy. Referring to the sociologist Helmut Schoeck, Foster suggests that egalitarian 
ideologies would be the answer to the universally human, extremely threatening 
experience of envy: “e utopian desire for an egalitarian society cannot…have 
sprung from any other motive than that of an inability to come to terms with one’s 
own envy, and/or with the supposed envy of one’s less well-o fellow men.”45 
As Foster shows, egalitarian ideals hardly work. In practice, they turn envy 
into “the dominant device used to enforce egalitarianism, so that the cure is at 
least as bad as the illness.”46 Envy being refurbished as egalitarianism means that 
whenever someone stands out, others are ideologically allowed to punish him for 
breaching the norm.
In the anthropological literature, this kind of penalizing behavior is referred to 
as “egalitarian conspiracies” and “leveling coalitions.” ese are cultural mecha-
nisms which help to hold back real and potential social climbers. Such practices 
have been made famous by anthropologist Peter Wilson’s analyses of what he 
termed “crab antics,” the term referring to the behavior he observed in Caribbean 
communities with a strong egalitarian ideology. Whenever people in these com-
munities succeeded in acquiring more than others, this caused the rest of the com-
munity to react like crabs do when put in a barrel: “[A]s one of them nears the top, 
the one below pulls him down.” Although all tried to climb out of the barrel, the 
lonely climbers who managed to resist the egalitarian ideology and reach the top 
were stopped by others and punished for climbing. Such behavior is not based on 
rational considerations, but on collective jealousy and envy.47 
Foster gives a brilliant analysis of how a public egalitarian ideology can be 
both the breeding ground and the hiding place for individual feelings of jealousy. 
When equality is an explicit and highly emphasized ideological norm, it sharpens 
people’s discernment of inequality. Achieving more than others is regarded as not 
proper, and individual feelings of jealousy get a free rein – not only because they 
are legitimate but because, according to the dominant ideology, jealousy is nothing 
to be ashamed of. It is the deviating behavior of the one who achieved more that 
is shameful. 
As shown in chapter four, behavioral standards and morals were enforced in 
the GDR according to the main motto of socialist ideology, mutual equality. is 
legitimized feelings of envy and jealousy by institutionalizing them. If someone 
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was seen to have achieved more than others, his behavior was penalized – not be-
cause people were jealous, but because he did something that ideologically speak-
ing was not right. e anecdote of Helmut’s former Nische suggests that these 
standards penetrated deep into the private domain. Breaking out of the mutual 
warmth meant the end of it.
Initially accepted to ward o painful collective experiences and legitimized by 
the ocial state ideology, in time the taboo on mutual dierentiation came to 
function as a social defense mechanism. e fact that East German society was 
primarily experienced as warm and hardly as repressive was partly due to a social 
climate (legitimized by the socialist doctrine) in which public signs of dierentia-
tion and competition were not acceptable. 
In spite of the socialist regime’s claim that it had accomplished a denite break 
with regard to the national-socialist policy aer 1945, there seems to have been re-
markable continuity. Continuity not only prevailed in the eld Joachim Gauck re-
ferred to during his lecture, when he stressed that in the eastern part of Germany, 
three generations had primarily learned to bow their heads, feel the fear, and ad-
just to the state’s demands. In the course of my research, I was confronted with 
another manifestation of continuity: the continuity of silence. Silence not only 
reigned with regard to the painful characteristics of the GDR’s past; post-World 
War II experiences also appeared to be still shrouded in persistent silence – a cli-
mate so aptly captured in Christa Wolf ’s words, “there is no silence as deep…as in 
German families.”48 When I tried to talk about this period during my eldwork, I 
noticed Wolf ’s conclusion still applied to the year 1994. ose who had not been 
committed socialists between 1933 and 1945 (or had become so out of true con-
viction right aer 1945) still covered up that part of their past with an impen-
etrable silence. 
Dr. Hartmann, for instance, with a PhD in history and one of Rudolstadt’s most 
renowned citizens, appeared unwilling to talk about it. e reason for visiting 
him was that I needed information on the Second World War in Rudolstadt: how 
many people had been killed, had there been any bombardments, had people been 
driven out, etc. He received me very enthusiastically: he was so pleased to nally 
meet someone from the Netherlands! Did I know about the many alliances be-
tween the Dutch royal family and Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt’s monarchs? e last of 
them had been guests of honor at Queen Wilhelmina’s wedding, but relations be-
tween the two royal houses dated from way back and had always been very hearty. 
One of Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt’s monarchs had been married to a direct heir of 
the House of Orange Nassau. He himself had known the last monarch personally 
because one of his family members had been secretary at the court then. He had 
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prepared a copy of an article for me which he had recently written describing in 
detail the relations between the two royal houses. 
It was as if I was attending a formal lecture, and no matter how hard I tried 
to point out that my main interest was in recent history, he did not stop talking 
about the monarchs. I tried to change the subject by asking him about the local 
Heimathee – a chronicle on Rudolstadt’s history. is turned out to be another of 
his hobbyhorses: “Well, yes,” he replied, and began to explain that he had initiated 
the series at the time, just like it had been his initiative to chart new walking-tours 
in the area around Rudolstadt. He had always had a keen interest in nature, and he 
was especially fascinated by Rudolstadt and its surroundings. It was so beautiful 
around here, so pure and rural. He really loved this country. 
Beautiful country, rich history, old monarchy…When I interrupted him 
again to ask whether he could tell me something about the period following 
Germany’s defeat in May 1945, he replied that he would rather not talk about it. It 
was too painful, too close. “I don’t want to sow new hatred. It is over, it’s history.” 
Aer insisting quite strongly, he told me that he had served as a member of the 
Wehrmacht. When he heard about Germany’s capitulation, he was in Russia, north 
of Stalingrad. He walked all the way back to Rudolstadt, mainly at night. He slept 
during the daytime. I asked him how things were when he came back here. “en 
I fully dedicated myself to rebuilding Rudolstadt,” he replied, adding that there 
had been some good communists as well – people one could work with. Again I 
had to insist: how were things in the summer of 1945, with the takeover of power, 
when the Americans le and the Russians came? What happened, and how did 
Rudolstadt’s population react? He smiled a little:
e Russians came to my door. ey were looking for me. I was an ocer, 
so I had to go with them. en I went into hiding in the woods, together 
with my wife. We lived secret lives, we were always on the alert. It took 
years before the coast was clear and we could return to our normal lives. 
We were not the only ones. is is many people’s story. But don’t you write 
it down. It is too painful.
And he continued to tell me about his eorts to rebuild Rudolstadt and initiate the 
Heimatheen. 
His defense was clear: a beautiful country, but he did not want to talk about the 
recent past. at was history, and over. At the same time it was too close and too 
fresh. e dierences and tensions, the internal betrayal, and the accompanying 
hatred that had risen to the surface so brusquely during and aer the war had been 
suppressed, buried under the state’s principal banner of anti-fascism.49
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Gerd was also used to living in silence. Although no one ever talked about it, 
he always thought that everybody knew about his father. His paternal grandfather 
had been a conrmed believer in communism since the beginning of the 1930s. 
Aer he was captured by the Nazis in 1941, he spent many years in concentra-
tion camp Buchenwald. At this time his son (Gerd’s father) decided to join the 
Waen SS. According to Gerd, it had been a family decision in an attempt to clear 
the communist (grand)father’s name, but it somehow sounded like a story which 
the family had concocted later in order to accept it. However, aer the war, both 
father and son returned home: the rst from Buchenwald, the second from the 
Waen SS. e former was appointed mayor of a town near Rudolstadt, the lat-
ter (the mayor’s son and Gerd’s father) had to hide. He went underground on a 
farm in the neighborhood for over a year. en he gradually began to take part 
in normal life. By that time, Gerd’s mother recently told him, he had started to 
drink. He had not been able to reconcile himself with the GDR’s existence. But in 
a family of conrmed socialist believers and being the son of the rst communist 
mayor of a middle-sized town, it was impossible for him to air his opinions. Gerd 
did not elaborate on what must have been a family drama but conded in me that 
he secretly admired his father for his guts not to go with the wind and change his 
views, when everything he had believed in was suddenly forbidden and taboo. He 
had not been a Wendehals [turncoat] when that was required aer 1945. He could 
not and would not, thus committing himself to a life of silence. 
is was also the case with the designer Katrin’s father-in-law. He too had re-
mained silent, and only of late, since he retired, had he begun to talk about his time 
in the Hitler Jugend, which was the greatest experience in his life. In the past he had 
never spoken about it. He had always been a quiet person who kept to himself. Only 
now did his family realize that the reason for his reticence was mainly that he had 
never dared to share his experiences. If he had, he would have run the risk of being 
completely excluded or even worse: being taken prisoner – as happened to many 
captured aer 1945 by the Soviet occupying powers, and who oen did not return. 
Many of them never spoke about their experiences or about their thoughts on 
the past. ey withdrew within themselves and remained silent. One of their life 
stories compiled by a clergyman in Rudolstadt describes how a man returning af-
ter seven years in captivity at Buchenwald never talked about it: “All the suering 
had caused him to lose the power of speech.”50 
ese people kept their mouths shut about various pastime topics and events 
and for various reasons. For all of them, remaining silent was in some way due to 
the fact that their memories ran counter to the promise of mutual solidarity which 
formed the kernel of the new, post-1945 symbolic order. eir experiences and 
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memories, although unspoken, oen lingered on in the form of fear of further 
persecution, sometimes with disastrous consequences for “relationships between 
members of their family and neighbors.”51 For many of them it was only possible 
to speak about their former experiences aer 1989, “but the suspicion towards 
others, also towards close relatives, the disappointment, the bitterness about their 
fellow men and the distrust...never le many of them.”52 
As described in chapters two and three, the promises of the new state seam-
lessly linked into a lesson in life (about distrust and fear of others), which was at 
the same time completely taboo. at lesson became the concealed core of the 
new symbolic order in the GDR and of the relationship between state and citizens. 
e solidarity and bond which developed in East German society were partly fed 
by the taboo on comprehending and exploring experiences of mutual distrust, 
jealousy and betrayal. And in time, the mutual equality and warmth in the Nischen 
were also the positive and therefore visible and demonstrable modication of feel-
ings of jealousy and envy, for those who succeeded in being just a little less equal. 
In the Nischen it was warm – until they opened. e ideology of mutual equality’s 
wide appeal does not so much show that East Germans had completely internal-
ized the ideology of equality collectively. One of the reasons for its wide accep-
tance was that it served to legitimize the type of crab antics people adopted among 
themselves to ensure that nobody thought they could get away with publicly po-
sitioning themselves above the community. You had to be very sure of what you 
were doing before you le your cosy re, for there was no turning back.
Not sticking out in the crowd and the mutual warmth and solidarity in private 
circles were the two sides of one ideological coin. rough its administration and 
bureaucracy, mutual equality had become the GDR’s master code, which although 
initially nurtured by the taboo, eventually became so institutionalized and widely 
accepted that it grew to be the symbol of the GDR – not just ocially but also 
perceived as such by its people. It became the fundamental characteristic of “their 
former consciousness.”53 e egalitarian grip which East Germans had on each 
other under a cloak of mutual warmth created its own contradiction. e passion-
ate denial of inequality, mutual competitiveness and strife, because they did not 
t in with the ne-sounding ideology, actually disguised the antics and endeavors 
that formed the Stasi’s breeding ground. e so-called politically ideological break 
aer 1945 concealed the continuity that silently and subversively lingered on.
When trying to imagine life in a dictatorship, one of the words that springs to 
mind is adjustment. Ever since the GDR ceased to exist, people have pointed their 
accusing ngers at the East German population, blaming them because by adapt-
ing to the situation, they were partly responsible for the Stasi terror in their coun-
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try. In a society such as East Germany it was extremely dicult not to conform: 
“Trying to live outside the regime’s inuence takes tremendous eort, particularly 
when everyone else is going along with the authorities.”54 e stakes are high: one 
not only relinquishes professional and career opportunities, but social isolation 
also threatens; not belonging to the group, your fate is to be an outsider – see 
Havel.
e majority of East Germans chose to adjust, at least on the surface; laugh-
ing half-heartedly at the demands that were made on them. Laughing was a way 
of showing that their adjustment was not whole-hearted and that they were just 
pretending. Besides laughing, people also pointed to the Nische as a kind of proof 
that they had not forfeited their entire identity for the ideology. e state had no 
inuence on the Nischen, they argued; there you could lead an entirely autono-
mous existence beyond the ideology. is population respresentation was just part 
of the truth. 
e very fact that the Nischen existed is an indication of the state’s power. e 
fact that people simply presented a politically unthreatening image of themselves 
in public, while only able to show their less adapted face in private circles, dem-
onstrates how far the power of the state went. “[P]ower resides not only in orches-
trated displays of obedience, but also in the silence about domestic politics that 
characterizes daily life.”55 
Moreover, the warmth and mutual involvement, supposedly symbols of the 
Nische, were also the visible and spoken manifestations of the taboo on mutual 
dierentiation and competition implied by the egalitarian ideology. As such, both 
the conspiring laughter in public as well as the Nische were not so much acts of 
resistance against state and ideology, as cultural forms in which the interweave-
ment of private life with the state and its ideology became visible. Both were clear 
examples of the furtive connection between subordinates and oppressors which 
Mbembe has described for Cameroon. Although the laughter and the Nische were 
presented as a type of distant and implicit criticism, we have to tread carefully 
when interpreting “the expressions, symbols, and acts we intuitively may regis-





Life in the west, which we longed for so desperately, would that have any shortcomings 
and weak points?…[F]or many of us, everything that went on beyond the invincible Wall 
was inated into an extraordinary exaggeration, an excellent breeding ground for paradi-
siacal fantasy and projection (Hans-Joachim Maaz, 1991).1
It appeared from the stories in the previous chapter that East Germans had learned 
to be selective about which negative aspects of their lives they preferred to keep to 
themselves. e only thing that was more or less in the open were people’s com-
plaints about the previous material situation. e power of attraction of the west-
ern world mainly derived from its material conditions. In East Germans’ eyes, 
the plentiful West German consumer world was so special that people visited the 
Intershop despite the fact that this was precisely the place where they knew they 
were being closely watched by the Stasi. In the GDR, western goods were regarded 
as little relics, the value of which could not be measured by any objective standard 
– they were a western fetish. Why did western goods have such value in the GDR? 
What did they appear to promise?
According to Dutch anthropologist Patricia Spyer, the “extraordinary power” 
that is oen attributed to certain categories of material objects, specically in 
socially unstable situations, is linked to the promise that material objects seem 
to evoke – a promise that proves to be irresistible especially in uncertain times: 
“[e] promise of fulllment and ultimate arrival.”2 us, completely out of con-
text, these words may come across as too vague and general an indication, but in 
my opinion they capture the essence of what the West German consumer world 
previously seemed to promise in so many East Germans’ eyes.
On the subject of his friends rising above him, Helmut remarked that “one only 
really became someone in the GDR when leaving the country.” is statement sug-
gests that apparently only beyond the borders of the GDR was it possible to really 
make something of life. us, the ultimate realization of East Germans’ existence 
was to be found beyond the borders of their own country. In many East Germans’ 
experience, the fulllment of their desires was found in the material wealth of the 
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west. ey imagined that in the western world that looked so ne, so so and so 
bright, and smelled so good, they would – slightly paraphrasing Helmut’s words 
– “nally become what we could not be in our own country.” is image was both 
related to and enforced by the materiality of objects.
Irresistible Prosperity
When I asked East Germans about their past views of the western world, their sto-
ries never ended. e wonderful world of the west!! e golden west!! Everything 
that came from there was special. If you received a present from the west, you felt 
as happy as a king because the possession of western objects had a certain sta-
tus attached.3 Heiko, the young man who was a sales assistant in an ironmonger’s 
both during my stay in Rudolstadt as well as at the time of the GDR, said that in 
the past, people were happy to have the smallest things from the FRG. Whether 
it was a pen or a packet of chewing gum, a bar of soap or chocolate, everything 
was equally desirable. Contact with West German friends and family was indeed 
extremely important for East Germans, and one of the reasons why West German 
visitors were always welcomed with open arms in the GDR was that they oen 
brought all kinds of gis – varying from spices and tins of preserves to do-it-
yourself materials and entire furnishings.
Mr Linke, the middle-aged man who used to be a taxi driver and had built his 
own house, told me that he had tted out his entire bathroom with equipment 
from the FRG. Every time his West German family came to visit, they brought 
something with them, one time it was a load of tiles, another time gold-colored 
taps or a beautifully decorated mirror. Such luxury goods were not available in 
the GDR. Also bathtubs were always scarce, and he proudly boasted how his West 
German relatives even managed to bring him a bath. As he was afraid of jealous 
looks from the neighbors, they secretly smuggled it into the house while everyone 
else was at work. Once it was nally in place, he was really pleased as he did not 
know of anyone who had a real West German bathroom!
Another way in which many East Germans were able to acquire the highly 
coveted western goods was through the Christmas parcels sent to them every year 
by their West German family or friends. ese parcels featured signicantly in 
many East Germans’ recollections. “Now that was something,” was their regular 
heartfelt comment. And how miserable people were if they did not have any family 
in West Germany and never received a parcel! In fact, they just did not really t in, 
for Christmas was all about a parcel from West Germany, it was as simple as that.4 
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Neither the parcels nor their contents were ever taken for granted or considered as 
normal, on the contrary: “ose parcels were little relics,” a middle-aged woman 
who worked for Rudolstadt’s parish explained.
If for example you received some soap, it was out of the question to use it 
to wash yourself. Only exceptionally and at the very last moment (getting 
on towards next Christmas when yet another new parcel was expected, 
mv), but in the rst instance it was kept in between the clothes in the cup-
board for a long time, on a dierent shelf each week, to give o the lovely 
scent. at was something, that scent...you could enjoy it for hours and 
lose yourself in dreams about it. And then the chocolate and the coee!! 
It was all a miracle. It came from another world, a wonderful world – one 
which was beyond reach.
Many people told similar stories. Western goods were so special in the GDR 
that even West German plastic bags had a high exchange value, and empty West 
German beer cans were displayed in many an East German living room cabinet.5 
e Intershops where western goods were sold also exerted an almost irresistible 
allure on many East Germans. With their sparse western money they oen went 
there to buy what for westerners were everyday consumer goods – such as chewing 
gum and chocolate or bars of ordinary household soap.6
East Germans’ desire for western things was certainly partly prompted by the 
status attached to possessing them, but their power of attraction went way beyond 
this rather clear-cut social determinant. An East German student recalled, for ex-
ample, how he and his countrymen almost lost their sense of reality when they 
saw westerners:
When we saw them, with their expensive clothes and posh cars, we al-
most forgot that they too went to the toilet and had to eat to survive. ey 
seemed to be a dierent, better, and more perfect kind of people. And that 
image, that notion, was linked to certain outward appearances. Up till the 
Wende, we believed that the people on the other side of the Wall were bet-
ter, because they looked better.
In order to get closer to that ideal image, East Germans were even prepared to put 
up with Stasi glares when buying western goods in Intershops. Such shops, accord-
ing to Mr Linke, were extremely alluring: “ey were tted out attractively with 
more attention to the lay-out. And although you paid much more than the goods 
were worth, you could tell if someone bought their clothes there. It was truly ge-
hobenes Einkaufen [upper class buying].”
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is was also the case, although to a lesser extent, with the Exquisit shops where 
East Germans could buy luxury goods made in West and East Germany. e de-
sire for such goods came at a heavy price, as shown for example in an anecdote 
from November 1967 – when an East German woman returned to the Exquisit 
shop in Leipzig, complaining at the top of her voice that the stitching on the West 
German shoes she had bought two days earlier for 150 East German Marks had 
already burst. When the shopkeeper contacted the supplier, the shoes appeared to 
have been purchased from the FRG by the East German state for the mere sum of 
eight (West German) Marks “im Interzonenhandel” [via inter-zone trading].7 For 
that low price, the supplier explained, “könne man ja wohl keine Qualität liefern” 
[one cannot deliver quality].8
e situation really becomes ridiculous once one realizes that it was not pos-
sible to be entirely sure if the shoes in question were actually West German. It is 
highly probable that the so-called West German shoes, which had provided the 
state of East Germany with a prot of 142 (East German) Marks, were originally 
manufactured in the GDR.9 As the GDR was always looking for ways to obtain 
hard cash, and wages in the GDR were much lower than in West European coun-
tries, the GDR manufactured many products for West German and other western 
companies. It was rarely stated on the product that it was manufactured in the 
GDR. e lady who ran a furniture manufacturing company both at the time of 
the GDR and aer the Wende said that the furniture produced in the GDR for the 
west was transported unlabeled to the FRG. e place of origin was not displayed 
because the West Germans who placed the order did not want the West German 
buyers to know that they were East German products.
us, it could transpire, Heiko explained to me, that people were buying “west-
ern” chocolate in the Intershop with their frugal West German DMs, while in real-
ity this was the very same chocolate sold in the Exquisit shops in an East German 
wrapper. is meant that some of the chocolate made in the GDR was wrapped 
in East German packaging to be sold as an East German luxury product in the 
Exquisit shops, while the rest was exported to the FRG to be packaged there, in 
order to be sold as a West German product. is latter category could then be im-
ported back again to the GDR, where it was sold for many times the West German 
price as Westprodukt in the Intershops.
It is hard to imagine a more extreme example of producers being alienated 
from their manufactured goods. Most interesting, nonetheless, is that even the 
knowledge that some of the “western” products were manufactured in their own 
country did not diminish the irresistible power of attraction that “western prod-
ucts” presented. According to Heiko, people were willing to part with their limited 
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DMs for things that had become so attractive thanks to the charisma of the west. 
His statement touches on one of the most fascinating issues concerning the study 
of consumption: how is it possible that people allow themselves to be so deceived 
and/or tempted?10
When asked how the irresistible allurement of the western material world 
came about, people oen replied quite vaguely, searching for words: “Well, yes, 
they just had all the things that we didn’t have.” And when I probed further, trying 
to ll in the general description of “all” (whether things from there were so much 
ner or better, or if the signicance of “all” was perhaps related to the fact that so 
little was available in East German shops?), such suggestions were mostly greeted 
with a kind of mumbling, such as, “Yes, no, it had nothing to do with that. Here 
you could oen get lots of things as well, but…there they just had everything we 
didn’t.” e confused vagueness of their reactions le no doubt that although the 
West German material world’s power of attraction was related to genuine concepts 
such as beautiful and ugly and full and empty shops, it all went much deeper than 
such descriptions suggested.
e irresistible power of attraction the western material world wielded over so 
many East Germans was linked to a number of factors, some more specic than 
others. I shall discuss them below, beginning with the most specic: appearance, 
then move on to less discernible ones.
e main way that East Germans’ perception of the west evolved was through 
West German television. From the numerous statements I recorded on this sub-
ject, it was apparent that East Germans collectively regarded the highly attrac-
tive image they saw on West German television as a realistic reection of the way 
things went on in reality. “Virtual reality was seen as everyday reality,” according 
to historian Hermann Glaser.11 And a middle-aged woman in Rudolstadt worded 
it as follows:
We really believed what they said on West German television. We thought 
that the western washing powder could really remove the stains. Not long 
aer the Wende, when we were able to buy all these things here too, I 
went shopping with my son, and he was very keen for me to buy a certain 
washing-up liquid which he had seen advertised. It was a well-known and 
expensive brand, so I thought it would be good and wanted to try it any-
way. At home he put water in the washing-up bowl, then added the liquid 
and the plates. en he stared at the water, waiting for a miracle. When 
he took out one of the plates, what a disappointment: it was not shiny and 
clean like they had said in the advertisement. It was still dirty. 
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One reason why the critical approach towards the West German consumer world, 
as broadcasted by the East German media every day, could not succeed was be-
cause East German media were notoriously untrustworthy. No one believed any-
thing of their statements and broadcasts. A social worker from Rudolstadt ex-
plained: “In our country, the gulf between word and reality was becoming wider 
all the time. Everyone noticed it. You only had to open the newspapers and read 
the rose-tinted stories that were reported there, and then look out of the win-
dow to see how dismal reality was.” is factor certainly played a role in many 
East Germans’ belief that what they saw on West German television and in West 
German magazines was the truth. e question remains, however, what exactly 
did they see in the western programs and magazines?
While handing out and collecting surveys, I was able to examine many dier-
ent East German homes within a short space of time. I was struck by the sharp 
material contrast between the dwellings that had been renovated since the Wende 
and those that had changed very little or had nothing done to them. e non-
refurbished houses had typically straight lines, dull colors and excessive amounts 
of chipboard pasted to look like wood, whereas the newly furnished apartments 
looked very dierent. I was particularly struck by three specic aspects of their 
appearance.
To begin with, by 1994, all over Rudolstadt you could buy objects which were 
predominantly advertised as having natural, nostalgically authentic features. 
Wooden furniture and objects were very popular. Cabinets were recommended 
as echt Eiche rustikal [genuine rustic oak], bedrooms as natürlich und gut [natural 
and good], and advertising leaets and shop displays were decorated with numer-
ous elements referring to nature: autumn leaves and owers, but also cats, birds 
and other animals, sometimes in the form of sculptures or pictures. is tendency 
towards natural elements oen took on a nostalgic form, which was evident for ex-
ample in the many reproduction antiques, which had been opposed so fanatically 
at the time of the GDR: from owery teasets to ornamental furniture and from the 
well-known Hummel gurines to the promotional description original Alt-Bürger 
Blau-Weisz [old farmer’s blue and white] on dinner services.12 Publicity brochures 
oen showed sentimental black and white images. If the combination of natural 
and ostensibly nostalgic elements did not suggest enough authenticity, the im-
pression that this was a signicantly enticing item was strengthened by allusions 
to exotic countries. Shops advertised originale Nepal-Teppiche [original Nepalese 
carpets], while exotic attributes such as palm trees and wild animals were used 
extensively in shop window displays and in the promotional designs.
Figure 7.1 a and b – Advertising brochures, as found in the author’s mailbox 
during her stay in Rudolstadt, 1993-1994
Source: Publishing agency unknown.
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Second, the western material world – certainly in comparison to East German 
design and objects – appeared to be extremely polished. Many items were osten-
tatiously decorated and embellished. While I was staying in Rudolstadt, (quasi-)
crystal vases and glasswork were immeasurably popular, and the same applied to 
otherwise shiny objects, whether they were silver or gold-colored. Formerly, many 
oors were covered with various types of dull-colored oor covering, but since the 
Wende, deep-pile carpets were all the rage. And in contrast to East German chairs 
which were usually covered with fabric in muted shades, the settees and armchairs 
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purchased more recently almost glowed with their shiny material which seemed 
to have been made with luminous elements.
e third thing that struck me in Rudolstadt was how much eort people 
made in order to conceal precisely the function of objects, compared to the old 
days when functionality was what was propagated. is was not only evident in 
furniture with ornate edging, decorative panels or curled and twisted ornaments, 
but also in the wooden conversions for central heating, built-in kitchens, ceilings 
decorated with fake wooden tiles, an L-shaped wall unit to conceal the corner of 
a room, concealing wires by building cupboards around them and decorating the 
sides by bringing the thick-piled carpet up a bit higher, then nishing o the wall 
with a wooden skirting board.
During the GDR’s more than forty years of existence, the East German public 
was instructed by the designers and editorial teams of magazines such as Kultur im 
Heim and Form und Zweck above all to adopt a reasonable and rational attitude to-
wards their material environment. Under the motto that one had to learn to accept 
the current reality (industrial production methods, short supply of raw materials, 
and limited state budget), people were encouraged to no longer disguise things by 
adding so-called romantic owers or frills, which evoked false associations with a 
past that had never existed. e preference for such designs was merely an escape, 
which unleashed a kind of false consciousness – according to the strict socialist 
instructors. However, attempts to inuence East German consumers to be more 
rational in their preferred taste always met with opposition. Conventional lamp-
shades were given a owery edge, and chipboard was provided with a surface that 
looked like wood. Apparently, many East German consumers always continued to 
desire the non-functional but perfectly polished, natural-looking objects which 
were for sale on every market stall and on every street corner at low prices in the 
west, and which they saw on television every day.
When investigating the power of attraction that emanated from the west-
ern world, it was striking that, apart from the visible dierences I could discern 
myself, many people answered my questions by referring to the strong sensory 
stimulus these had provoked. Western things were recalled for having had such 
a lovely smell, and for shining and sparkling so beautifully, and feeling so dier-
ent. Furthermore, the colors were so much more vibrant and beautiful, and as 
far as food was concerned, it usually tasted so much more intense and nicer than 
in Eastern Germany. Annette Simon gave a concise description of her rst visit 
to the west (which took place in 1980) as follows: “Today I know that the inner 
motto of my trip was ‘don’t be seduced!’ I was particularly impressed by the west-
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ern world’s sensory-aesthetic characteristics: those smells, and colors, the many 
dierent foodstus.”13
e most frequently mentioned alluring characteristic of the western world 
was its smell. When Heiko told me about the smell of the Christmas parcels which 
his family received every year, even six years later it seemed to send him o into 
a day-dream: “Just the smell of it...that was indescribable. I shall never forget it. 
You can ask anyone and they will all conrm it. e smell of the soap, the washing 
powder and that coee...e clothes that were wrapped in the parcels smelled of 
that strange mixture of scents for months.”
East German writer omas Rosenlöcher has described how as a young boy 
he was walking around the station in Berlin and almost against his will was com-
pelled to follow a “secret neon smell” that seemed to be waing from an Intershop. 
Although there was absolutely no point in him entering the shop at that moment 
because he had no Westgeld, which made the goods on display there unattainable 
to him, time and time again he was drawn inside “by the aromas.” In Rosenlöcher’s 
opinion, it was not just thanks to their aroma but also to their radiance and shine 
that the East German population was collectively enthralled every December by 
the West German Christmas parcels. He describes how the entire kitchen changed 
when a parcel arrived and was then set on the kitchen table to be opened, as a 
“little glacier of prosperity.” At that moment, it was as if the room was bathing in 
the imaginary light that even seemed “to come from the pudding mix.” Although 
the parcel was wrapped up again aer a quick look and only properly opened on 
Christmas Eve, the smell lingered in the kitchen for days aerwards and was so 
strong that every passerby asked, “Have you received a parcel?”14
Besides having a dierent smell, western goods also looked totally dierent than 
East German ones, as all the stories conrmed. Among other things, the color ap-
peared to be an important aspect of the allure. A middle-aged man explained to 
me: “e stu from the FRG was far more colorful than ours. We just had plain old 
green, but in the FRG there was also lime green and grass green and spring-bud 
green. And it was like that with all the colors.” It also struck me that whenever East 
Germans tried to describe western goods’ power of attraction, they oen referred to 
West German things having such a remarkably shiny appearance. at shine was so 
typical for the west that many referred to it shortly and sweetly as “the golden west.” 
In a similar vein, Rosenlöcher describes the Intershop at the previously mentioned 
Berlin station as a “shiny grotto” in which he was especially struck by the “splendor 
of progress” which radiated a “spiritual” and “exalted brilliance.”15
Some mentioned the brilliance and shine of western objects in one and the 
same breath, thereby referring to the incomparably dierent tactile perception 
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they le behind compared to East German products. For example, when I asked 
an older woman who had waxed lyrically to me over the shine and smell of west-
ern things how she would have explained the dierence between things from the 
GDR and from the FRG to me if I had been blind, she responded: “I would have 
let you feel how so the West German material was and have you experience how 
dierently those things felt.” With that she made a gesture as if stroking a round 
thing. To make her point, she told me about her neighbor who had just bought a 
new couch with matching side table. e couch in particular was so beautiful, so 
“colorful and smooth.” She made it clear to me that it was vastly dierent to the 
rough fabric in the GRD. When I asked Heiko what it was about West German 
goods that appealed to the senses so much, he replied:
e smells held a promise that there was more to life than here – that it 
was more than mere functionality and purposefulness. Look, our washing 
powder did clean. It was functional and was t for the purpose. But the 
washing powder from the west, the soap from the west...that was completely 
dierent, something unique. at soap, its lovely smell...at soap enticed 
you to use it, to enjoy it: that was an experience-soap. Whereas our soap... 
Well, perhaps it did not really stink – the washing powder for that matter 
did stink – but then it was not intended that you enjoy the experience. Our 
soap was meant to clean things and that was that. And that is how it was 
with everything. Our salt was just salt and that is what it said on the label. 
It was a plain white packaging with ‘salt’ on it: stincknormal [bloody nor-
mal]. And in fact the same applied to everything. Compared to cabinets 
from the west, our cabinets were downright straight. Western cabinets had 
a little ridge here and a little edge there and there again a bit of decoration. 
And take our clothes, they did not tempt you at all to put them on. e 
jeans for example: at some point the stone-washed trousers were in fash-
ion. But the GDR did not have that material. Finally, Schalck Golodkowski 
succeeded in importing that material, and at last those jeans were also 
made in the GDR.16 e government knew very well that the people could 
only be satised with consumer goods, and so it was constantly doing its 
best to purchase what was required. But it never succeeded. ere was 
always too little, and it was never right. e same with the jeans: they did 
indeed come, but the style was just not quite right. We wanted them with 
a label here, and a stitching of a certain color there. But what did we get? 
ose straight up and down trousers. ey were of course jeans, and the 
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denim material was right, but without the trimmings and decoration we 
wanted.
And that is how it happened with everything. It was all too functional, too 
unappealing, and looking at it gave you little sense of experiencing any-
thing. But appearances count too, don’t they? And therein lay the secret 
of western things. e power of attraction of western things lay in the fact 
that they had a completely dierent charisma than ours. Our things were 
functional, and if you looked at them it was obvious that they were meant 
to function, and to be useful, but that you should not expect anything else 
from them.
I am in all honesty compelled to admit that I was the one who had introduced the 
concept of functionality into my conversation with Heiko. But once I had men-
tioned that word, he exclaimed: that was it! at is what it was all about, I had 
taken the word right out of his mouth. East German things were functional, no 
more than that, while western things were, as he called them, “things to experi-
ence.”
With his reply, Heiko demonstrated that the visual impressions of functionality 
(as nothing-more-than-usefulness) versus non-functionality (as pleasure-provid-
ing-experience) through the smells and other sensory perceptions amounted to 
an all-embracing physical experience, which in the western case was felt as un-
mistakably enticing and in the eastern case was not. e extraordinary powers of 
“western” goods that featured in the stories people told me were explicitly related 
to their physical characteristics, showing that this was one of the factors respon-
sible for western goods being recognized as incarnating the ultimate realization of 
how East Germans’ lives should have been.
e fact that East Germans’ fantasies of “fulllment and ultimate arrival” were 
being evoked and fed by western goods connects to the signicant role material(ist) 
issues have played in East German history.17 From the outset, the desire for mate-
rial redemption gured centrally in the pact between the state and its inhabitants, 
as described in chapter three. Both sides assigned an important stabilizing role 
(socially and mentally) to the material sphere, as being able to bring salvation. One 
thing that became clear while recording the stories in Rudolstadt was that materi-
alist developments had indeed become pivotal for East German subjectivation and 
identication processes. More than any other external criteria of value, collective 
images of “who we are” and “what we want to be” were oen directly related to and 
expressed in terms of the value and signicance of goods.
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East Germans’ Identification with the West
e fact that material living conditions in the GDR did not develop as favorably 
as promised nor as favorably as on the other side of the Wall had a profound eect 
on many an East German’s condence and feeling of self-worth. is for instance 
was voiced as: “We were not worth anything because our money was not worth 
anything,” or “we were worth nothing because nothing was achieved or built up 
here.”18 Many people criticized domestic consumption, and even the critique on 
the impossibility to go abroad was usually expressed in economic or material 
terms: “We worked hard, but we couldn’t even leave the country! Our money, our 
coins, our nationality was worth nothing abroad.” Or: “e worst thing about the 
GDR was that we were not worth being given permission to go abroad.” One of 
the few times that someone spontaneously put forward a more general complaint 
about life in the GDR, “wir sind immer so gehalten daß wir gebückt und geduckt 
durch das Leben gingen” [we have always been required to go through life stoop-
ing and crouching], even this statement was prompted by a comment on the mate-
rial conditions: “Wir haben ja nichts gehat, man hat uns als Bettler angesehen [we 
didn’t have a thing, we were looked down upon as beggars].”
Many East Germans experienced their country’s material shortcomings almost 
as a personal failure. ey sometimes admitted to being ashamed of their living 
conditions. A woman told me that she was always ashamed whenever she had 
West German visitors: what on earth do you oer people who came from a coun-
try where you could get everything? And a good friend of mine, Diana, explained 
how exceedingly insecure she always felt when going into an Intershop, just be-
cause it represented such an un-East German world.
I always felt like a beginner in there. And many people seemed to feel that 
way. You saw them getting themselves all pumped up before they went 
inside. Although they then appeared to be very condent, anyone could 
see they were just putting on a front. Everyone was unsure. ere were so 
many things you did not know, everything looked dierent, and besides, 
the stu was laid out so that you could not reach it yourself or even hold 
it in your hands; you could only look at it. It was all so unknown that you 
really felt very small when you were there. In order to reassure myself a bit, 
I used to think about the sales-lady being just an ordinary East German 
woman as well.
Diana’s explanation showed that the excess of western material goods evoked feel-
ings of inferiority. Similar feelings were recollected vaguely now and then in peo-
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ple’s stories of their encounters with West Germans who visited the GDR. ese 
stories featured swaggering West Germans behaving as if they were God in the 
GDR, and East Germans on holiday in foreign socialist countries being treated 
as second-class Germans because their money was only worth a fraction of the 
DM. ere were countless stories about objects, and anecdotes in which people re-
duced themselves to objects, and considered themselves in relation to one another 
through and as objects.
Many East Germans seem to have been permanently comparing their own ma-
terial existence with the western side of the border and constantly felt themselves 
to be the less successful, less endowed, poorer, little twin brother.19 “Existing in the 
shadow of West German society continued to shape the lives of GDR Germans.”20 
In contrast, the GDR seems to have played a less signicant role for West Germans 
forming their identity, but it was beyond dispute that West Germans also com-
pared themselves with their East German neighbors, and that the respective mate-
rial attainments of both countries also played a major role in that comparison. In 
the eyes of many westerners, the disintegrating and drab material state that was 
the scene of East Germans’ existence was an apt symbol for the backward general 
development of life in the GDR – as shown in chapter six.
e assertion that the material dierences between the two countries gave 
rise to feelings of pride and shame, respectively, and of looking down at or up to 
one another is wonderfully illustrated in the numerous anecdotes recorded by the 
West German author Hanns Werner Schwarze in his volume Die DDR ist keine 
Zone mehr [the GDR is no longer a zone]. is is all the more remarkable since the 
theme of the book has nothing to do with material or consumer developments as 
such but covers the situation in the GDR in general. e volume contains an inter-
view recorded with a West German who was just back from a holiday on the Black 
Sea (the interview dates from October 1967). Asked if he had had any contact 
with people “from the zone,” he replied that this had scarcely happened. “I only 
got chatting with one because he was admiring my car: BMW 1800, latest model.” 
Aer he had named the price, the contact between the two was over immediately. 
e East German had become angry and swore that he was just as proud of his 
Wartburg, even more so because he had had to wait four years to get it and, in 
converted currency, had paid more for it than the West German had for his BMW! 
Elsewhere in the book an East German explains why he would never want to live 
in the Federal Republic. He is fed up that every time when West German relations 
pay him a visit, he has “to make a good impression...dish up enough food to make 
the table sag, and say that he is doing well and is denitely not to be pitied.”21
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How profoundly the respective national material achievements could arouse 
feelings of inferiority and superiority in individual East and West Germans was 
demonstrated in the letters presented below, which were prominently displayed at 
an exhibition on Christmas culture in East and West Germany, held in December 
1992 in Berlin. e letter on the le was written by a West German woman to her 
East German sister-in-law, the one on the right by an East German niece to her 
West German aunt. For the sake of clarity: the two letters and letter writers have 
no connection with each other.
Würzburg, 10.12.1987
Dear Sister-in-law,
Have a Merry Christmas at your home in 
Leipzig!
Many thanks for the invitation. You always make 
such an eort. Unfortunately, we have to keep an 
eye on our house, we are ying to Sanfangi [?] on 
December 20. We would have liked to join you, 
are the Wuppertalers coming?
Give everyone our regards.
How are you all doing? Has Hans got the new 
Wartburg [East German car, mv] yet, surely the 
ten years must have passed by now?
We have so much to do, and I have not yet got 
round to sending you a parcel. I have already 
been using the writing paper that you sent me.
Merry Christmas, we are thinking of you,
Your Hannelore and Kurt
Luckenwalde, 26.12.85
Dear Aunt Henny!
ank you very much for the lovely 
Christmas parcel. It arrived on the 23rd. We 
were really worried. It was falling apart a bit 
as if it had been round half the globe.
Mama says that it did not have all the things 
that you usually always send. No ‘Tosca,’ but 
that does not matter. Mama still has some 
le from last year. It does not go o and still 
smells the same. Yesterday we had goose, 
and for dessert, chocolate pudding made 
from your packet, it is not as lumpy as ours.
In the evening we went to the Schneiders, 
they had Apfelkorn which their grandma 
had sent them. I liked it. Mama prefers dry 
wine and papa cognac.
Your dearest Romy
P.s. Hope you got our Dresden stollen and 
the candles you wanted so much.
Both letters are almost exclusively about matters of consumption, and it is no-
ticeable how condescendingly one side of the border thanks for the invitation (for 
which the addressee obviously had neither the time nor the inclination – such an 
eort! Unfortunately, we have to go to our house in Spain), while on the other side, 
the pleas for more gis are scarcely disguised.
e strong identication with the respective material conditions on both sides 
of the inter-German border was linked with the central role of materialist themes 
and promises in both countries’ post-war history.22 As chapters three and four 
showed, aer 1945 both sections of the country sought to recover by focusing 
on material reconstruction. Both parts of the country worked equally hard to re-
move the damage of war and build up a new society and a new condence in the 
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future, but the conditions in the FRG were more favorable than in the GRD. e 
Americans dished out chocolate, coee and cigarettes, whereas the Russians dis-
mantled the East German railway lines and other industrial attainments. From the 
outset the GDR excelled in ne (materialistic) promises which came to nothing, 
while the material reconstruction and associated mental and social pay-o in the 
west of the country were much more successful.23 On that subject, Borneman’s 
conclusion is signicant: “e major dierence between East and West Berliners…
lies in the fact that the Wirtschaswunder is translated into prosperity by West 
Berliners, whereas the Auau [reconstruction] is translated into hard work by 
East Berliners.”24
From the moment the Wirtschaswunder began to bear its fruits, the inhabit-
ants of West Germany managed to disguise increasingly well what I previously, 
and inspired by Geissler referred to as the Void under a relatively shiny, polished, 
material presentation of who we are. “Consumers. We are a nation of consumers. 
Ties and conformism, shirts and non-conformism – everything has its consum-
ers, the only important thing is that it – shirt or conformism – presents itself as 
branded article.”25 Generally speaking, West German post-war consumerism is de-
scribed rather critically, as in the included quote from Böll, because it supposedly 
expressed the collective denial or suppression of the burden of the Second World 
War.
Aer the Second World War, material aspirations unmistakably helped the in-
habitants of both Germanys to aim their sights at the future and away from the 
past. More openness towards and collective involvement with the past came later, 
forced by the revolt of the illustrious 68er Generation [generation of 1968]. From 
then on, the collective guilt became an integral part of West Germany’s ocial self-
image, and even up to the present time, hardly a public debate can take place in 
the FRG without some reference or other to Germany’s blame for the Holocaust.26
e steadily increasing material prosperity in post-war FRG formed the ba-
sis for a newly developed mutual trust and, with it, a form of mutual/national 
solidarity. Post-war developments in the eastern part of Germany were less un-
ambiguously positive. Although material prosperity had improved, it was still less 
compared to the west. During my research in Rudolstadt, a woman with whom I 
was discussing the newly acquired prosperity explained to me: “Oh you know, I 
lived through the war and then forty years of the GDR. I will always be an Ossi.” 
Asked what that meant, she replied: “at is someone who always grabs if he sees 
something and always stocks too many supplies.” In her experience there was one 
continuous line from 1945 to 1989; the continuity of shortage and always wanting 
more.
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In the previous chapters I have tried to illustrate that the East German state 
powers did not fulll either the material or social promises underpinning the pact 
with the population that gradually came into being aer 1945. Certainly from the 
time of the Wirtschaswunder years, East Germans’ eyes were continually focused 
on the west in order to compare the FRG’s developments with those in their own 
country. is comparison suggested that everything East Germans desired for, and 
everything their state promised to realize, was accomplished on the other side of 
the border. at is why the East Germans’ interpretation of growing West German 
prosperity was much more far-reaching.
e all-encompassing signicance attached to material possessions, consump-
tion and excess in collective identity formation processes in both parts of the 
country since 1945, and the role of the lost war in this, are illustrated by a brief 
anecdote dating from 1958. In it, a little East German boy appears on the scene, 
and when a Mercedes parks right in front of him in the eastern part of Berlin, 
he asks his mother: “Mama, are those Germans, too?” e mother replies: “Yes, 
Günter, they are German, but I think they didn’t lose the war like we did...at least 
that’s what it looks like.”27
Aer the Wende, English-Dutch author Ian Buruma conducted interviews on 
German unication with a number of leading West German intellectuals. One 
unnamed “famous West German writer” commented on his new compatriots: “I 
don’t like those people in the east. I feel that I know them. I don’t want to have any-
thing to do with them.” When Buruma put these words to a “literary critic” from 
the former FRG, the reaction was as follows:
I understand him completely...In fact, it is a miracle how quickly the 
Germans in the Federal Republic have become so civilized. Now we really 
belong to the West. We have internalized democracy. But the Germans in 
the former GDR, they are still locked in a pre-modern age. ose are the 
ugly Germans.
ereaer, Buruma concluded that:
[West Germans] antipathy towards the ugly Ossis in their badly tting 
suits, their stone-washed jeans and plastic shoes...[was] more than just 
snobbery. e unspoken message was that the Wessis themselves had only 
narrowly escaped remaining crypto-Nazi, goose-stepping Germans, and 
because of that had become dierent, perhaps modern Europeans.28
e statements show that the identication of the two German nations with their 
respective material standards of living had also given rise to mutual processes of 
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projective identication. West Germans looked down on the “ugly” East Germans 
with their shabby, old-fashioned appearance because in them they identied a de-
feated, historically removed part of themselves – their “contemporary ancestors.” 
“ere is an Ossi hidden in every Wessi – at least a little le over.” And vice versa, 
East Germans seemed to look up to West Germans with their radiant appear-
ance, because in them they recognized the better developed part of themselves. “In 
comparing their life course with those of West German peers, for whom material 
prosperity was a constant...they developed a sense of themselves as weaker and 
poorer, ‘lacking’ something ineable.”29
e inhabitants of the two German states have oen been compared to twins, 
and in this context Borneman remarked that in the eyes of East Germans, West 
Germans were “the desired other.”30 I believe, however, it would be better to re-
place the description “the desired other” with “desired self.” When looking at West 
Germans, East Germans were seeing who they themselves could have been if his-
tory had taken a dierent course. In this regard, it is telling that in the GDR, East 
Germans who did not possess any DeutschMarken were called Aso (abbreviation 
from Asozialen, anti-socials). Apparently, people who had no Westgeld did not be-
long; they were anti-socials, who had dropped out of society. A similar descrip-
tion was applied to the area around Dresden – the only area of the GDR where 
West German television reception was impossible. is was called the Tal der 
Ahnungslosen [valley of the clueless]; no access to the west was obviously seen 
as having “no idea what was going on in the world.” e constant comparison of 
the world within the Wall with the world outside it made East Germans consider 
existence in their own country to be not only relatively worthless, but above all a 
weak extract of the so-called real existence taking place in the west. When Helmut 
spoke about the Nische breaking into pieces, he put it slightly dierently: according 
to him, you could only “really become someone” if you le the country.
e confusingly vague responses to the question of what was so special about 
the west also le no doubt that its power of attraction might be linked to demon-
strable characteristics, but was primarily stronger and more all-encompassing 
than could be determined by any specic criterion. e West German material 
world “[represented] the real one,” and the main reason for that world being so 
irresistible was that the people there had everything they did not have on the east 
side of the border.31 e material world beyond the Wall represented what East 
Germans lacked. It was not just about what East Germans wanted to have but could 
never really get, it was also about who they wanted to be but could never become. 
Signicantly relevant in this context is the dierence between the ways West and 
East Germans outlined their life stories. While the stories told by West Germans 
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born between 1910 and 1955 focused on the themes of economic and material 
success (such as leisure time, consumer goods, and prosperity), East Germans of 
the same generation characterized their existence in terms of “lack.”32 is lack 
was not an isolated experience: it was related to life in the west. In the GDR people 
missed what had been developed in the FRG. e same applied to the west’s power 
of attraction: the images of western excess were so alluring because they were close 
by, geographically and emotionally, while at the same time unattainably far away. 
us they formed the perfect basis for collective fantasies about “fulllment and 
ultimate arrival.”33 e prosperous western world with its beautiful appearance, its 
enticing smells, and its wonderful glow seemed to be the ultimate materialization 
of the socialist message of salvation – in which a materially improved existence 
was the basis for social harmony and mutual solidarity.
The Material as Fulfillment
e images that residents of the GDR could see every day via West German tele-
vision presented a world that was the opposite of their own to a certain extent. 
Whereas they were constantly asked to accept functionality, rationality and hon-
esty as their guiding principles (our accommodation is just a bit small, get on with 
it! we are now in the 20th century, so just accept that!), life in the west seemed to 
embody a sort of timeless harmony, where problems and tensions scarcely ex-
isted.34 at the West German picture was intuitively interpreted as being out-
spokenly harmonious is in my view primarily related to the sensory ways East 
Germans were informed about the material world of the west. What people saw 
was strengthened by other sensorial impressions: the smell, taste and tactile attri-
butes of the western world were so strong that its visual attributes, and the associa-
tions they elicited, were conrmed through the other senses. What people thought 
to see in that world (non-functionality and a shiny, polished but still natural au-
thenticity) was experienced in an all-encompassing physical way. us, what they 
saw and the temptation this aroused were more dicult to resist rationally than if 
it had only been an outward appearance.
e second reason East Germans imagined they saw all-encompassing harmo-
nious fulllment on the other side of the Wall was due to certain external features 
of western material culture. According to Katrin (the designer from Chemnitz 
with whom I regularly discussed East German images of the west), the outward 
appearance of the west seemed so natural, nostalgic, and authentic. “All those dried 
oral arrangements and owery settees,” Katrin explained and she continued:
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All those forms of ‘naturalness’ – they express a desire; a desire to go back 
in time; not back to a particular age or to a particular period. It is the de-
sire to return to a kind of primitive feeling. We want to go back to the time 
when there was no separation within us, back to the time when we were 
still one, undivided. We miss that feeling of unity and look for it in nature. 
Nature is real and honest.
Katrin tried to put into words the chord that was struck by the previously de-
scribed pictures, displays and objects. According to her, such images evoked an 
almost intuitive, common human desire for an ideal world which could be, as she 
described it: “One and undivided.” According to her, that was what East Germans 
were seeking and thought they had found in the prosperous west (and their collec-
tive identication with it). at was why they desperately longed for and identied 
with it. I think Katrin’s interpretation is extremely relevant. It refers to the desire 
for an existence without gaps and cracks, an existence without chasms between the 
self and its lived experiences on the one hand, and the demands and needs of the 
social and symbolic order on the other. Generally impossible to achieve everlast-
ingly, East German history painfully illustrates the on-going dialectics between 
the promises dominating the social order, their fallibility, resulting in collective 
experiences previously described as the Void or “lack” (East Germans), and the 
increasingly pressing desire for “fulllment and ultimate arrival.”35
e GDR came into existence in an era when material shortage aected every 
aspect of life. Also as a result of the poignant material conditions suered by the 
people living in the area that was to become the GDR, they were painfully con-
fronted with what Geissler called the Void – a situation in which social cohesion 
was painfully absent and where even the last remnants of society were shattered. 
In chapters three and four, I described how people succeeded in jointly writing o 
a reality which had manifested itself so intrusively.
Finding a new foundation in the socialist promise of harmony was partly en-
abled by what one could call its “materialistic packaging.” Even if there was no 
solution to the social problems, the aspiration of material improvement which 
was oered as the concrete starting point for future social well-being seemed to 
be worth the eort. And people did their best: restoring the collapsed houses, they 
hoped to restore mutual harmony and warmth. is hope was based on experi-
ences which people were not allowed to discuss – they were taboo. ese negative 
experiences had been turned into positive promises, for the future restructuring of 
society. e negative life lessons were reported to be beseitigt [put aside] through 
the denazication and implanting of socialism in the GDR.
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e residents of the society thus formed were mutually connected in the shared, 
secret knowledge of a traumatic, forbidden reality. is gap was the core around 
which society evolved – as shown in the previous chapters. Right from the start, 
the East German state attempted to ensure that the gap between word and reality 
did not become visible – by never acknowledging, for instance, that denazication 
had been unsuccessful, and later that suspicion and Stasi existed where solidarity 
was preached. e warmth that did exist also served to cover up socially disruptive 
forces and experiences, such as envy and rivalry between people.
e “lack” East Germans struggled with was not only of a material but also of 
a social nature. Competitiveness, jealousy and distrust between people were hid-
den from sight, they were taboo. e aims of material improvement as the basis 
of paradise to be created on earth were never fullled. But precisely because these 
material aims were potentially attainable (in contrast with the problems of a so-
cial nature which remained the hidden core of East German society), the desire 
for improved material conditions always remained the articulated and collectively 
shared façade which disguised other types of unspoken problems.36
In the years before the Wende, criticism on the material situation in the GDR 
was so widespread and general that when West German historian Lutz Niethammer 
and his colleagues Alexander von Plato and Dorothee Wierling were allowed to 
carry out an oral history project in the GDR in 1988, they were shocked. e in-
habitants of the GDR seemed to have completely reduced their existence to a ma-
terially economic concern. According to Niethammer, the complaints about mate-
rial consumption were used to express another type of dissatisfaction regarding 
matters which were not named as such: “Criticism of provisions dominated nearly 
every interview, just as much so with party loyalists…e all too obvious reduc-
tion of people’s entire existence to a direct material concern had become a lin-
gua franca in the GDR, into which all feelings had to be translated.” According to 
Niethammer, the reason why all possible feelings of dissatisfaction were translated 
into material complaints was due to a “deep-seated consensus with the material 
economic values of the system.” e criticism of consumption functioned as an 
“ocially legitimate valve” because this was “the only area in which the unfullled 
perspectives of the people and the party leaders corresponded.”37
ese conclusions fully correspond to what I have sketched so far. e obvious 
identication with the close-by-yet-so-unattainable West German prosperity was 
so widespread because in the GDR, material prosperity used to be related to more 
far-reaching promises of salvation. e image of the glorious west gave way to a 
fantasy that if East Germans would have those things, they would be released from 
the “lack” prevailing in their society. “If we had that, everything would be perfect,” 
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is how East German fantasies about the west could be summed up. Just how far-
reaching people’s perceptions of life in western prosperity could be was illustrated 
in Mr. Linke’s recollections. When talking about the house he himself had built, 
he regularly referred to the west. If he had lived on the other side of the Wall, he 
said, not only could he have built a real “dream house,” but thanks to the material 
wealth there, it would have denitely been possible for him to achieve everything 
he was never able to do in the GDR. It was in this conversation that he uttered the 
words I already quoted in the introduction: “In the west everything was beautiful 
and wonderful. People seemed to have no worries, and only there was it possible to 
be really happy. Everything always looked better and more beautiful than here. It all 
looked so wonderful! We really thought it was paradise, a Schlaraenland pur [e 
Land of Cockaigne in its purest form].” While the unfavorable material situation 
was the only problem in East German society that was allowed to be discussed, 
the ctitious solution to all (unnamed) problems could be equally found in mate-
rial areas. Paraphrasing: “If only we were as rich and prosperous as on the other 
side of the Wall, then...,” followed by a completely harmonious description of who 
we really could have been, from which all the existing – though not mentioned 
– shortcomings, problems, and frustrations were deleted. A social worker from 
Rudolstadt put it into words as follows:
In our country, the schizophrenia between word and reality was continu-
ously increasing, and the western material world played an important role 
in that. We really believed that people in the west stood closer to their 
ideals; that ideal and reality were in harmony than in our country, and 
that people were happier there because there was no schizophrenia. at 
is what we thought because of everything we saw on the television. And 
western visitors conrmed that image. ey looked like the people in the 
advertisements, they laughed like in the advertisements, and they even 
smelled like in the advertisements. e image that was spread by televi-
sion advertising was conrmed by them in real life. And on that basis, 
we really believed that the residents of the west and their ideals were one. 
Consumer goods played a signicant role in that fusion: eir reality was 
ideal because they had those things. And if we only had these things too, 
it would be like that here, too, and that would put a stop to the schizophre-
nia. en the gap between ideal and reality would be closed here as well.
eir representation of the west helped East Germans to conceal that their society 
was more characterized by mutual tension and envy than they tried to feel in their 
Nischen. e fact that people collectively desired the west, just as they also laughed 
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together by poking fun at the lies which dominated the public arena in the GDR, 
seemed to conrm the mutual solidarity and community.
All the destabilizing elements of East German existence were removed as far 
as possible. And if that was not possible, people scapegoated the state – for “die da 
oben, die machen doch immer so ein Schwachsinn! [those at the top, they always 
make such a mess of it],” and the fantasy about whom they would have been if…
was every bit as beautiful as the western world appeared on television: shiny, ra-
diant, sweet-smelling, so and harmonious. When the Wall fell, this fantasy was 




Where we think we have caught hold of the Grail, we have only grasped a thing, and what 
is le in our hands is only a cooking pot (Georges Bataille, 1988 [1967])..1
In late 1989, the unimaginable happened: GDR residents could freely enter West 
Germany, and one year later, the two Germanys were united. In that year, the 
country was in a state of jubilation. e euphoria was immense, especially in the 
GDR. Yet these joyous feelings quickly disappeared, and ve years later they had 
given way to a general mood of dissatisfaction, disappointment, frustration and 
despair. Many felt like the man in the street, cheated by the western world. Many 
missed the GDR, sighing nostalgically: “en the world was still friendly, warm 
and convenient.” Interestingly, this mood was apparent in every social circle and 
layer of society. Even people who had prospered since the Wende oen declared 
their frustration and disappointment. All in all, I hardly met anyone who was en-
tirely satised with the changes that had taken place. e question is how this 
mood change should be interpreted?
ere appeared to be various reasons for the widespread discontent. In the 
rst place, many East Germans were disappointed by what the economic upheaval 
had engendered. In a market economy, only the ttest survive according to East 
German common opinion. is was seen as one of the causes not only of the high 
unemployment in the GDR, but of the painful fact that, in order to better them-
selves, people cheated on each other. e second reason why the capitalist world 
met with such strong disapproval in the former GDR was that since the Wende, 
social dierentiation between people had increased considerably. is was said to 
have largely put an end to people’s involvement with each other. e third reason 
was that the relationship between East and West Germans did not work out as 
people had expected. On the contrary, because West Germans supposedly looked 
down on East Germans and their past society, East Germans collectively felt as if 
they had become second-class citizens in their own country. e changes in the 
consumer market that had occurred since the Wende were cited as a cause, a result 
or an illustration of the three dierent sources of discontent.
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Before going into these issues more deeply, let me rst outline the dramatic 
events that took place in the GDR from the moment that some of the East German 
population took to the streets in the autumn of 1989.
The Wende
In the summer of 1989, when East German holidaymakers in Czechoslovakia 
managed to secure entry to the west through the West German embassy in Prague, 
the call for change was beginning to sound in the GDR and would be declared 
more openly. Various letters to the editors of newspapers were published in which 
people – rst cautiously and later ever more blatantly – demanded change: more 
openness, democracy and freedom. “Wir sind das Volk [we are the people]” was 
heard everywhere. “e people” no longer accepted not having a voice and being 
dictated to. ey demanded changes to the existing East German power structure.
It was a rather specic section of the people that spoke out. e people who 
took to the streets and called for changes were generally those who had also previ-
ously been more critically involved in society: intellectuals, people active in the 
protestant church, party members, writers, artists, and journalists. e vast major-
ity of East Germans were only remotely interested in politics that autumn.2
Just like in all the towns and cities up and down the country, meetings were 
organized in Rudolstadt from the middle of October 1989 – in churches, theatres, 
youth clubs and schools. ere, too, the rst initiatives were taken by the local intel-
ligentsia. On October 16, some actors from the local theatre organized a meeting, 
and three days later a service to pray for peace was held in the Protestant church, 
aer which the congregation walked to the Catholic church at the other end of the 
city center. In that rst demonstration an estimated total of 2000 people took part. 
Although demonstrations had been held in other towns for over a month, vari-
ous participants of that rst demonstration in Rudolstadt remembered how scared 
they were when they went into the streets. ey still vividly remembered the previ-
ous summer’s “Chinese solution” when the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square 
in Beijing had ended in a bloody massacre. Considering how unthinkable it had 
always been in the GDR to voice a dissident opinion out loud in the streets, this 
felt extremely scary. Moreover, during the rst demonstrations, police was every-
where, and photographs were taken of the demonstrators. Despite the fear, the 
numbers of people taking part in the demonstrations quickly increased. Once it 
became clear that the powers of state were not going to intervene with force, the 
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fear gradually made way for a feeling that people were witnessing a remarkably 
special moment in time.
From the end of October, national events started to take o at a rapid pace. On 
November 4, the biggest demonstration in the GDR’s history took place in East 
Berlin; it was estimated that one million people took part. On November 7, a mass 
demonstration was held in Dresden, where for the rst time people publicly called 
for the government to step down. at same day the government resigned, and on 
November 8, eleven members of the Politburo did the same.
During the following day’s press conference on November 9, while Günter 
Schabowski, a member of the reduced Politburo, was giving an account of the 
recent events, an unimaginable thing happened. A piece of paper was shoved into 
Schabowski’s hands, which he read out in front of the cameras. People watching 
the event on television later said that it seemed as if Schabowski did not know 
what he was reading, but his words meant that with immediate eect, the residents 
of the GDR were free to leave the country. e announcement was so unimagi-
nable that initially it almost did not sink in. People could not believe their ears, it 
could not be true. e East German Reverend Weber, who later published his di-
ary describing those astonishing days, explained the consequences of the televised 
broadcast of Schabowski’s press conference as follows:
No-one seems to understand the signicance of the announcement – 
Schabowski just as little as all those who saw him on live television. Slowly, 
a sort of shock situation emerges, and people begin to realize the huge sig-
nicance. Does this really mean...? ese hopes are immediately banished 
again. Impossible, a joke, one of the numerous fake decisions that people 
know so well: rst your hopes are raised, only to be dashed by the subse-
quent interpretation. Or could it be possible? Indeed: the late news con-
rmed what people had not dared to hope. ousands of East Berliners 
started to cross the border to West Berlin.3
On November 9, 1989, the border between both German states was opened. News 
spread very rapidly throughout the country, and within a couple of hours, the 
whole of East Germany was aware that the country was no longer hermetically 
closed to the outside world. e East German customs ocers’ initial reaction was 
reluctance, but it soon became clear to them as well that they would have to let the 
ocking mass of countrymen through the border without hindering them in any 
way. For the rst time, no mirrors had to be held under the cars, no visas had to be 
checked, and no contents of cars and bags had to be subjected to a thorough search 
in case someone was being smuggled over the border. Everyone who wanted to 
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could freely pass the border between East and West Germany, to be received on 
the other side by the equally enthusiast masses of West Germans.
What happened within the hours, days, and weeks thereaer dominated the 
news. All over the world the television showed the same images: blocked East 
German roads, mile-long rows of Trabants [East German car] trying to reach the 
frontier, indistinct masses of people at the border, and East and West Germans 
sobbing as they fell into each other’s arms on the western side. e promise that 
every East German would receive an amount of one hundred DM Begrüßungsgeld 
[welcoming money] on the west side was an additional incentive for most East 
Germans to go and see the world on the other side with their own eyes. Everyone 
went. In the rst ten days aer November 9, an estimated eight million East 
Germans crossed the border to West Germany.
Aerwards, most people still remembered vividly what they then felt. Many 
said they just could not control their tears when visiting West Germany for the 
rst time. Especially its material aspects made a deep impression. What prosper-
ity! It was all there! Everywhere, there were things for sale! Everything looked 
equally beautiful: the people, the streets, the houses, the cars, the shops, all of it! 
e attraction of the West German to the consumer side was also evident in the es-
says on the Wende, written by secondary school pupils in Rudolstadt.4 A 13-year-
old girl described this attraction as follows:
Five years ago, how much we looked forward to our rst trip to West 
Germany!! In those days we still had our old Wartburg [East German car, 
mv], and my grandfather drove us to West Germany. At the moment when 
the East German roads became West German, my grandfather said to my 
father, ‘You can tell that we are in the west.’ We drove on and collected the 
hundred DM that had been set aside for everyone, and then we went to 
the rst shop we saw. My grandmother got out of the car, went into the 
shop, and at that moment she cried tears of joy. en my mother asked my 
brother what he would really like…I could of course pick out something 
as well and I chose my rst radio. at day, everything changed.
Another 13-year-old girl wrote: “My parents and I went by car to West Germany 
to do our Christmas shopping. We could not believe what we saw there. It was like 
being in heaven.”
e trains were bulging, people took their old grandmothers and grandfa-
thers along to collect the hundred DM to which they were entitled. One woman 
even told how she had seen a mother leave her pram behind at a station in East 
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Germany: she was determined to get to the FRG with her baby in order to collect 
two hundred DM, but could not get the pram into the jam-packed train.
Social scientists also noticed that above all, encountering western consump-
tion was of signicant importance to most East Germans. “In the days and weeks 
aer the opening, East Germans gorged themselves on the symbolic goods of 
West German nation-ness...ey ocked to the shopping centers and stores in a 
consumptive orgy.”5 When sociologist Zygmunt Bauman, originally from Poland, 
asked East Germans if their discontent also had anything to do with the quality 
of education, for example, he was made to understand that he had simply just not 
grasped it. is had nothing to do with education or the quality of welfare. It was 
about “the gratifying feeling of self-assertion, expressed in the act of consumer 
choice.”6
In light of what I have described in the previous chapters, it is hardly surpris-
ing that so many East Germans experienced these events as their entry to “the 
promised land.”7 When Christa Wolf tried to put into words what stirred her and 
her countrymen in that euphoric autumn of 1989, she described those days as a 
“Traum-Zeit [dream time]”. East Germans were “einige Wochen lang…wirklich 
die, die sie sein könnten [for a few weeks, East Germans were truly who they could 
have been].”8 Although Wolf is extremely vague about what in her view was the 
main reason for this collective feeling of sudden self-realization, I read her de-
scription as a conrmation of my thesis: that East Germans, when they were at last 
given access to the wonderful world of the west, which up until then they had only 
been able to enter in their dreams, collectively felt that their dreams had come true 
and that reality was nally living up to them.9 Before going into more depth on this 
subject, I rst want to describe further the developments that took place in and 
aer the autumn of 1989, focusing specically on economic and material changes.
Aer the opening up of the border on November 9, 1989, a rapid sequence 
of developments ensued in the GDR. On November 17, Hans Modrow, the 
new head of the East German government, put forward the idea of forming a 
Vertragsgemeinscha [contractual community] with the FRG. e Ministry of 
State Security (the Stasi) was disbanded, citizens’ movement Neues Forum was ad-
mitted, the leading role of the SED was scrapped from the constitution, and refu-
gees of the republic were granted amnesty. Articles appeared in the East German 
newspaper on the Stasi’s methods, and on East German television images were 
broadcast in which the lifestyle of the highest-ranking party ocials in the village 
of Wandlitz was revealed. Especially the luxurious (by East German standards), 
western interiors, mostly purchased in Intershops, gave rise to mass rage: “[A]
ll those years when they preached water, they were drinking wine!” was how an 
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older man expressed the people’s anger. Scandals about corruption, abuse of power 
and illegal trade were revealed right up to the party’s top ranks. On December 1, 
1989, the East German singer Wolf Bierman, who had been ausgebürgert [expatri-
ated] in 1976, performed again in the GDR.
Meanwhile, demonstrations were still being held all over the country, with 
more and more people joining in. On November 27, the director of Rudolstadt’s 
museum, who had attended a number of demonstrations in Rudolstadt, Leipzig, 
and Dresden, wrote in his diary: “Stimmung kippt, massive Förderung nach 
Einheit Deutschland [Mood has shied. Massive support for German unity].” 
Around that time, other reporters also noticed a change, which according to many 
was most clearly expressed by the dierent slogan the demonstrators were chant-
ing. Whereas the earlier demonstrations upheld “Wir sind das Volk [We are the 
people]” (a slogan in which the democratic, politically idealistic aims of the rst 
demonstrators resounded), this gradually made way for a slightly dierent slo-
gan, which clearly voiced the striving for concrete political-economic and material 
changes: “Wir sind ein Volk [We are one people].” e switch in slogan was sig-
nicant: the demonstrations, begun in an attempt to reform the GDR, were aimed 
more and more at the unication of the two German states.10
e call for unication was gaining ground everywhere. In December 1989 al-
ready, the East German Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU, Christian Democratic 
Union) acknowledged the market economy and announced it would strive for na-
tional unity. As the opening up of the GDR had set in motion a mass migration from 
east to west, the most important sectors of the East German economy were gradually 
becoming paralyzed, and the country was in danger of breaking up in chaos.11 is 
was one of the reasons that general elections were announced in the GDR for March 
18, 1990.
In the meantime, however, there was also a surge in the opposite direction, al-
beit smaller and more limited in form. It mainly consisted of West German traders, 
who were very keen on serving the eager-to-spend East German public. Goods and 
market stalls were loaded up in the FRG and unloaded on the East German side of 
the border. In many East German towns, provisional market halls and tents sprang 
up to enable the East German population to purchase the desirable Westwaren as 
quickly and easily as possible. For the rst time in history, the East German shops 
remained empty. Now that West German goods were available, nobody wanted to 
spend their money on East German stu any longer. Even East German meat and 
vegetables could not compete against West German varieties. And while up until 
1989, people had had to wait for years for the desirable Trabant, these same cars 
were now being given away for a pittance, sometimes even for nothing.
Figure 8.1 – Rudolstadt 1989/90, Trabant – instant sale
Source: Picture by one of the author’s interlocutors.
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A West German furniture salesman who had opened a business in Rudolstadt 
right aer the Wall fell, selling remnants bought up in the FRG, explained that it 
did not matter what he brought, it all sold anyway, “the people wanted everything, 
as long as it came from the west.” When traders from Bayreuth, a relatively nearby 
West German town, brought their wares to the market in Rudolstadt, everything 
sold like hot cakes, despite the fact that a pineapple cost 24.95 DM and a bar of 
chocolate 7.50 DM. With wages many times lower than in the FRG (even at the 
ctitious exchange rate of 1:1), these prices were indeed “überteuert [exorbitant],” 
but as the residents of Rudolstadt asked a local journalist: “Wann habe ich einmal 
die Möglichkeit, das Alles einzukaufen [when will I be able to buy all this?].”12
Having a share of the west’s prosperity became the main focus in the run-up to 
the elections. Chancellor Kohl’s CDU presented itself as the party that had enabled 
West Germany’s good fortune. At the rst of Kohl’s rallies, whilst giving the green 
light for the election campaign, he promised to achieve the same material prosper-
ity in the GDR (blühende Landschaen, blossoming landscapes) that existed in 
the FRG. According to Kohl, that prosperity would only come about if the voters 
ensured that the Social Democratic Party (SPD) was kept out of the government.13
On March 18, 1990, something happened that most of the reporters had an-
ticipated: the CDU won the elections in the GDR with an overwhelming major-
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ity. “Die Noch-DDR hat die schnelle D-Mark gewählt [the still existing GDR has 
voted for the fast DM]” was how the newspaper article described the CDU’s land-
slide victory.14 Economic and materialistic considerations had won over the more 
idealist, political aims with which the rst demonstrators had taken to the streets 
in the autumn of 1989. East Germany’s inhabitants had voted for unication with 
the FRG as soon as possible, for the DM, and for the promised material prosper-
ity of Kohl’s blühende Landschaen. eir voice was explicitly meant to oppose 
every attempt to develop an adapted socialism as suggested by the supporters of 
Neues Forum. Aer the elections, the previously mentioned director wrote in his 
diary: “Das Volk will seine Vergangenheit zu Grabe tragen...Auf dem Markt wird 
Erdinger Weißbier ausgeschenkt. Die Vorhut der neuen Zeit ist da: die Händler 
[the people want to bury their past…At the market West German beer is being 
served. e vanguard of the new era has arrived: the traders].”
From that moment on, East Germany’s transformation happened very quickly 
– especially in the material sense. More and more East German goods lay un-
touched on the shop shelves. When it was announced that the Währungsunion 
[nancial union] would take place on July 1, 1990, whereby East German coins 
would disappear and payment in both countries would be in DM, people stopped 
buying anything from the GDR. Almost immediately aer the elections it was 
made known that the previously desirable automobile, the “Trabant P 601 in der 
Ausführung Limousine und Universal [Trabant P 601, type limousine and univer-
sal]” could be purchased “ohne Vorbestellung [without pre-ordering].”15 “[U]nter 
dem Motto Ansehen – Kaufen – Mitnehmen” [Under the motto ‘see – buy – take 
away’], a completely unknown phenomenon in the GDR, the car was freely avail-
able.16 Dramatic price cuts were made everywhere. Shoes which used to cost 190 
Ostmark were suddenly available for 29.60 Ostmark, and things people used to 
have to queue for could now be had for almost nothing. East German shop spaces 
were bought up by West German chains, existing purchase agreements with East 
German producers were cancelled, and even sheet music produced in the GDR 
was seen as ramsch (junk), “als ob Chopin für den Westen anders komponiert 
hätte [as if Chopin composed dierently for the west].”17 While there had been 
only one newspaper in the GDR, now there were suddenly numerous papers and 
magazines for sale, full of advertisements oering things for sale that would have 
been completely unthinkable in the old days: pieces of land and other investment 
opportunities, for example, but also sexual favors and services.
What was happening in the sphere of consumption found its ocial conr-
mation on July 1, 1990. From that day on, only one coin was used throughout 
the entire country. With that, the reunication of the two Germanys had practi-
Figure 8.2 – Rudolstadt, July 1, 1989: Währungsunion [monetary union], queue in front of 
Rudolstadt’s bank 
Source: Picture by one of the author’s interlocutors.
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cally become a fact. In the days that followed, East German banks were inundated. 
Long queues formed in front of them as everyone came to exchange their money. 
Bank assistants worked overtime to deal with the huge stream of people. ey 
worked on in the evenings to exchange the hated Aluchips [derogatory name for 
East German marks made of aluminum] as quickly as possible for the equivalent 
in the desired DM. Everyone wanted to know what their money was worth, how 
much “schönes Geld [beautiful money]” they had precisely, as a bank worker at the 
Sparkasse (one of Germany’s largest banks) explained. Although people could ob-
viously have calculated that themselves, the bank worker emphasized that people 
simply wanted to see it with their own eyes.
For East Germans, the DM was their entrance ticket to the western world – to 
“heaven on earth,” as the 13-year-old girl had described in her essay. Moreover, 
many also considered it an opportunity to clean up the life they had led up until 
then. Many couples who had married a long time ago took their new money to the 
west in order to buy each other another wedding ring. Only two styles of wedding 
ring had existed in the GDR, and practically everyone had worn the same one.
With the arrival of the DM, the East German material landscape changed at 
lightning speed. Shops were tted out and decorated dierently, old East German 
shops were obliged to shut down, and new shops were opening their doors ev-
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ery day. According to the director of Rudolstadt’s Industrie und Handelskammer 
[Chamber of Commerce], at rst for shops household electrical goods and jeans, 
were immensely popular, and the same applied to garages, taxi companies and 
driving schools. Businesses were set up that had never existed before in the GDR, 
such as video stores, game halls, insurance companies, estate agents, sex shops, 
and computer shops. Alongside all these new retail opportunities, the street scene 
was also enlivened with brightly colored western advertising. “Once again the ma-
gician waved his magic wand, and up sprung new signs above the new shops. At 
last, long cherished desires could be fullled. And what next? Now, said the magi-
cian to the people, everything will be quick and easy.”18
And quick it certainly was. Walking round Rudolstadt in 1994, I found it hard 
to imagine that scarcely ve years ago, people had had to stand and queue for ba-
nanas and oranges, while no-one knew what a kiwi was. And where most western 
visitors had struggled in 1988 to spend the obligatory 25 exchanged marks a day, 
by 1994 Rudolstadt had everything for sale that a spoilt westerner could desire: 
from gold-rimmed long-drink glasses to fresh basil, and from thrillers by John 
le Carré to the latest model of widescreen television. Queues were nowhere to 
be seen, on market days the public sauntered leisurely over the market square, 
and a supermarket had been set up just outside the town center, with nearly 6000 
square meter of oor space oering more than 85,000 items. In a material sense, 
Rudolstadt had become identical to any other West German provincial town. e 
residents dressed according to the same fashion trends as their West German 
contemporaries, and about a hundred advertising brochures landed in their let-
terboxes every month. Here, too, the post oce workers had to work overtime 
when mail-order companies issued their new catalogues, in order to unpack and 
dispatch all the catalogues as quickly as possible. e kiosk sold 19 dierent maga-
zines on nance and the stock exchange, and posters hanging in bank oces said: 
“Ansprüche sind wie Kinder: Sie wachsen [Demands are like children: they grow],” 
or “Papa sagt, hier wächst unser Geld schneller als ich [Papa says that here our 
money grows faster than I do].” And a totally dierent type of poster hung in the 
post oce: an address you could apply to if you were suering from compulsive 
buying.
e former socialist society’s material landscape had been completely trans-
formed, and everything the East German population could scarcely have dared to 
imagine had actually happened in an extremely short space of time. As we know, 
this did not go hand in hand with the joy and contentment everyone had expected.
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East Germans’ Dissatisfaction
e vast majority of Rudolstadt’s residents were quite negative about the emer-
gence of the western consumer culture. In fact, the mood was unmistakably 
gloomy, which in many ways had to do with the changes that had occurred in con-
sumption. Although hardly anyone seemed to really want to return to the GDR, 
feelings of nostalgia were widespread, and many people reacted as if they had been 
stung by a wasp when asked questions about the transformation in the country’s 
consumer culture. Paraphrasing what so many people felt then: “Yes, now we have 
everything, but our lives have certainly not improved. Nowadays, it is only about 
money. Before, there was nothing, but now we cannot aord anything. Because 
of capitalism, there is nothing le of the life we had, and the former solidarity 
between people is gone.”
is was roughly the message circulating throughout the GDR in 1994. Aer 
a while I even stopped writing down comments like these. ey were expressed 
so oen that I began to simply list them under the heading “standard story” in my 
diary. e most surprising aspect was that nearly everyone I spoke to seemed to 
conrm the above statements more or less. During the een months I lived in 
Rudolstadt, I met only a few people who were really positive about the country’s 
transformation. Strangely enough, not all of them had gained the most in nancial 
or economic terms from the country’s Wende. e dissatisfaction extended to all 
layers of society, and even those who were better o than before, either in an abso-
lute or relative sense, were oen unsatised with the transformation.
Although the complaints were certainly not just directed at the country’s mate-
rial transformation, everything did seem to hinge around this. Paraphrasing, the 
crux of the problems could be described as follows:
In exchange for material wealth, we had to give up everything that used 
to bind us. Whereas mutual solidarity was once the core value, nowadays 
there is only one God, and that is Mammon. Our former existence em-
bodied a great deal of mutual warmth and involvement, but nowadays 
everyone cheats the other in order to better himself, and that is all down 
to capitalism, the new money and the goods. Our former lives have been 
stripped of all of their positive attributes.
ree female workers at the municipal Diakonie [social ministry] said that since 
the Wende, they had become distinctly more suspicious and mistrusting. “And 
that is a good thing too,” one of them remarked bitterly, “for whoever is trusting, 
is stupid. Everyone just walks over you. If you are gullible and kind, people just 
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exploit you.” In this day and age, they complained, everything revolved around 
money and goods. is crept into the work situation as well, even if someone’s line 
of work did not give rise to such behavior at all – for example, if she was a social 
worker. Partly due to their growing dierences, people’s contact with each other 
had contracted considerably since the Wende. People no longer trusted each other, 
they did not greet each other in the street, and friendships were broken because a 
sudden feeling of rivalry had arisen.19 Additionally, life had become so hectic that 
people did not have time for each other. All three women knew of marriages in 
their neighborhood which had suered from the changes. Even the atmosphere in 
family circles was oen spoilt due to the underlying rivalry and distrust engulng 
everything. One of the women described how the onset of capitalism had drasti-
cally changed the feelings between members of her own family.20
In the past we always came together for big celebrations. at does not happen as oen now. 
It has become too expensive, and we no longer have time for each other. We also trust each 
other less. Whenever we meet up, everyone is always checking: what has he got, what has she 
got, how did he get it, she must be doing well, how is that possible, how much is he earning, 
how is she spending her money, etc. is ruins the atmosphere, and because of that we are no 
longer so open and trusting with each other. In the past, if one family member had a birth-
day, the whole family was invited to dinner: we made Klöße with meat and possibly lettuce 
if we could get it, and then pudding with coee aerwards and home-baked Kuchen.21 But 
now when it is someone’s birthday, it is only celebrated if it is a child, and then we invite each 
other round in the evening, only to come and grill sausages on the barbecue. It has become 
too much of an eort; we no longer have or take the time, and we do not feel like doing it 
any more. It has all become so depressing... e one has lost his job, the other cannot nd a 
nursery.
In the past we used to look forward to someone coming to visit us, but now? We react very 
dierently to each other. An intimate conversation is a thing of the past. at just does not 
happen anymore. We do not want to be saddled with each other’s problems, and we do not let 
people get close to us anymore. Everything has changed completely. You do not know who is 
honest and who is not, whether it is a lie or not. One is even a bigger cheat than the other, and 
then there is the mutual envy in the family. We had just bought a new car, and my brother 
remarked: “A new car? e other one was still running ok?” But it is none of his business how 
I spend my money, what I do with it! His daughter is always dolled up like a princess, but I 
do not ask him how he can aord all that!
When asked why they no longer wanted people to get close to them, she replied:
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We all used to be a bit more equal in the old days. Now I surely would not think of letting 
my family see my bank statements! And nowadays you have to present yourself, you have to 
know how to sell yourself – they taught us that at a retraining course. In the past, that would 
not have played a role at all, people only looked at who you genuinely were. Appearance? 
Presentation? But now you have to present yourself as well as possible. You have to please 
those above you, anschleimen und arschkriechen [sucking up and ass-licking]. It is all just 
blah blah blah these days. Where I rst worked, many people had to be laid o aer the 
Wende, but I was kept on. I trusted that all would go well and did not get involved with any-
thing. But my colleagues went to the boss and said to him: “We have young children, work 
is very important for us.” en I was given the sack, and the others could stay. at was a 
breaking point for me. Since then, I no longer trust anyone anymore.
Everyone hides in his own little shell, and we all only live for ourselves. e Stasi might not be 
around anymore, but now it is the employers who put you under pressure. In the past, when 
we were all in the same boat, we all had the same problems. And even if you had dierent 
problems, they were political or to do with the Stasi. But today it has changed. People assume 
that if you have a problem, you are responsible for it. People have become more egoistic. e 
main thing is: I am alright. at is why you have to stand up for yourself. Soon I am going to 
see my aunt in the west and I now know already what she will say: “New car?? How is that 
possible???”
No, nobody needs to know as much about me as they did in the past. It does not serve any 
purpose. I was brought up with the idea that you had to love your neighbor like yourself, 
but tell me honestly: can I love those who play me a mean trick? You have to learn to deal 
with it. I always used to deal with things spontaneously. Now I just sit and listen. I do not 
say too much, and contemplate quietly. I no longer trust anyone. Everywhere you go you are 
deceived anyway: by the authorities, at the Treuhand [Trust agency].22
e fact that I was dismissed due to the actions of my colleagues, I have not got over that yet. 
at has changed my life. Someone’s face alone does not tell you. With everyone you must 
ask yourself: can I trust them or not? And everything is connected to the pressure to achieve, 
to be more than your neighbor, and to have more than your neighbor: he already has that but 
I do not yet have it, she looks better than me, and so on and so forth. Struggle, envy, jealousy, 
wanting more than at rst, wanting more than others, joining in the ght for status, that is 
what it is all about these days.
Her long story contains all the themes that cropped up in nearly every conversa-
tion I had with people: about how money ruled the world, that the atmosphere 
between people was not what it used to be, that pressure to achieve, jealousy, mu-
tual rivalry and distrust had come to dominate the once so egalitarian and jovial 
society. Since the Wende, people withdrew to their own four walls – even more 
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so than in the East German Nische society, and that was due to capitalism and its 
accompanying lifestyle, in which everything revolved around money and material 
possessions. From the moment the country became western, nothing remained of 
what used to be East German existence: all the warmth and friendship had made 
way for egoism. is resonated everywhere, and the newspapers regularly pub-
lished cynical jokes, making fun of the central role of egoism in current society.
e fact that East Germans had little faith in society and the future aer the 
Wende is also demonstrated demographically. In the period between 1989 and 
1992, the number of marriages that took place in East Germany dropped by 62 
percent – a “marriage shock” which has almost no parallel in history. Even between 
1942 and 1946, the number of marriages in Berlin only dropped by 30 percent. 
East German death rates for 1992 were not yet available when political economist 
Nicholas Eberstadt carried out his research, but on the basis of the 1991 gures, 
it was clear that death rates had increased in all age categories since the Wende, 
and “many of these increases were dramatic.” According to Eberstadt, the most 
signicant illustration of the shock phase the GDR was going through three years 
aer 1989 was the fall in the number of births in the former East Germany: in 1992 
this had dropped by 55 percent compared to three years earlier. “Industrialized 
societies…have scarcely ever registered such radical declines in fertility – not even 
during the chaos and destruction attendant upon defeat in total war…Eastern 
Germany’s adults appear to have come as close to a temporary suspension of child-
bearing as any large population in the human experience.”23
Similar trends were also visible in Rudolstadt. Whereas 877 children were born 
in Kreis Rudolstadt in 1988, that number had dropped to 287 in 1993. e an-
nual number of marriages showed a similar slump: in 1988 there were 578, in 
1993 only 177.24 In addition, I heard about a surprisingly high number of suicides. 
Some even knew of several people who had decided to end their lives. One of the 
women from the Diakonie reported that since the Wende, at least three people in 
her village had committed suicide. One of them, a man, threw himself under the 
train aer having been dismissed. Another was a 21-year-old woman who had had 
a child almost exactly a year ago.25 ese are the most extreme stories I recorded, 
but I met many people who admitted that they too no longer had any faith in the 
future. “In ten years? I hope I am still alive then,” a 35-year-old woman joked bit-
terly when she spoke of how much her life had changed recently. Just like many 
others, she admitted to missing the GDR. en she knew what she was living for, 
she still had a job, a purpose, a structure, something to do. But now? She was going 
mad sitting at home, not being able to do anything because everything she could 
think of would cost money.
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I listened to lots of stories like these – dismal, bitter tales from people who said 
they had completely lost their desire for and grip on life since the Wende. Even 
in the little café under my apartment which was frequented mostly by Wessis, 
Wossis (East Germans who wanted to be seen as successful Wessis) and other 
Möchtegerns26 [wannabe’s] working in Rudolstadt, many people complained about 
the destructive Werdegang [development] of the once so harmonious society. 
Sometime before articles about Ostalgie started to appear in the German media, a 
GDR night was organized in this café.27
at night the café was decorated with East German attributes: East German 
consumer goods (packets of beans and other preserves) were placed in between 
bottles of alcohol, old maps of East Germany adorned the walls, and there were 
lots of GDR memorabilia on the bar. Many visitors had put on part of their old 
FDJ uniforms, and some greeted each other with the FDJ’s usual slogan, “Wir sind 
bereit [we are ready].” Others had pinned on GDR badges such as “für ausgezeich-
nete Leistungen [for excellent achievements].” Remarkably, however, the music 
played was not from the GDR era. Only the most popular current hits sounded 
through the bar, one of which was the East German band Der Prinzen’s song “Alles 
nur geklaut [everything’s just stolen],” undoubtedly the most popular song at that 
time. During my stay in Rudolstadt, I heard the song everywhere: in shops, cafés, 
the gym, and also in people’s homes. e chorus went like this:
es ist alles nur geklaut, heho heho
 [everything’s just stolen, heho, heho]
es ist alles ja nicht mein’, heho heho
 [nothing here belongs to me, heho, heho]
es ist alles nur gestolen, nur gelogen, nur geklaut
 [everything’s just stolen, lied about, and taken]
entschuldigung, das hab’ ich mich erlaubt, heho, heho
 [apologies, I allowed myself to do it]
das hab’ ich mich erlaubt
 [I let myself do it]
I could not help hearing the lyrics as an ironically cutting criticism of the central 
role of money in the current society.
Here too, nothing but criticism. e pressing question is why so many people 
were utterly negative about the new era. As mentioned before, my interlocutors 
gave various reasons for the depression they had collectively fallen prey to. e 
rst was complaints concerning the economy and the economic structure of so-
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ciety, second the social dierentiation which the introduction of capitalism had 
led to, and lastly the humiliating feeling of being treated as second-class citizens. 
Running through everything was the dissatisfaction with the changed morals as a 
result of the Wende from socialism to capitalism.
Three Reasons for East German Despondency
Fraud, privatization and unemployment
When trying to distribute questionnaires, I noticed that a great number of houses 
in Rudolstadt had stickers on their front doors outlining and commenting briey 
on East Germans’ collective experience of the country’s economic Wende. e 
stickers were meant to keep traders and sales representatives at bay. e texts dif-
fered, but one of the most common was: “We are insured for everything. We do 
not want to be converted to join a sect, we already have a vacuum cleaner. We also 
possess an encyclopedia. We do not want to change our newspaper or our weekly. 
Please do not disturb us! anks!”
e stickers were a reaction to one of East Germans’ rst experiences of the 
down side of the capitalist economy. Immediately aer the country was opened 
up, it was overrun with West German traders and representatives, and the stick-
ers summarized succinctly a number of collective experiences which had enraged 
those in the former GDR. Everywhere people had come banging on doors, try-
ing to sell goods and services, thereby taking blatant advantage of East German 
naivety regarding the workings of the market economy. Playing to the feelings 
of desire and insecurity about the future, they sold expensive insurance deals for 
things people did not have to insure, or even could not insure against. People were 
persuaded to book trips to areas which on closer investigation appeared not to ex-
ist, or they had to pay absurdly high prices for products of poor quality.
In the early days aer the Wende, the former GDR was a goldmine for specu-
lators. Because land and real estate had been almost worthless in the former so-
cialist economy, West German speculators anticipated an opportunity. Even be-
fore the Währungsunion [nancial unity], West German estate agents headed o 
en masse to the GDR, searching for the best pieces of land and objects that looked 
interesting. “Wie im Goldrausch, seien sie allen durch die DDR gestiefelt [they all 
charged round the GDR, as if they had gold fever],” explained an assistant at one 
of the construction companies that were quick to seize their chance to earn “eine 
schnelle Mark [a quick mark].”28 e transformation of value that came with the 
introduction of the capitalist market economy was so unimaginable for nearly all 
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East Germans that they were an easy prey to the slick young men of capitalism. In 
Rudolstadt numerous stories circulated about people who had closed seemingly lu-
crative deals during the Wende, which later proved to be cases of downright fraud.
Alongside the feeling that unfamiliarity with the rules of the capitalist economy 
was being abused, the economic changes that had occurred in East German society 
since 1989 also enraged everyone because of the way the East German economy 
was privatized. Since the Wende, there was scarcely anything le of East German 
industry. Although everyone could see how outdated and herunter gewirtschaet 
[economically hollowed out] most of the East German production companies 
were, the general expectation had nonetheless been that many of them would be 
restored once West German production companies would set themselves up in 
the former GDR. at did not happen. East German companies were too poorly 
maintained, and their productions methods were far below international stan-
dards (especially in ecological aspects). And because wages and other production 
costs in neighboring countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic were much 
lower than in Germany, the West German companies that were considering set-
ting up additional branches mostly preferred other countries to the former GDR. 
us, the Treuhand was forced to sell o very cheaply a large number of companies 
and factories that had been relatively productive before.
is was also the fate of the huge chemical concern in Rudolstadt, which until 
1989 had employed 7000 people. In 1993, the company was sold to two Iranians 
for the symbolic amount of one DM. e new owners, having received a vast sum 
of money from the state of uringia intended for the renovation and conser-
vation of the factory, dismissed 6300 of the employees. Shortly aerwards they 
disappeared – taking with them the renovation subsidies. Since then, uringia 
has tried many dierent ways to keep the factory going, but in 1994, the remain-
ing 700 employees were uncertain about their jobs. Just like the majority of East 
German production companies, the factory had belonged to the international top 
in East and Central Europe at the time of the GDR. Many of Rudolstadt’s resi-
dents simply did not understand why the company and its products were suddenly 
dumped without a trace aer the Wende. Many suspected that the downfall of East 
German industry was a case of evil intent; West German producers were said to 
have much to gain by destroying all the competition. For them, the GDR would 
only be worthwhile as a distribution market, and they would have tried to prevent 
anything really ourishing here.29
e former employees of the chemical factory formed a substantial part of 
Rudolstadt’s unemployed. In 1994, the percentage of jobless ocially uctuated 
around 20 percent, but the statistics only included those people who were entitled 
200 Material Fantasies
to unemployment benet. Many women whose husbands worked, 55-plussers who 
came under a dierent entitlement category, and the great numbers of people who 
thanks to Arbeitsbeschaungsmaßnahmen [job creation measures] were helped in 
nding temporary work were not included in these gures, which brought the 
actual percentage of unemployed to nearly double that amount.30 is means that 
at least 35-40 percent of Rudolstadt’s residents who wanted and were able to work 
were unemployed. is was undeniably one of the signicant reasons why the 
GDR’s economic transformation enraged so many people.
A large portion of the unemployed (both in Rudolstadt as well as in the rest of 
the country) consisted of women, who were accustomed to working and to derive – 
unlike in the old FRG – a signicant part of their identity from their work. Most of 
them suered considerably from the feeling that they were no longer needed and did 
not belong anywhere. “We have no experience with this,” the head of Rudolstadt’s 
Wohnungsamt explained. Whereas in the old days, people’s existence was mainly 
structured around work, now that this had ended, many felt that everything simply 
ceased to exist. All that was le was the emptiness and the feeling “ich werde nicht 
mehr gebraucht [I am useless, nobody needs me].” Precisely because unemployment 
had not existed in the GDR, East Germans did not know how to cope with this phe-
nomenon. e many unemployed women had no idea at all of how they could adapt 
to life without having a job, nor had they seen any role models. I met many women 
who spent their days drearily on the couch, waiting till their husbands came home in 
the evening and not knowing what to do with the rest of their lives.
Besides the bitter consequences of the economic privatization and the frequent 
fraud of which they been made victims, there was a third reason why many East 
Germans were dissatised with the economic unication of the GDR with the 
FRG. is was because East Germans who did have a job earned only 70 percent 
of those in an equivalent job in the west. As rents and the costs of living were by 
this time at a similar level as in the former FRG, this meant that working residents 
of the GDR had much less to spend than those in the old federal republic.
ese reasons illustrate why many East Germans criticized the economic 
transformation of their country. Apart from that, dissatisfaction and disappoint-
ment was also related to the fact that aer 1989, the whole GDR’s economic struc-
ture had to be converted, reorganized, renovated, privatized, and reimbursed in a 
terric hurry. is caused a rapid increase in the social dierentiation of society.
Increased Social Differentiation
By the year 1994 it was evident throughout Rudolstadt that not everyone had bene-
ted equally from the country’s transformation. Especially in the town center, huge 
Figure 8.3 – Rudolstadt, 1994, the city as seen from the Heidecksburg (castle on Rudolstadt’s hill)
Source: Picture by the author.
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dierences were visible between the buildings and streets that had been renovated, 
and those that had not. Whereas some shops were identical to the shiny, garishly 
colored shopping paradises that overshadow the shopping streets in the west, oth-
ers had not changed visibly in forty years. If you looked down from the castle that 
towers above Rudolstadt to the town below, you see a similar picture unfolding. 
Buildings that had obviously not been touched for forty years stood next to those 
that had recently been given a complete make-over. Similar contrasts between old 
and new, neglected and renovated were visible everywhere: at parking places and 
on motorways, where next to the shiny, brightly colored Mercedes and four-wheel 
drives, a great many old Trabants were still chugging along. Comparable dier-
ences could be seen in the interiors of houses and public areas. In chapter seven, 
I described the visible dierences between the decoration and interior design of 
the houses that had undergone an entirely new refurbishment and those which 
showed no sign of having being changed in the past forty years. Whenever I visited 
people at their place of work, the same picture was evident; there was oen a great 
contrast between the rooms where the managers worked and those that could be 
accessed by everyone or where subordinates worked. e dierences in outward 
appearance were so obvious that people going to work everyday became aware of 
Figure 8.4a and b – Rudolstadt, 1994, houses
Source: Pictures by the author.
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a divided society, one half of which scarcely seemed to matter, while the other half 
appeared to be fully in control.
While the nouveaux riches ostentatiously honked the horns of their ashy cars 
as they drove round Rudolstadt’s market square and had new kitchens measured, 
sometimes costing over 100,000 DM, the less fortunate went on shopping trips to 
Poland. A travel agency in Rudolstadt organized these one-day trips to the town 
of Görlitz, just over the border, where the day-trippers could take advantage of 
Figure 8.5 – Saalfeld (neighboring city, 6 miles away from Rudolstadt), 1994
Source: Picture by the author.
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the cheap lace blouses, plush animals, “crystal” glasses, bright owery “porcelain” 
dinner services, “real leather” jackets for 10 DM, and jeans recommended as “real 
Live’s Strauss [sic]: there is nothing more American.”
One time I went along. Aer the woman I sat next to in the bus had walked 
round the market all day, she opped down, exhausted from shopping. She could 
not stop talking about how successful her day had been. At least four times she 
told me about the crystal glasses at 8 DM a piece, for which she would have to pay 
at least 30 DM in Rudolstadt. She had bought as many as she could carry and had 
already signed up for the next day-trip. She wanted to have more of that glassware 
and was going to buy some as presents for all her relatives. In the old days, the 
luxury of crystal glasses was unattainable for ideological reasons; nowadays, such 
glasses were for sale on every street corner. But whereas her neighbors were able 
to buy them in Germany, she had to travel abroad to get them. For only there, at 
a Polish market, was she able to indulge in a shopping spree and feel completely 
happy.
e increased social dierentiation of society was a signicant cause of East 
Germans’ frustration. e pain it inicted was aggravated by two factors; the 
growing dierences had wide-ranging eects on the social contacts between peo-
ple, and secondly because East Germans were made to understand in all sorts 
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of ways that they should accept these developments – as that is what it takes to 
be successful in the free capitalist market. Ideologically, the growing dierences 
seemed to be entirely accepted. Both factors deepened the pain caused by the so-
cial dierentiation as such.
e escalating social rivalry had chilled and hardened the general atmosphere 
in society. Due to the greater dierences, it oen happened that people who used 
to be good friends suddenly aer the Wende did not see enough in each other to 
warrant keeping in touch. It occurred just as oen that people who beforehand 
associated with each other in a normal and sometimes even genuinely friendly 
manner did not want to know one another aer the Wende because they suddenly 
felt superior.
And so, in numerous dierent ways, East Germans learned by bitter experience 
how important it was in a capitalist society to convince others of your own merits. 
You had to always keep up as good an appearance as possible to prove your ca-
pacities to others. is was what Claudia – the secondary school pupil referred to 
before – explained bitterly once when we were talking about West Germans: “Die? 
Die können spielen glücklich zu sein [em? ey can act like they are happy!],” 
she sighed, and she explained what she meant by that:
Every time West German musicians come to play for my parents’ orches-
tra (her parents were professional musicians, mv), they manage to pres-
ent themselves so well that the entire orchestra is impressed beforehand 
already. ‘Wow! is is going to be something special.’ When they subse-
quently start playing, it is not until much later that my parents and their 
colleagues realize that those West German musicians actually play only as 
well as they themselves and are not impressively better at all.
As East Germans were generally unfamiliar with the principle of showing o, they 
themselves were oen the victim of people who were better at these tricks. e 
East German owner of a Bureau für Imageberatung [image consultancy], estab-
lished in Berlin in 1994, told a Dutch journalist that East Germans were not good 
at seeing through simple (outward) trickery. According to him, this was because it 
had been especially important at the time of the GDR for people to adapt and gear 
themselves to the collective to which they belonged.31 Consequently, he explained, 
East Germans had in fact continually been taught how not to stick their neck out. 
ey still struggled with this, he explained, for in the old days it was ideologically 
reprehensible to stand out too much from others. People were therefore basically 
ashamed to do so now. And because East Germans were not accustomed to pierc-
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ing through the fancy words and polished exteriors, they had become an easy prey 
for all kinds of deception since the Wende.32
Apart from that, many people also struggled with the growing dierentiation of 
society because they had dierent ways of fullling the freedom to shape their own 
lives as they saw t. e previously mentioned Diakonie workers described how 
many friendships had suered under the increasing possibilities: suddenly one did 
this, the other did something very dierent, and consequently it was obvious that 
people had less in common and were less like each other than they had previously 
thought. One of the women remarked dismally: “Diese sogenannte Freiheit hat 
viele Ketten gesprongen [this so-called freedom has broken many ties].” And the 
head of the Wohnungsamt [housing department] explained that even people who 
had previously complained about the high degree of uniformity dominating life in 
the GDR now saw that this very aspect of East German existence had something 
nice and egalitarian about it. As everyone’s lives had been organized in the same 
way, people felt and expressed themselves as more equal than was the case nowa-
days:
We all lived in the same block of ats, which we le in the morning to 
go to work, where it was known what would happen in the course of the 
day. e child went to the nursery, later to the Krippe [crib] and later on 
to school. In each case he was taken care of ten hours a day and when you 
came home in the evening you also knew he had watched Notruf [TV 
program] and then could go to bed. At work everyone got a hot meal. 
at cost seventy pfennig a week. e food was inedible, and everyone 
complained, but the doctor ate the same horrible food in the canteen for 
the same amount as everyone else, and then, because it was so horrible, 
he like everyone else went to the kiosk on the other side of the street to 
get a piece of Kuchen. Had he wanted a tomato salad, that was impossible, 
just like it was impossible for all of us. Even if he had paid shall we say 
y Ostmark, he still, just like everyone else, would not have got a tomato 
salad. Today, however, this same doctor can have his assistant bring him a 
dierent salad every day if he fancies it. And it is totally unthinkable that 
he would eat it together with her. What is more: he will keep her at a great 
distance. He employs her, but the dierence in salary between the two has 
become so large; and regarding these dierences, he has even fooled her 
that he has got himself seriously into debt in order to set up the practice, 
so that although he had to take her on, he can only oer her a low salary. 
So he does not want her to know that these days he has a real carpet in his 
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living room and not the same carpet from the Konsum [shop] we all had 
before. In the past we all bought the same stu because there was noth-
ing else. is made it more equal. e wages were dierent, but much less 
dierent than now. And because there was nothing, everyone was able to 
buy the same with his money. It is true there was not much, but what there 
was, was for everyone.
From this lengthy anecdote it is clear that in the old days dierences did exist, but 
because they came less to the fore, there was less reason for jealousy than is the 
case nowadays. In this way people could deceive themselves and others that such 
feelings had not or hardly ever existed in the GDR. Whereas now? In the words of 
one of the Diakonie workers, “jealousy seeps through society like corrosive acid.”
is is a meaningful statement, which in the rst place claries that more 
than just political freedom was repressed in the GDR. Under the motto of mutual 
equality, socio-economic dierences were ideologically toned down and covered 
up. Moreover, in a practical sense they were indeed not so apparent because the 
lack of consumer goods ensured that what little there was had been shared rela-
tively honestly, leaving people collectively longing for the west. Second, the state-
ment is also meaningful because it reveals that the pain caused by increasing dif-
ferentiation was very much linked to the fact that nowadays this was ideologically 
legitimized instead of condemned.33 Under the motto that everyone is responsible 
for their own existence and that dierences are just part of life, in present-day soci-
ety no-one needs to be ashamed of driving around in an expensive car and feeling 
too good to drink a beer with their unemployed neighbor. According to the same 
ideology, no-one but yourself was responsible if you decided to insure yourself for 
worthless things, book a holiday to a place that didn’t exist, or got persuaded to 
buy a basic vacuum cleaner for nearly 1000 DM.
Former East German author Monica Maron (who le the GDR long before 
the Wende) provides a striking analysis of the pain caused by increasing social 
economic dierentiation in the former socialist society. In her view, the disap-
pearance of socialism in the GDR primarily meant that the ideological constraint 
on mutual inequality had disappeared, which in the old days had to a certain ex-
tent supported “the losers” by giving them at least some ideological credit. Maron 
states bitterly that aer the Wende:
[East Germans primarily] miss their familiar equality. When they all had 
less rather than more, or in any case had the same, they apparently also 
felt equal. One of the most frequently posed questions in this country was: 
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you surely think you are better? But no-one was better…In matters of taste 
and culture, the assertion that we were living in the dictatorship of the 
proletariat was certainly not a lie. And then suddenly this was over, just 
like that; that is what hurts the most.34
I agree with Maron. e main reason why the increasing dierentiation was so 
hard to bear was because the growing opportunities and freedom of movement 
had made visible and expressible what formerly had remained hidden – under an 
ideological taboo, under shortages in material consumption, and under the associ-
ated collective (and therefore mutually binding) desires for a prosperous world.
A New Existence and Second-Class Citizens
Besides the complaints discussed above, many East Germans were very frustrated 
because they felt like second-class citizens in their own country. is feeling was 
presumably to a large extent the result of the arrogant way they were treated by 
West Germans.
Since the Wende, all of East German life has changed. Not only the political, 
economic, and judicial structure of society has changed, but also its material, in-
frastructural characteristics. A psychologist working at the Diakonie in Rudolstadt 
recalled that during the Wende, she realized at an early stage how all-embracing 
the transformation awaiting her and her compatriots would be. Because she feared 
she would lose her grip on life, she forced herself to investigate what exactly would 
change and what the legal consequences would be, at least in a small area relating 
to her work with young people. When talking about it ve years later, she remem-
bered well how much time and eort this had cost her during that period:
I was determined to avoid feeling overwhelmed by the developments. I 
wanted to understand what was going to happen, and how the new society 
that was about to appear would function. I wanted to understand what I 
was up against. I spent many nights engrossed in employment law and 
juvenile law, but I am probably the only person who did this so intensively 
then. Most people let themselves be entirely overpowered by what was 
happening.
Many people explained that their dissatisfaction with the Wende was indeed not 
only linked to the terric speed with which the changes had taken place, but also 
to the fact that the entire East German existence was reshaped in a tested West 
German model. Nothing that had existed in the GDR appeared to be worth keep-
ing. To illustrate this point, people referred to the long-winded discussions that 
208 Material Fantasies
had raged in 1993 and 1994 over the question of whether one of the former East 
German trac signs, the so-called grüne Pfeil [green arrow], could be retained in 
the east of Germany and possibly even adopted throughout Germany. Most people 
felt that the lengthy political commotion was out of proportion to the speed with 
which all of the former GDR had been rigorously crushed. e fast and painstak-
ing way their existence had been shoved to one side gave people the feeling that 
they themselves were considered worthless.
One area where this feeling was actually conrmed was in the way job vacan-
cies arising in the former GDR were lled aer reunication. From the moment 
the socialist society ceased to exist, a large number of jobs had to be reallocated, 
for example in areas such as justice and law and order. In addition, everyone in the 
civil service was checked for Stasi involvement, and most people whose involve-
ment was proven were dismissed. Together with the large number of jobs created 
by the introduction of the market economy, a large number of positions became 
vacant. During the reallocation process, East Germans oen noticed that people 
from the old FRG were systematically given preference over East Germans. is 
was partly inevitable, such as with former East German public prosecutors, judges, 
and the majority of the police force. But the fact that the new directors of the mu-
seum and theatre in Rudolstadt were also from the west met with less approval. 
e same applied to the many West German civil servants added to Rudolstadt’s 
administration. In general, the predominant feeling was that East Germany was 
being governed by West Germans who were not good enough to achieve their 
ambitions in their own country, but seized the opportunity in “the east.” In ad-
dition, East Germans were paid only 70 percent of the salary of an equivalent 
job in the west, whereas for their activities in the east, West Germans received 
an extra supplement, commonly described in scathing tones as Busch- [bush] or 
Dschungelzulage [jungle supplement].35
A further development which contributed to making East Germans feel like 
second-class citizens in their own country concerned one of the most controversial 
conditions of the German unication treaty: the right to property reimbursement. 
According to this clause, all real estate illegally appropriated by the East German 
state aer 1949 had to be given back to the original owners.36 is measure caused 
a massive transfer of property in the eastern part of Germany, and everywhere East 
German residents’ houses and land were handed over to people who for decades 
had considered themselves West Germans. In some communities, 80 percent of 
the houses and land were reclaimed.37 When I lived in Rudolstadt, the closing 
date for applications to claim reimbursement of property had expired. A total of 
3500 applications were submitted, of which 32 percent had been settled by the 
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middle of 1994. According to the head of Rudolstadt’s branch of the Amt für oene 
Vermögensfragen [oce that dealt with reimbursement claims], three-quarters of 
the requests were settled. A salient detail, however, is that the 3500 claims related 
to 10,000 real estate items. e average reimbursement claim was for three build-
ings. is means that those who had le the GDR at the time were generally the 
ones who already owned a great deal. And it was precisely those people who ben-
etted from this measure.
Many East Germans experienced the manner in which the right to property 
reimbursement was claimed as a painful and concrete example of West Germany 
taking over the GDR nancially and materially. It was by and large West Germans 
who benetted the most while East Germans lost out, and this general feeling was 
roughly expressed in an article in Neues Deutschland (the former East German 
party newspaper): “Alle Eigentümer sind gleich, die westdeutschen gleicher38 [all 
owners are equal, but the West Germans are more equal].”
By 1994 not much was le of the happiness and mutual reconcilement which 
had prevailed between East and West Germans during the Wende. “e Wall is 
gone, but the wall in our heads has become even bigger,” was one of the comments 
typifying the mutual relations. Germany was in danger of becoming a country of 
Ossis and Wessis. East Germans thought that West Germans acted as if they had 
the world in their pockets. According to East Germans, this arrogant attitude was 
primarily prompted by West Germans’ perspective on the world, which was sup-
posedly based on money and status. Because East Germans generally had little 
of either, West Germans did not acknowledge them. It frequently happened that 
West Germans reminded East Germans that they did not amount to much, were 
unworldly, were behind the times, and still had a great deal to learn. Also for this 
reason, most West Germans (once again: in the eyes of East Germans), in retro-
spect, regretted the unication of the two Germanys.
It was true that the German media regularly published articles implying that 
West Germans would actually have preferred to let the Wall stand. is was usu-
ally motivated by the exorbitant costs involved in restoring and modernizing the 
GDR. Because so much money was spent on bringing the former GDR to a com-
parable level as the western part of the country, West Germans frequently reacted 
disgruntled at the increased prosperity in the former GDR. A middle-aged woman 
told me, for instance, that when she and her husband had been on holiday to Spain 
with her sister from the west, and the rest of the group in the coach heard that 
they were from the GDR, they were showered with questions: “Wie könnt ihr das 
denn leisten [how can you aord this]?” Even when she tried to put a stop to the 
questions by saying – wrongly – that her sister had paid for the trip, again new 
210 Material Fantasies
discussions began: “You did not contribute anything to our pension pot, yet now 
you are getting our good money!” At one point the East German woman asked one 
of the West German women if she herself had worked. It turned out the woman 
was receiving a pension because her husband had worked. Even aer all this time, 
it could still infuriate my East German interlocutor: “Time and time again we 
still have to belittle ourselves and show gratitude because we too have that lovely 
money! As if we have not worked the past y years!”
e sluggish relations between West and East Germans were the topic of many 
jokes published in the local newspapers and in joke books. Here is one about West 
Germans’ changed attitude towards German unication:
An Ossi and a Wessi meet each other.
e Ossi says to the Wessi: “We are one nation!”
e Wessi replies: “So are we!”39
West Germans’ anger regarding the high costs of the unication and the suppos-
edly fast enrichment of East Germany were the theme of many cartoons, as were 
the unworldly traits East Germans thought West Germans assigned to them.
As gure 8.6 suggests, many East Germans experienced West Germans as 
neo-colonialists, who not only thought that their money could buy the whole 
of the GDR including its inhabitants, but also that they could do anything they 
liked. Some thought the way West Germans acted in the former GDR was like 
“Herrenmenschen in einer Kolonie [lords in a colony],”40 which made many East 
Germans feel like “Heimatvertriebene [displaced persons in their own country].”41 
at even children were aware of the feelings of humiliation so strongly present 
in the former GDR was apparent from the following excerpt from an essay that 
a 14-year-old boy wrote entitled, “Deutschland. Ein Land von Ossis und Wessis? 
[Germany. A country of Ossis and Wessis?]:”
Ich nde es schlimm so die Ossis hinzustellen als wären sie dumm, sie 
wüsten nichts, haben noch nie was von Hi und Video gehört. Es stimmt 
ja das wir noch einiges dazu lernen müßten, aber so dumm waren wir 
nun wirklich nicht.[I think it is bad that East Germans are looked upon as 
being stupid, or do not know anything, and have never heard of hi- and 
stereo. It is true, we still had to learn some things, but we were not really 
that stupid.]
Against this background, the initial onset and increasing emergence of Ostalgie 
[combination of nostalgia and Ost, East] should primarily be seen as a form of 
protest against the complete devaluation of East German life histories.42
Figure 8.6 – Cartoon on German unication. e man pointing at the chair says: ‘is chair 
here, this desk here, understand?’ His colleagues at the front of the picture comment:  “col-
league Müller could have been a little more sympathetic towards the East German employees 
during their job induction”
Source: Jörg von Morgen, Markus und die Besserwessis. Hamburg: Stern Verlag, 1992.
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Although it was evidently painful for many East Germans to have to experi-
ence, from one day to the next, their whole lives and past being shoved to one side 
as if entirely useless, you cannot help but wonder: was that not precisely what the 
greater majority had passionately wanted themselves – at least initially? Aer all, 
was it not the East German population in the autumn of 1989 who desperately 
wanted to dissolve their country and join the FRG? e landslide victory of the 
CDU, the party most outspokenly aiming at fast unication at the rst election 
in March 1990 was explicitly linked to the party’s promise that there would be 
no transformation whatsoever of socialism or the GDR. e majority of the East 
German population wanted then – as the museum director wrote in his diary at 
the time – to “bury the past as quickly as possible.” However painful the devalua-
tion of their history might be, one aspect of East Germans’ complaints is notice-
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ably absent: their own initial condemnation of East Germany before 1989. I there-
fore think that the West German disapproving glances also exposed something 
that many East Germans themselves simply did not want to see.
The Idealized West Glances Back
In discussions on inter-German relations since 1989, one important element was 
not touched upon: the fact that East Germans had strongly idealized the world 
on the other side of the Wall, in order to be able to subsequently identify with the 
positive image this had created. Beforehand, the west had been seen by many East 
Germans as the imaginary space where they assumed there was the ultimately 
perfect society. In West Germans they thought they recognized themselves in bet-
ter material circumstances. It must have been extremely painful to have to wit-
ness aer the Wende that this recognition was certainly not mutual. While East 
Germans fundamentally recognized themselves in their West German neighbors, 
those glances were ruthlessly averted by West Germans: “Us? Like you? ank 
goodness no! You, like us? Why then? Based on what?”
rough the increasing contact between West and East Germans increased 
aer 1989, it soon became apparent that the perfect West German existence 
was rather more the product of East Germans’ projected imagination than East 
Germans would have wanted to admit beforehand. is in its turn threatened to 
reveal what the previously idealized projection had in fact always been: a means of 
cleaning out less pleasant characteristics and experiences from their own collec-
tive self-representation. In my opinion, the supposed West German post-Wende 
contempt was so painful for East Germans because in the deprecating glances, 
they had to recognize what they had chosen not to see in their own representation 
of self.
In her book Versuch, mir und anderen die ostdeutsche Moral zu erklären, East 
German author Annette Simon remarks that West Germans’ outlook on the his-
tory of the GDR has helped her to see more clearly a number of less pleasant 
aspects of her own life history. She recalls that although up until then she had al-
ways regarded herself as critical and dissident, it was only aerwards and through 
West Germans’ perspective on her history that she came to recognize the extent to 
which her previous perspective (on life, the GDR, and its history) was inuenced 
by “den ‘Herrschenden’…diesen Staat [this state’s rulers]:” “I think it is important 
[to recognize] that our loyalty to the GDR, which was virtually drummed into 
us…that this loyalty had irrational, almost mystical dimensions. In one way or 
another, the think-patterns imposed on us were deeply embedded in our uncon-
sciousness.”43
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e fact that West Germans’ stares revealed what she herself had not noticed 
before makes her feel ashamed, Simon writes, and she suggests this is why so many 
East Germans so vehemently opposed the scornful West German bearing on their 
society and history: “Wenn man sich schämt, schlägt man lieber die Hände vors 
Gesicht als sich vor einen Spiegel zu setzen oder sich gar im Auge eines Westlers 
zu spiegeln [when people are ashamed, they prefer to hide their faces in their 
hands, instead of looking in the mirror, or mirroring themselves in West Germans’ 
eyes].”44
I think her analysis is right. rough the belittling glances from those with 
whom they enjoyed identifying themselves, East Germans were being shown how 
idealized their own self-portrait had been. Because this would have been a painful 
confrontation, most East Germans chose to avoid the critical, judgmental glances 
from the West German other aer the Wende. ey kept them at a distance by 
using well-known forms of capitalism critique: “In the west, everything revolves 
around money,” thus assuring themselves of general recognition and approval. 
Since almost everyone can to some extent agree with these words, they resemble 
the ocial East German state’s label of anti-fascism – for almost no-one would 
dare to defend the contrary.
In East Germans’ representation of their society’s post-1989 Werdegang, it was 
capitalism, the Wessi and his accursed attributes (money and consumerism) that 
were responsible for their once so solid society being suddenly devoured by envy 
and mutual rivalry. Literally translated, the words oen uttered were: “Since the 
Wessis and the DM arrived, our whole society has changed” – as if these were just 
powers of nature rather than developments and tendencies involving their own life 
and fellow countrymen.45 Recognizing that it was rst and foremost East Germans 
who were jealous and competing with each other would have devastated the rep-
resentation of their own society as a unit of warmth and solidarity.
In my opinion, the initial emergence of Ostalgie should be seen in this light: as 
a counterbalance to the threatening realization that it was an East German who 
no longer wanted to have a beer with his neighbor because since becoming redun-
dant, he was a loser. Ostalgie functioned according to a similar mechanism as the 
East Germans’ previous desire for the west. Both collective representations helped 
East Germans to close ranks against the imaginary enemy, which prevented them 
from being who they really wanted to be. Before, East Germans basked in the 
harmonious image of the West German as the one they in fact would have been if 
only history had drawn the line dierently. ose collective fantasies helped them 
to hide the unpleasant aspects of their own society from view. In that representa-
tion, there was always an implicit enemy (the Wall, history, “them up there”) that 
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prevented them from achieving true harmony. With the help of this fantasy, East 
Germans attempted to convince themselves that they would only be inclined to-
wards great mutual solidarity. e fact that this failed was blamed on alienating 
circumstances.
en came the Wende. Finally, East Germans expected to become just like their 
idealized image of the west. at did not happen, and the harsh light of the emerg-
ing capitalist society revealed that East Germans were also united by collectively 
disguising experiences of competitiveness and crab antics. In my opinion, the pain 
that unication caused in former East German society is for a large part due to 
the fact that it robbed East Germans of a collective fantasy – thus revealing what 
was hidden within its harmonious representation. “It is this traumatic moment of 
the political qua encounter with the real that initiates again and again a process of 
symbolization…[leading] to the emergence...of a new social fantasy...in the place 
of the dislocated one, and so on and so forth.”46
No longer able to escape in the fantasy that they were actually just the same as 
the idealized other on the other side of the Wall, East Germans initially took refuge 
in a new fantasy, that of Ostalgie (and I paraphrase): “In the past we led a warm, 
comfortable life, but since 1989, not much of it is le because of that accursed capi-
talism.” In this way, East Germans were trying to hold onto the main thing which 
the Wende threatened to destroy in their country: the escape route to fantasy.
 215
Conclusion
Initially started as a project on consumption, it is no coincidence that this book 
came to revolve around the role of fantasy in social life. Given the close relation-
ship between consumption and identity, and corresponding to recent anthropo-
logical analyses of ‘identity’ as impossibility, I claim that consumption is one of the 
ways in which people try to substantiate their identity fantasies.
Fantasy
My use of the term fantasy is inspired by a number of recent works in which phi-
losophers and social scientists show the benets of applying the main tenets of 
Jacques Lacan’s legacy to social scientic and historical theorizing.1 e most fre-
quently raised objection with regard to the use of psychoanalytic theory in social 
sciences concerns using concepts and ideas that were developed for studying in-
dividual subjects and apply them to the social eld. One way to circumvent this 
problem is by studying the social as the sum total of many individuals – assuming 
that, because the members of a certain community or society have shared the same 
experiences, their emotional reactions are also comparable. is line of reasoning 
not just runs the risk of wrongfully generalizing individual experiences and reac-
tions, but fails to take into account the social aspect, in as much as this refers to 
the relationships between people. Inspired by the work of political scientist Yannis 
Stavrakakis on the political signicance of Lacan, I have followed a dierent tra-
jectory. My starting-point is the parallelism between Lacanian thinking on “the 
impossibility of identity” on the one hand, and recent anthropological insights on 
the intrinsic fallibility of the constructions anthropologists study as culture on the 
other.2
According to Stavrakakis, there is no reason to maintain a strict dividing line 
between the individual psychological level – the traditional realm of psychology 
and psychiatry – and the collective level, to which social scientists and historians 
usually restrict themselves. In Stavrakakis’s opinion (which is deeply inspired by 
Lacan’s body of thought) the boundary between both is ctive. From the very mo-
ment an individual is introduced to the world of agreements and rules we term 
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culture (described by Lacanians as the symbolic order), he feels amputated, or, as 
Stavrakakis put it, a “lacking subject.”3 Where culture requires classication, des-
ignation and valuation of experiences (this behaviour is male, that is female, this 
behaviour is correct, that is not), introduction to culture means to be subjected to 
arrangements and rules. is means that experiences that formerly simply existed, 
are suddenly being classied as unsuitable (not only as strange, unknown, but also 
as reprehensible in a moral sense). Giving them up is experienced as a loss; where 
there was unity, there is now delimitation, denition, and selection. People try to 
overcome that loss, searching for the experience of completeness which character-
ised their lives before they took part in and subjected themselves to social interac-
tion. However, that search is in vain. Not just because it attempts to nd what is 
forbidden, but also because undierentiated being is at odds with the social neces-
sity to be recognised as an individual. Man is an “inchoate collection of desires,” 
and it is only thanks to society’s rules and agreements that a certain degree of con-
sistency can be found and experienced.4 “I” as a more or less distinct, recognisable 
unit therefore exist only by the grace of sacrice, lack and loss.
By seeking fullment (that is to say: an existence where the chaos of human en-
deavour coincides with the collectively shared agreements and rules), people come 
to identify with matters that seem to represent fullment. In personal life, these 
can be for instance the promise of true love, and/or a role or task that promises 
fulllment – such as a career or motherhood. Although experienced individually, 
such promises are socially constructed and therefore shared and collective. More 
easily recognisable as being socially dened, are the promises and perspectives 
that gure in the public domain, the most obvious of which are those of a religious 
or ideological nature. In addition, social groups can also seem to oer complete 
fulllment – think for example of football clubs or student bodies, thus causing the 
self-image of the group’s members to correspond (for a certain period) to that of 
the group to which they belong.
Because all the identications people undertake by denition occur within 
“socially available discursive constructions such as ideologies,” the succession of 
“failed identications or rather [the] play between identication and its failure,” 
which people undertake in order to full themselves is a “deeply political play.” 
at play, however, is not without liability. Not only are the stakes high, but it is 
also doomed to fail. “A lack is continuously re-emerging where identity should be 
consolidated. All our attempts to cover over this lack…through identications, 
that promise to oer us a stable identity, fail.”5 No permanent match is possible 
between the interpretative frameworks that enable people to organize their experi-
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ences and give meaning to their lives on the one hand, and their everyday experi-
ences, sensations and perceptions on the other.
Although this brief extract from basic Lacanian theory primarily relates to the 
individual domain, it underlines that the agreements we use to dene as culture 
should not only be recognized as facilitating (mutual bonds, recognition, meaning 
making and communication), but also as restrictive. In my opinion, this approach 
oers a useful startingpoint for present day anthropology. 
During the past decades, anthropologists have time and again stressed that the 
living environments, cultural categories, values, ideologies and classes which an-
thropologists study are not the result of laws of nature, geographical adjustments 
or an historical unilinear revolution. ey are manmade constructions, which 
could have turned out very dierently.
People need to categorize, classify and draw boundaries in order to discrimi-
nate – for instance between just and unjust, dirt and cleanliness, us and them. At 
the same time, everyday life continually confronts them with the inadequacy of 
this undertaking. How, for instance, do you dene ‘us’ in multi-ethnic societies? 
How to account for female leaders when competitiveness is classied as a male 
characteristic? How to maintain that solidarity is one of our main characteristics, 
when the fear to be denunciated by one’s neighbours is omnipresent? e intrin-
sic fallibility of the agreements people live by, is particularly threatening when 
a society is confronted with episodes or events that are impossible to compre-
hend within the existing interpretative framework. When, for instance, a society 
is struck by unexpected outbursts of inter-ethnic violence, the story of “us” (being 
a society, a nation, living peacefully together) loses its credibility. In such circum-
stances, when the symbolic order is unable to meaningfully assimilate people’s 
experiences, it threatens to be revealed for what it is: not self-evident, seamless 
and smooth as glass, but man-made, messy and typically full of gaps and cracks.
Except for the eeting moments of ecstase and jouissance, an everlasting match 
between the interpretative frameworks that enable people to organize and give 
meaning to their lives on the one hand, and their everyday experiences, sensations 
and perceptions on the other is impossible. Any seemingly self-evident, seamless 
and smooth coherence is the ctive (and temporary) result of a political-ideo-
logical struggle about who and what we are. According to Lacanian theory, both 
thinking of and striving for such unity demonstrates the essentialist fantasy we 
are collectively inclined to fall prey to. Descriptions like identity X or society Y 
disguise the fact that they are merely attempts to experience a degree of unity and 
structure which does not and cannot exist enduringly. e “thing” that continu-
ously destroys these endeavors is referred to by Lacanians as the Real. By applying 
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this term, they refer to the universal impossibility (both at the individual as well as 
at the collective level) to constitute a discursive identity which fully captures and 
matches reality.
More than twenty years ago, Michael Taussig already remarked that it was high 
time to change the anthropological spotlight: instead of constantly focusing on 
the constructed character of this or that category, anthropologists should start 
questioning how it is that people nevertheless manage to convince themselves that 
their constructions are real.6 In my view, Lacanians’ work on the subject, search-
ing for a stable identity, oers a worthwhile starting-point to rethink the dialectics 
between the existential necessity and ultimate fallibility of culture.
Once people are confronted with the make-believe of what they simply used 
to refer to as ‘us,’ or our culture and society, hard work awaits them to restore 
their condence in the symbolic order as a meaningful discursive framework that 
can support social structure and allow for mutual recognition. e history of the 
GDR, with its dramatic succession of totalizing stories and their complete failures, 
perfectly demonstrates the relevance of these general theorems. Or, as the man at 
the Rudolstadt Christmas market snapped, when asked about the country’s recent 
transformation: “We’ve been betrayed for the third time.” ree times betrayed, 
that is three times believed, or at least invested in an ideal, a coherent story, a 
representation of “our” life, future and ultimate goal, and three times confronted 
with its complete breakdown; 1945 was the rst pivotal moment when the simul-
taneous need for, and impossibility of a rm, existential rooting presented itself 
unrelentingly. Daily life painfully illustrated the make-believe that had upheld the 
previous symbolic order. Fear and animosity reigned while hunger destroyed the 
last remnants of society. Everything people used to believe in or had simply taken 
for granted – the unquestioning belief that neighbours do not harm each other, 
that we Germans are of the same kind – all this had gone astray. Losing the war not 
only shied the frontiers of Germany, it primarily shied its inhabitants’ expecta-
tions as to what life may have in store, and their notions about what to expect of their 
fellow human beings. No hold, no certainty was le – an experience well captured by 
German author Christian Geissler, who referred to it as the Void.
e German population’s overall reaction was telling: a general retreat from 
the public realm. Silence reigned and people turned inward, individually trying 
to rebuild the material remnants of their lives. As understandable as these reac-
tions may be, they nevertheless convey an impossible position. e knowledge 
that homo homini lupus est is not the best basis to build a life on – let alone a sense of 
commonality, of togetherness, of us.7 No matter how inconceivable it is that people 
in this situation searched for solace in a new promise of mutual solidarity, that 
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was at the same time absolutely imperative. It is impossible for a society to survive 
while simultaneously admitting that its mutual solidarity has failed. In order to 
function, a society needs some vaguely shared notions of who we are, where we come 
from and what we have in common. Especially in circumstances such as these, a new 
symbolic order has to be created, providing new rules and agreements on how to 
live, what to value and what to despise, in order to obtain some sort of hold or trust 
in the future.
is was the main task facing both German states aer the war: to restore people’s 
condence in the symbolic order as a meaningful discursive framework, able to 
support social structure and allow for mutual recognition. A new symbolic struc-
ture had to be created, which also had to help eliminate the reality which had just 
manifested itself with such devastating force. Albeit embedded in dierent ideolo-
gies, and achieved at a dierent pace, the politics of both German states that tried 
to accomplish this, also show remarkable commonalities.
e role of the West German Wirtschaswunder in countering the material, 
social, moral, and psychological consequences of the war can hardly be overesti-
mated. e American backed consumer society oered the West German popu-
lation “an imaginary cultural space where they could distance themselves,” not 
only, as the quotation continues, “from the Nazi past,” but also from the complete 
breakdown they were confronted with.8 Painful past experiences were silenced 
and people were encouraged to work and focus on material security and well-
being. e new West German state acquired legitimacy and popular support by 
successfully constituting the framework for a new symbolic order, centred round 
material wellbeing and consumption as the means to forget and start anew.
Socialist politics in the GDR were fundamentally dierent, but their promise of 
a new beginning, a new society, new forms of humanity, bere of social frictions, 
mutual mistrust or competition also functioned as state-ordered amnesia. And 
because all this was to be accomplished through a materialist restructuring of soci-
ety, the East German state equally accredited the material domain with renovating 
and amnesiac powers. is combination, of materially establishing social equality 
in order to counter recent experiences of social tension, formed the basis of newly 
built East German society.
Both East and West German societies were thus rebuilt by state-sanctioned 
forms of materialist amnesia. But whereas the disguising role of post-war West 
German materialism was vigorously revealed some twenty years later by the pro-
tests of younger generations – oen referred to as die 68-er Generation [the gener-
ation of 1968], the initial historical selection on which the GDR was founded, was 
not to be called into question. And because silencing the void was from the very 
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beginning the core around which society was constituted, the fear of and taboos 
on those experiences were also constitutive of the social relations that developed 
within it. Consequently, the society that came into being on East German soil was 
not only held together internally by a certain ideology but also by a shared secret, 
that had to remain hidden at all costs.
Originally embraced as a means to draw a line between the dark past and the 
bright future, equality became East Germany’s central trope and the main symbol 
of East German society – not just ocially, but also experientially. And although 
socio-economic equality was certainly achieved to a certain extent, the egalitar-
ian doctrine was of course unable to fully capture social reality. Equality’s role 
as symbol of East German society, initially made possible by selective ltering of 
(post) war experiences, continued to demand the twisting and denial of undesir-
able experiences. Whereas claims of social solidarity and loyalty dominated the 
public sphere, the experiences of homo homini lupus est, which Germans had suf-
fered so bitterly during and aer the war, continued in a very diluted and disguised 
form in East Germans’ everyday lives. e gap between ideological promises and 
everyday reality, which characterized material life in the GDR, also typied the 
social climate.
Both the egalitarian dogma as such and the taboo on publicly exploring its 
feasibility created a surplus – of practices, experiences and feelings that were pro-
hibited. Standing out was not only a sure way of meeting the state’s secret service, 
it was also branded as norm-breaking behaviour in everyday social contact. e 
warmth that characterized East German social life was partly the result of a gen-
erally shared ban on dierentiation. Initially motivated by painful collective ex-
periences, and legitimized by the ocial state-ideology, the taboo on distinction 
functioned as a double-edged sword: solidarity, mutual equality and social safety 
were the positive, and thus presentable reverse of the crab antics which found their 
mildest expression in the frequently posed question “du glaubst wohl, du bist was 
besseres [so you think you are better, huh?].” e egalitarian dogma, that implicitly 
banned social dierentiation, operated deep into the private domain. e warmth 
that characterized East Germans’ existence also covered up potential competition 
and antagonisms.
e socialist dogma of equality was the (state sanctioned) way in which en-
counters with the traumatic reality, that equality preached as solidarity, also 
implied distrust and the Stasi, was hidden from view. e Nische was another 
way. But whatever the cover and however half-heartedly people upheld it, East 
Germans were mutually bound by (sharing the common secret of) a traumatic and 
forbidden reality. In as much as the egalitarian doctrine threatened to be revealed 
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for what it was (an arduous struggle to uphold an articial we-category), East 
Germans had two escape routes at their disposal, in order to avoid the potentially 
painful confrontation with the fact that the ideology they so willingly subscribed 
to, did not fully correspond to their actual experiences. Both escape routes, realis-
tic enough not to be easily exposed as such, boiled down to the material domain of 
life. Scapegoating the state for not delivering the cargo it promised, and fantasizing 
about a life amidst western abundance, allowed East Germans to uphold some sort 
of faith in their collective self-representation as being more or less harmonious.
e reason that precisely the material world acted as cover, was that within 
the ocial state ideology the material was presented as the solution for all (un-
named) problems. State and citizenry found each other in a publicly disseminated 
materialist ideology to combat social inequality. In the GDR there was a “deep-
seated consensus with the material economic values of the system,” according to 
which material improvement would form the basis of future, all-encompassing 
salvation.9 For as long as the GDR existed, its public sphere was dominated by 
exuberant promises about economic success as the basis for social solidarity and 
equality, which were not realised in practice. e schizophrenia between promises 
and reality became more visible every day. e western material world nestled in 
this gap. Many East Germans believed that in the west, reality and ideal were not 
so far apart, and that the inhabitants of West Germany and their ideal selves were 
one and the same. In this fusion, consumer goods played an important role.
In many East Germans’ perception, West German auence seemed to oer the 
ultimate fullment of all that their own existence lacked.10 Although they merely 
seemed to long for the material wellbeing they themselves so visibly missed, I 
contend that their all-encompassing harmonious interpretation of the beautiful-
looking western world was an implicit way to imaginatively erase their own soci-
ety’s non-harmonious characteristics, without having to acknowledge or recognise 
them as such. e main reason to describe this conglomerate of half-conscious 
collective representations as a fantasy is that the term fantasy not just refers to 
longing, but also to the implicit interests people have in doing so. “e collective 
fantasy masks the insights that it contains.”11 Whereas related concepts, like (day)
dreaming or desiring, are usually applied to refer to the perfected version of reality 
that people long for, fantasy is a construction that attempts, rst and foremost, to 
cover up reality’s lack. Taking daydreams to represent an ideal, I use the notion of 
fantasy to express its double-edged character: by representing an ideal, a fantasy 
derives its force from its attempt to hide why the ideal is not reality. By explicitly 
attempting to deny imperfection, the imperfection is implicitly inscribed in the 
idealised representation itself.
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Because fantasies are oen meant to erase, the taboo is implicitly part of the 
idealized representation. And although the advantage of fantasizing is, that the 
imagination only observes the ideal, it is also a defence mechanism, meant to hide 
the unnamed discord from view.
is certainly also accounted for the East German representation of life in the 
prosperous west. Although it appeared to revolve around individual self-realiza-
tion in full social harmony, its power of attraction seemed to be derived from the 
impossibility of this combination within the GDR. ere, individual aspirations 
could only be realized within the strict connes set by the state, and they were 
smothered in the mutually exacted equality under penalty of social exclusion. 
Crab antics were translated as warmth and harmony. Acknowledging this would 
not just have had a devastating eect on the much appraised East German solidar-
ity. Recognizing that their warmth partly depended on the equality-centred, illicit 
cohabitation with the state, would also have robbed East Germans of the scapegoat 
“die da oben [them up there],” to whom they could ascribe all the acknowledged 
failures in their existence.
People thus cherished their fantasies of the west as if these were dreams about 
‘our life’ amid prosperity, whereas they were actually about the combination of 
prosperity-cum-Gemeinscha [with community], which was impossible in their 
country.12 e almost magical representations of the west, captivating so many East 
Germans before the Wende, coincided with the fact that the unnamed problems 
in their own country did not seem to exist there. “If only we could live our lives in 
such splendid material circumstances, everything would be ne” – so the fantasy 
went. Eradicating all unwanted elements and experiences, the fantasy helped to 
preserve the existing discursive framework that allowed for mutual recognition. 
e central importance of western consumer potential was even recognized at the 
ocial state policy level. Ocially, the western world was despised, but some of 
the most loyal state functionaries and party members obtained part of their pay in 
western currencies.13 In this way, the state unwillingly acknowledged a feeling that 
was widespread in the GDR: that East German identity was best expressed in the 
language of western commodities.
East German history shows that culture – whether regarded as a set of implicit 
rules and agreements, or as a web of signicance – demands selection, which in 
itself creates a surplus, of practices, experiences and feelings that people are unable 
to make sense of within the connes of their cultural categories. ese processes 
may be easier to recognize in dictatorially ruled societies, where the dominant ide-
ology, rules and regulations are more explicit and restrictive than in democratic, 
open societies, but the processes at work are more general. Earlier I referred to ex-
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amples taken from our own (western, late capitalist) society, where we make sense 
of female leadership and male vulnerability by creating extra categories in order to 
understand our classicatory surplus. But not all surplus is as easily captured and 
accommodated. In situations where the surplus concerns experiences that might 
have a fundamentally destructive eect on people’s collective self-image, scape-
goating and fantasy are common solutions. ey enable people to close the gaps 
in their symbolic order, in order to uphold the discursive framework of society, by 
ascribing its failures to factors beyond their control.
One reason to explicitly focus on fantasy’s role in people’s everyday lives, is 
because it refers to an internally contradictory, layered phenomenon. While re-
vealing the ideals which people aspire to and cherish, fantasies acquire their pro-
pelling force from covering over the symbolic order’s vulnerable spots. ey thus 
invite historians and social scientists not to take people’s desires at face value, but 
to unravel the tensions on which they thrive. By inviting us to focus both on what 
people express and silence, fantasy’s theoretical value is that it forces us to “con-
sider the expressed words of the actors, without ignoring what they did not want 
to articulate clearly, as well as what they found dicult to articulate at all.”14 It 
forces us to incorporate people’s irrational motives into the stories they tell us.
Although fantasies refer to an absent reality (usually the future), their breeding 
ground and goals are created within the connes of the existing symbolic order. It 
would therefore be wrong to regard fantasies as the opposite of reality. By promis-
ing that reality could actually be perfect, fantasies play a crucial role in sustain-
ing the fundaments of people’s discursive constructions of reality. is is what 
Lacanians refer to when they state that “fantasy supports reality [by] (temporarily) 
closing its gaps and cracks.”15
Hegemony
e strong appeal of western consumer goods in the former socialist bloc is oen 
interpreted as an implicit critique on the socialist states and societies. Katherine 
Verdery, for instance, formulated it quite pointedly: “Acquiring consumption 
goods and objects conferred an identity that set one o from socialism.”16 Although 
I agree with Verdery that East Germans’ desire for western consumer goods was 
a way of criticizing the state, this does not mean that the critique as such set them 
o from socialism. Positing socialist state’s inhabitants in opposition to the states 
in which they lived, unwillingly conrms a bipolarized frame of reference with 
regard to the socialist world as inhabited by clear-cut categories of oppressors and 
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oppressed. is perspective is not only wrong, it also tends to victimize the people 
living under socialist rule, representing them as being passively inscribed by dic-
tatorial rule.17 In this book I have shown that life in the GDR is better understood 
if we focus on the “ambiguities of domination,” and on the ways in which people 
“have internalized their own surveillance,” oen to such an extent, that it is im-
perceptible where compliance ends and coercion begins.18 is insight has proven 
to be relevant in order to understand the dynamics of power and the relationship 
between state and society in the former GDR.
In chapters three and four, I showed that the socialist ideology in de GDR was 
not just implemented from above. Aer 1945, the new powers of state oered the 
East German people an ideology which would transform the life lessons confront-
ing them, into promises worth pursuing: as part of the material improvement, 
unity would be restored and mutual solidarity would reign once more. ese 
promises meant, that, although the painful lessons (1) would be freed of their so-
cially poisonous sting, (2) they still occupied (in disguised form) the central place 
in the public domain which their importance demanded, while (3) the social need 
to silence them was at the same time obeyed.
Within the ideology to which the East German symbolic order owed its unity, 
social dierentiation was said to have been result of capitalist relations of produc-
tion, which, thanks to the development of socialist society and the accompanying 
denazication, were apparently eradicated once and for all. ey had been there, 
but now they were gone – swept away by collective and state-sanctioned eorts. 
In an unthreatening form, the most essential-but-unmentionable was embedded 
in the dominant symbolic order, allowing society to close its ranks. e socially 
destabilizing recognition of society as an internally divided and potentially an-
tagonistic ‘unit’ had gone, or at least seemed to have disappeared. Exploring it was 
strictly forbidden throughout East Germany’s history.
anks to the beautiful sounding socialist promises of mutual solidarity fol-
lowing on from material improvements, with which the new powers responded to 
the prevailing shortages and traumas in 1945, a half-hearted form of identication 
with the state and socialism developed in the GDR. e history described in this 
book well illustrates the functioning of hegemony. Hegemony can only be achieved 
if the ones seeking power succeed in linking their goals and endeavours with those 
of their subordinates. e best way to achieve this is by appealing to more general 
elements that extend over and beyond the explicit ideology. Žižek has worded this 
very clearly: “In every ideological edice, there is a kind of ‘trans-ideological’ ker-
nel, since, if an ideology is to become operative and eectively ‘seize’ individuals, 
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it has to parasitize on and manipulate some kind of ‘trans-ideological’ vision that 
cannot be reduced to a simple instrument of legitimizing pretensions to power.”19
As examples of such trans-ideological components, Žižek mentions “notions 
and sentiments of solidarity, justice, belonging to a community, and so on.”20 
Crucial elements of the socialist ideology, contained in the notion of mutual equal-
ity, ensured that a certain commitment arose between the state and citizens of 
the GDR. at this commitment was not generally recognized or visible to those 
involved, was partly due to the fact that dictatorial power was exercised rather 
subtly in the GDR. ere were hardly any public displays of force. e social-
ist regime was able to convince most people that they were unable to change the 
situation, and most people understood that the best option was to just follow the 
rules. is resulted in a remarkable relationship between rulers and ruled, well 
analysed by historian Corey Ross. He shows that the relationship between the do-
mains we usually designate separately as regime and society, should be regarded 
in East Germany as “areas of overlap, or better still as elds of negotiation,” where 
a “process of interaction and mutual dependence between rulers and ruled” took 
place.21 Employing dierent mechanisms (amongst which the use of the term anti-
fascism as the state’s ocial label and the socialist dogma of equality have probably 
played the most important role) to enmesh East Germans in the state’s rituals of 
legitimation, the dictatorial state seems to have been able to partly coerseduce (a 
contraction of coerce and seduce) its inhabitants to a form of what Cameroonian 
political scientist Achille Mbembe (writing about postcolonial Africa) has called 
the “illicit cohabitation” between dictatorial states and their inhabitants.22 e ma-
jor consequence of conformity’s exonerating function was that “the minority of 
people who chose not to conform…experienced a complete lack of understanding 
from those around them, who felt provoked or even threatened by the civic cour-
age of others.”23
ose who showed the guts not to conform, experienced painful consequences; 
they usually not only had to give up their career and professional prospects, but 
they also encountered repudiation and social marginalization.24 A general climate 
of vigilant alertness was the result. People learned that it was wise not really to 
trust others, outside the close circle of relatives and friends. is coerseduction, 
facilitated by both the omnipresence of the language of power and the fact that 
people learned “[to] internalize their own surveillance,” ensured that in the course 
of time, a form of “conviviality” existed between rulers and ruled, in which mutual 
equality was the principal binding factor.25
is does not mean that East Germans entirely approved of the situation in 
which they found themselves. ere was a great deal of moaning, especially about 
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matters of provision and consumption. e reason these issues were relatively 
openly discussed was that, unlike the corruption of promises on the social eld, 
right from the beginning it was in the interest of both state and citizens to recog-
nize the material problems as the cause and solution for the failure of the symbolic 
order that had manifested itself so awfully in the recent past. Consequently, the 
residents of the GDR were to a certain extent able to discuss freely the material 
shortages. And they certainly did, sometimes cautiously, but oen in public as 
well. Complaints in this sphere subsequently motivated the powers to wheel in 
extra cartloads of oranges at politically sensitive moments in order to placate the 
local population. Because the East German state and its citizens found each other 
in the non-mentionable problems where it concerned society’s social sphere, the 
materialist elements of socialist ideology functioned as lingua franca. e all-en-
compassing consumption-critique functioned like a valve, sanctioned from above: 
complaints about provision expressed sources of dissatisfaction regarding issues 
which remained unspoken.
Although East Germany’s history is primarily a chronicle of domination and 
compulsion, extensive forms of cooperation did exist in the GDR between state 
and citizens, which partly contributed to many people scarcely being aware of 
their own subordination. e sniggering and withdrawing to the Nischen demon-
strated that the subordination and adjustment were not complete, but as I pointed 
out in chapters ve and six, both cultural forms show that the adjustment was also 
more internalised than people themselves were possibly aware.
Although many East Germans aerwards contended that their seeming con-
formity was merely a formal act which should not be taken seriously, this was 
not publicly expressed. As Wedeen points out, power “not only [resides] in or-
chestrated displays of obedience, but also in the silence about domestic politics 
that characterizes daily life.” Participating and acting as if (reality was as beauti-
ful as described on paper), East Germans clearly illustrated that the regime was 
able to “make most people obey most of the time.” Discreetly laughing about the 
outward signs of conformity which they displayed, East Germans reinforced and 
diused the power of the authoritarian socialist regime.26 Silencing the extent to 
which central elements within the East German symbolic order (claims of social 
solidarity and loyalty) were actually corrupted by experiences of mutual alertness 
and lack of trust, East Germans helped to cover up the gap between the ideo-
logical promises on the one hand and everyday reality on the other. And although 
their fantasies about a life amidst western goods were certainly a form of critique 
on the government that failed to deliver what it promised, the critique as such 
remained within the state-sanctioned hegemonic frame. It was, as Niethammer 
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rightly pointed out, an “ocially licensed valve,” through which frustrations and 
discontent were expressed that had to remain unspoken. is is not to say that East 
Germans supported the state. What it does say is that in this way, they tried to close 
the gaps in their leaking symbolic systems, upholding the existing discursive order 
which allowed for mutual recognition. Being the indirect result of the state’s main 
ideological promises, East German fantasies about the west helped to reproduce 
and sustain the state’s utopian ideals – amidst scenes of material wellbeing. West 
German auence was the bright epicentre of the East German “politics of utopia,” 
the main centre of the state’s hegemonic project.27 By cherishing their fantasies as if 
these were dreams about (paraphrasing) “our life in a more prosperous form,” East 
Germans succeeded in collectively upholding a perfected self-representation from 
which all unwanted elements and experiences were eradicated.
Although the realization of this ideal identity occurred in the west, the spe-
cic location of this imaginary space was irrelevant. Rather than being concrete, 
it was a fantasy – a state-legitimized fantasy, supported and enabled by the ex-
plicitly materialist politics of identity the GDR had nourished. Western consumer 
goods were the referential incarnations of an imaginary world, conjuring up not 
just an imaginary geography, but more importantly, an imagined collective iden-
tity, which was perfect in the Lacanian sense of the term; an identity in which all 
experiences, feelings and desires would be reconcilable with the dominant cultural 
categories, ideology and discourse.
Every society has to come to terms with the impossibility of attaining jou-
issance as fullness; it is only the fantasies produced and circulated to mask 
or at least domesticate [the] trauma that can vary, and in fact does vary 
immensely, [for] what we fantasize, is what we are lacking: the part of 
ourselves that is sacriced when we enter the symbolic system of language 
and social relations.28
at is why I stated earlier that “the purpose of fantasy is not to satisfy an (impos-
sible) desire but to constitute it as such.”29
is interpretation links my research to a long tradition of anthropological 
theories on domination and subordination. A long time ago, Godelier highlighted 
that when rulers and ruled share the same ideological space, this does not neces-
sarily mean that they mutually agree on the meaning they bestow on it. In his work 
Weapons of the Weak, James Scott has made it clear that the seeds of critique are 
oen enclosed in the kernel of the hegemony. Because the promises used by rulers 
to sell their claims, have to match with trans-ideological elements, their promises 
subsequently form the root of future criticism:
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e crucial point is rather that the very process of attempting to legitimate 
a social order by idealizing it always provides its subjects with the means, 
the symbolic tools, and the very ideas for a critique that operates entirely 
within the hegemony. For most purposes, then, it is not at all necessary 
for subordinate classes to set foot outside the connes of the ruling ide-
als in order to formulate a critique of power. e most common form 
of…struggle arises from the failure of a dominant ideology to live up to 
the implicit promises it necessarily makes. e dominant ideology can be 
turned against its privileged beneciaries not only because subordinate 
groups develop their own interpretations, understandings, and readings 
of its ambiguous terms, but also because of the promises that the domi-
nant classes must make to propagate it in the rst place.30
e history of the GDR is a good illustration of Scott’s suggestion that future criti-
cism is almost implicit in the ideological promises with which a dictatorship at-
tempts to legitimise its power. Because East German socialists took up with the 
needs and desires which prevailed among East Germans aer the Second World 
War in order to bring their central ideological messages across, they formulated 
certain (ideologically informed) promises. As they failed to live up to them, 
whereas they kept proclaiming them up till the end of the GDR, they were respon-
sible for the critique when their materialist message of salvation was not delivered. 
It is pertinent that Scott suggested that also in European socialist countries the 
root of criticism would be contained in the promises that functioned so promi-
nently in “real existing socialism.”
[T]he ideology formulated by the ruling class to justify its own rule pro-
vided much of the symbolic raw material from which the most damning 
critique could be derived and sustained…[I]t is clear that a radical cri-
tique of existing arrangements may arise in virtually any subordinate class 
that takes the dominant ideology at heart and, at the same time, penetrates 
in daily life the realities that betray or ignore the implicit promises of that 
ideology.31
Since an ideology never serves everyone’s material best interests, it can only catch 
on and bind people if it succeeds in appealing to (unspoken) social-psychological 
desires and interests (mostly with regard to unity, harmony, reconcilement), or 
a people’s alleged superiority. When ideological representations then manage to 
dominate the public sphere, they help to suggest social unity and mutual connec-
tion. But this suggestion is always at odds with the antagonisms that cut across 
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society. And when, as is the case in dictatorships, naming and exploring these 
are strictly forbidden, the unrealized extra-ideological appeal oers the breeding 
ground and ingredients for fantasies which provide a binding force where the ide-
ology has failed.
Fantasies are in fact the implicit by-product of ideologies. East Germany’s past 
is a clear example of the thesis that ideology and fantasy can be seen as commu-
nication vessels. ey assume, feed and constitute each other by denying the most 
essential but unmentionable antagonisms in the social fabric of society. e one 
delivers the message which helps to disguise them, whereas the other seems to of-
fer the implicit solution if the unifying message threatens to lose its binding force.
Fetishism, Commodities, and the Senses
e strict East German design ideologists warned their compatriots above all not 
to yield to the improper temptation of (western) kitsch. According to them, doing 
so was a form of escapism – an escape route which they called fetishist. As I am 
discussing the same phenomenon, and also interpret East Germans’ strong desires 
for the material world of the west as an escape, albeit of a dierent kind, the ques-
tion arises why I call it a fantasy. What is the added value of that term, as compared 
to fetishism?
Within Marxist theorizing, the term fetishism expresses a form of illusion 
which occurs when (under a capitalist mode of production) workers are estranged 
both from themselves and the surrounding (material) world. Deprived from the 
control of their own labour and productive power, they are no longer able to 
recognise their own or other people’s labour in the products surrounding them. 
Considering that these products do have a value (for they do have a price), that 
value seems to originate from the products themselves. is is what Marx calls the 
“mystical character of commodities.”32 Valuable in and of themselves, they entice 
people to purchase them, suggesting that their value can improve the purchaser’s 
existence. According to Marxian thinking, this pattern can be broken and the es-
tranged person can be freed of his alienation, by a revolutionary metamorphosis 
of society’s socio-economic structure.
Where the term fetishism within Marxist theories applies to a pointless at-
tempt, through the magical characteristics of commodities, to escape repressive 
and estranging socio-economic circumstances, I previously remarked that in my 
opinion, the escape is of a dierent kind. East Germans attributed healing and 
harmonious powers to the western world of consumption in order to turn a blind 
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eye to the gaps (consisting of crab antics and the so called warmth sold as mu-
tual equality, exacted under penalty of social exclusion) in their own society and 
symbolic order. is is denitely not a (class-related) escape from socio-economic 
conditions, but rather a case of avoiding the potential recognition that “[o]ur soci-
eties are never harmonious ensembles. is is only the fantasy, through which they 
attempt to constitute and reconstitute themselves.”33
In my view, East Germans not so much tried to escape circumstances that 
could in principle have been arranged dierently, thereby putting a stop to their 
estrangement. ey tried to evade conditions that are part of existence, albeit re-
inforced in the East German context because the dictatorial state did not allow for 
an open exploration of prevailing antagonisms and (social) tensions.
e fetishism of commodities, which Marx and his followers claimed could be 
solved by changing the social-economic circumstances, is in my opinion unsolv-
able. As Stavrakakis points out: “[I]f consumerism [castigated as a substitute for 
autonomy [or]…an inadequate compensation for the denial of a more meaningful 
life] is so inadequate, how does it manage to resist the unmasking operations of its 
critics, how does it retain its hegemonic grip?”34
e term fetishism, generally used for the description of materialist fantasies, 
aims to bring across “the compulsive power,” which especially material objects 
can have.35 It is a valuable term, that reminds us of the irrationality at the heart 
of what is usually presented as a well-considered and rational choice: determin-
ing the value of goods. Commodity fetishism is a fantasy, and as such, part of 
existence – both in its capitalist as well as in its socialist form. It is interesting 
to note, however, that fantasies are so oen materialistic: at the individual level 
(think of shopaholics), but primarily also at the collective level. e world-wide 
spread of consumer capitalism is probably the most striking example of material-
ist fantasies, but older examples are known. Long before the American model of 
consumption began its world-wide victory march, numerous materialist fantasies 
were described and analysed in the anthropological literature under the headings 
of cargo cults and fetishism.
ere are a number of specic historical reasons, discussed in this book, why 
East Germans’ collective fantasies of the prosperous west were so explicitly mate-
rialist. Apart from these, however, I think that there is another, more general rea-
son why the East German cargo fantasies were locked into and fed by imagining 
a materially better life. I believe, in other words, that it is not a coincidence that 
fantasies are oen of a materialist nature. In the last part of this conclusion I will 
focus on what I deem the underlying reasons.
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In many East Germans’ perception, the material world of the west represented 
their ideal society, unhindered by the social shortcomings and tensions which un-
dercut their everyday existence. Notwithstanding the romanticized character of 
their representations, their assessment of the western dream world was not just 
imaginary. It was regularly fed through real contacts. When that happened, it was 
remarkable that people primarily revered the delightful sensory impressions these 
meetings aroused: they were physically touched by the western world’s scent, its 
colours, gloss and tactile features, and of course by the taste of western products, 
which presumably diered strongly from East German wares.
East Germans’ stories about this topic highlight a feature of the relationship be-
tween people and material culture that up till recently has scarcely been dealt with 
in social science theories: the sensory way people got acquainted with objects. In 
my introduction, I already pointed out that anthropological theories on material 
culture traditionally start out from what objects represent on the one hand, and 
their (deceiving) irresistibility on the other. e fact that people’s recognition of 
the material world is primarily sensory has been almost ignored by social scien-
tists up until recently.36
Only in the past een years have anthropologists become aware that the sen-
sory characteristics of social life are worth being investigated. is has led to a 
large amount of studies focussing on the senses, but it is remarkable that up till 
now the sensory turn has not featured in (social science) theories on the relation-
ship between people and their material surroundings.37
In my introduction I paid particular attention to the works of Campbell and 
Miller. Both authors were instrumental in providing new impulses for social sci-
entic thinking on mass consumption and the relationship between man and 
material culture. Campbell showed that objects serve as solid attributes to satisfy 
desires which, according to him, cannot ever be satised, because they are related 
to the unbridgeable gap between imagination and reality. e question I raised 
earlier was whether it was really a coincidence that these desires are attached to 
material things. e importance of Miller’s work is due to the fact that he took 
seriously the empirical observation on the intricate relation between people’s sup-
posed identity and material goods – a relation he furthermore conceptualized as 
interactive and dynamic. My main objection to his work is that, by emphasizing 
the constitutive potential of consumption in the development of identity, Miller 
does not suciently take into account the problematic nature of the term identity 
and the existential weight of the term alienation.
e aspects of East Germany’s history which I have analysed so far, clearly illus-
trate that East Germans’ desires for West German consumer goods were prompted 
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by a fantasy that these goods would help them to achieve a harmonious society 
and at last become (I paraphrase) “who they had always wanted to be.”38 According 
to me, East German history demonstrates that the desire for improving reality is 
not so diuse and undened as Campbell’s premise. In the GDR, it was prompted 
by the (ideologically supported) fantasy, that a better material environment would 
close the gaps in the symbolic order. Although this fantasy can only be understood 
in relation to the GDR’s history (in which material goods played a major role, both 
in manifesting the void, and in the subsequent formation of the ideological pact 
meant to cover it), this was not the only reason for its materialist character. is 
also had to do with the sensory way East Germans became aware of the abundant 
material and consumer world in the west.
East Germans’ descriptions of the west were full of examples referring to the 
gloss, the colours, the lovely feel, the taste and smells in that world; all stimulating 
the senses and therefore transferring information in a very direct (physical) way, 
about the world from which they originate. Since Proust began his magnum opus, 
à la recherche du temps perdu, with a sketch of how taste sensations may evoke 
memories,39 it is common knowledge that the senses are capable of transferring 
certain types of “knowledge” (in this case about the past), in a physical manner.40 It 
is, however, no coincidence that in the previous sentence I have chosen to print the 
word knowledge between quotation marks: I want to emphasize that transferring 
information through the senses is by denition an utterly subjective and irrational 
process, resulting in utterly subjective, non-rational knowledge. Because mate-
rial objects reach us through our senses, they penetrate, as French anthropologist 
Jean-Pierre Warnier has observed, “deep into the psyche of the subject because 
[they reach] it not through abstract knowledge, but through sensori-motor experi-
ence.”41
Knowledge derived through the senses is the kind of knowledge that is embed-
ded in impressions, memories, associations, images and emotions. It is therefore 
only partly and at a later stage receptive for rational and critical examination and 
scrutiny. Exactly because material objects present themselves to us in a sensorial, 
irrational manner, they are the ideal vehicle for cognitive processes which are 
rather hindered than helped by the intellect. I am alluding to processes of desire, 
identity formation, memory, and, above all, fantasy.42
As explained above, fantasies help to cover the impossibility and unattainabil-
ity of a solid, well-bound identity or truly harmonious society. e reason why 
material culture is such a useful fantasy-prop, is that the search for (individual 
or social) fullment generates, as argued by Dutch anthropologist Gosewijn van 
Beek “a strong incentive to actually capture part of this world as inalienable pos-
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session in an eort to control precisely what is uncontrollable: one’s identity in 
relation to the world.”43
By looking at an object which appeals to them, people recognise some aspect of 
themselves in it. e thing might represent a typical feature of their life-style, char-
acter or self-image – as highlighted in Mary Douglas and Marshal Sahlin’s (neo-)
structuralist approach. Perhaps the observer recognizes something in the object 
that he himself would like to be, incorporate, resemble, or look like. No matter 
how: the object represents something which applies to the observer. “[T]he self 
is mirrored in the potential object of acquisition with questions which are rarely 
formulated and hardly ever articulated: ‘is that for me?’; ‘Am I like that?’; ‘Could 
that be (part of) me?’; ‘Could I be like that’; ‘Would I like to be like that?’ and so 
on; an endless series of questions which are acts of self-formation in themselves.”44
While gazing at an object and (implicitly) asking oneself such questions, some-
thing happens to the observer. He does not just see the object, but while looking at 
it (perhaps also touching it briey, or possibly smelling it), an image is evoked of 
how it will be, how it will feel (how the potential purchaser will be as future pos-
sessor, how he will feel, how life will be and feel) when he puts on the object, sits 
on it, reads it or cooks with it, when it is in his living room or garage. e senses, 
stimulated by the object (via the eyes but possibly also through the ngers, nose 
and tongue) provoke a series of associations and images whereby he (his body, 
his being) is briey full of what he sees – fullled by the associations and images 
which the object has aroused through his senses.
More than a decade ago, the Finnish sociologist Pasi Falk (also inspired by 
Lacanian theories) remarked that “[t]he pursuit of completion is the core around 
which the whole system [of consumption, mv] revolves.”45 I agree with Falk that 
the insatiable desire that objects may arouse, is related to a desire for complete-
ness, fullment, unity, indivisibility. It is a desire that appears to be quenched by 
purchasing, by consuming. One of the reasons why I think that consumer desires 
can be so irresistible, is that in our contact with objects a sensory process is set in 
motion that is hardly accessible for rational consideration. is associative process 
suggests, in a physical way, that identity fulllment, symbolic closure is possible: 
if I have that, I am like that. Conveyed in a non-rational, sensorial way, material 
objects promise to bring what they look like; solid, inalienable and whole in rela-
tion to the world. is promise is irresistible, and the desires that things raise are 
linked to what we could call the intrinsic impossibility to realise a rm identity.
As stated earlier, Miller’s theory evolves round the relationship between con-
sumption and identity. He attempted to break with the Marxist inspired theories 
of consumption that so long dominated social science debates, and in which con-
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sumers were portrayed as the unwilling victims of capitalist structures – estranged 
from the only source of true self-fullment, they wrongly recognise commodities 
as value-adding elements or keystones of their identity.46 is perspective of con-
sumption is to a great extent based on the premise that productive labour is the 
most decisive factor in the way people manifest themselves in the world. According 
to Miller, this assumption has become outdated in today’s consumer society, for 
people no longer manifest themselves and their identity through work, they use 
consumption to shape their lives. In one of his monographies about Trinidad, ana-
lyzing Christmas as cultural feast, Miller states, with an ironic nod to the central 
place of work and production in Marxist theories: “It is the consumption of apples 
and grapes, not their production, nor their origins, which denes what [the inhab-
itants of Trinidad] are.”47
I agree with Miller that consumption plays a central role in current processes 
of cultural and individual self-development. It is, however, remarkable that Miller 
fully disregards the problematic character of terms like identity, self-construction, 
culture and authenticity. He seems to consider “self creation” as an unproblematic 
given. And estrangement is for him merely a temporary phase, which can success-
fully be terminated by consumption as appropriation.
Whereas Miller seems to have a rather optimistic view on the development of 
identity, kept in motion through a dialectics between people and objects, I tend to 
think of this process as a continuously doomed to fail attempt to construct a true 
and solid identity. e dialectic between identity and consumption is in my opin-
ion propelled by estrangement – not as a temporary phase in a continual process of 
further self-development, but as an existential condition that drives our consump-
tion behaviour, ensuring that as soon as consumer desires for material possessions 
(as the requisite props for a bound and solid identity) are satised, this brings 
about disillusionment – as Campbell rightly emphasized and expounded theoreti-
cally. e history of East Germany, with its succession of ever new endeavours to 
create a frictionless symbolic order, shows that there is good reason to incorporate 
Stavrakakis en Žižek’s work in our thinking on (collective) identity; recognizing 
it as an intrinsic impossibility, and thus as a necessarily traumatic attempt. If we 
want to understand the consumption–identity–culture nexus, we ought to rethink 
their mutual relation: in as far as people use consumer goods, or refer to consump-
tion as an expression of their collective or individual identity, they refer to a wish, 
a desire, to create and constitute what is eeting, inpermanent, and shot through 
with contradictions and antagonisms. 
On the basis of the East German case, I suggested that in the outward appear-
ance of material objects, people think they recognize (an aspect of) their so highly 
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desired “own identity,” or, at the collective level, “authentic culture” – no longer as 
a desire or fantasy, but as an achievable reality. Because objects present themselves 
to people in a variety of sensorial ways, they are such suitable vehicles to substanti-
ate desires and dreams, ideologies and fantasies. e power of things is largely de-
termined by the fact that, contrary to subjects, they are complete and unnegotiably 
real. As Van Beek pointed out, it is precisely “the ‘incompletion’ of the subject in 
relation to the world” that plays an important role in the relationship between 
people and material objects.48
Exactly because the intrinsic incompleteness of our identity leads to an “in-
centive to actually capture part of this world as inalienable possession in an ef-
fort to control precisely what is uncontrollable: one’s identity in relation to the 
world,” the possession of an object always leads to the emergence of new desires, as 
Campbell explained so well. We simply cannot create our (collective) self, not even 
through purchases. And although acquiring objects can perhaps in theory provide 
the ingredients for further self-development, it is invariably the inconsistency, the 
elusiveness and intrinsic unfullment of the subject and his identity which cause 
detachment, disappointment, confusion, desires and fantasy. Buying things is an 
attempt to avoid such feelings. People buy things which on the outside possess a 
characteristic of their make-believe true self, in material and concrete form, in the 
vague suspension of disbelief that they themselves will become just as solid and 
real, as complete and indivisible as the thing they have purchased.49
is interpretation owes much to Van Beek’s analysis and to the perspective de-
veloped by Campbell, with its focus on things as the concretization of a widerang-
ing, non-materialist desire for perfection. I fully agree with Campbell that the de-
sire for a perfectioning of reality is the nexus around which consumption revolves. 
But I disagree with him on the role of the materiality of objects in arousing that 
desire. According to me, it is to a large extent due to that very materiality and the 
accompanying sensory characteristics of things, that they become irresistible in 
the ways mentioned above.
I see, smell, touch and taste something that looks as I (want to be)
And if I buy it, I am (albeit eetingly).
is is fetishism, and as such, a fantasy, about “fullment and ultimate arrival.”50 
Although it is easier to think of fantasy as an individual phenomenon, the history 
of East German and West German consumer goods demonstrates that fantasies 
can also be a collective phenomenon, aiming at perfectioning and harmonizing 
the social domain.
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e fantasy in the former GDR was beautiful, and it did function as a bond, 
uniting people in what seemed merely to be a shared desire. Immens was the eu-
phoria in 1989 when the Wall came down. Stavrakakis’s work explains the pain 
that followed so soon: “e more beatic and harmonious…a social fantasy, the 
more the repressed, destabilising element will be excluded from its symbolization 
– without, however, ever disappearing.”51
e destabilising element had indeed not disappeared, and the Wende was 
traumatic. e crab antics, eradicated from the ocial ideology and symbolic or-
der of the GDR, appeared in the open when the fantasy was unmasked. Since 
then, the residents of the GDR are confronted with forms of mutual contact and 
experiences which had been written o in the GDR under a passionately preached 
form of mutual involvement and solidarity. And although East Germans desper-
ately desire their social world to change, longing for other forms of contact and 
social interaction, this desire is not going to be fullled. In daily live it appears to 
be more dicult than one wishes, to have a beer with a loser if you yourself are a 
winner – or vice versa. Apparently, common desires only function as bond if sup-
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